Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Precautionary Principle Meets the Hill Criteria of Causation.Daniel Steel & Jessica Yu - 2019 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 22 (1):72-89.
    ABSTRACTThis article examines the relationship between the precautionary principle and the well-known Hill criteria of causation. Some have charged that the Hill criteria are anti-precautionary because they are strongly inclined towards false negatives in multi-causal contexts typical of environmental and public health issues. However, we argue that without guidance on how to interpret and weight the criteria, no such claims can be supported. Using a case study of tuberculosis among South African goldmine workers, we consider the implications of different weightings (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Resisted Rise of Randomisation in Experimental Design: British Agricultural Science, C.1910–1930.D. J. Berry - 2015 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 37 (3):242-260.
    The most conspicuous form of agricultural experiment is the field trial, and within the history of such trials, the arrival of the randomised control trial is considered revolutionary. Originating with R.A. Fisher within British agricultural science in the 1920s and 30s, the RCT has since become one of the most prodigiously used experimental techniques throughout the natural and social sciences. Philosophers of science have already scrutinised the epistemological uniqueness of RCTs, undermining their status as the ‘gold standard’ in experimental design. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Psa 2012.-Preprint Volume- - unknown
    These preprints were automatically compiled into a PDF from the collection of papers deposited in PhilSci-Archive in conjunction with the PSA 2012.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A New Direction for Science and Values.Daniel Hicks - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3271-95.
    The controversy over the old ideal of “value-free science” has cooled significantly over the past decade. Many philosophers of science now agree that even ethical and political values may play a substantial role in all aspects of scientific inquiry. Consequently, in the last few years, work in science and values has become more specific: Which values may influence science, and in which ways? Or, how do we distinguish illegitimate from illegitimate kinds of influence? In this paper, I argue that this (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Social Values Influence the Adequacy Conditions of Scientific Theories: Beyond Inductive Risk.Ingo Brigandt - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):326-356.
    The ‘death of evidence’ issue in Canada raises the spectre of politicized science, and thus the question of what role social values may have in science and how this meshes with objectivity and evidence. I first criticize philosophical accounts that have to separate different steps of research to restrict the influence of social and other non-epistemic values. A prominent account that social values may play a role even in the context of theory acceptance is the argument from inductive risk. It (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Taxonomy and conservation science: interdependent and value-laden.Stijn Conix - 2019 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 41 (2):15.
    The relation between conservation science and taxonomy is typically seen as a simple dependency of the former on the latter. This dependency is assumed to be strictly one-way to avoid normative concerns from conservation science inappropriately affecting the descriptive discipline of taxonomy. In this paper, I argue against this widely assumed standard view on the relation between these two disciplines by highlighting two important roles for conservation scientists in scientific decisions that are part of the internal stages of taxonomy. I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Scientists’ Attitudes on Science and Values: Case Studies and Survey Methods in Philosophy of Science.Daniel Steel, Chad Gonnerman & Michael O'Rourke - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 63:22-30.
    This article examines the relevance of survey data of scientists’ attitudes about science and values to case studies in philosophy of science. We describe two methodological challenges confronting such case studies: 1) small samples, and 2) potential for bias in selection, emphasis, and interpretation. Examples are given to illustrate that these challenges can arise for case studies in the science and values literature. We propose that these challenges can be mitigated through an approach in which case studies and survey methods (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Modeling for Fairness: A Rawlsian Approach.Sven Diekmann & Sjoerd D. Zwart - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46:46-53.
    In this paper we introduce the overlapping design consensus for the construction of models in design and the related value judgments. The overlapping design consensus is inspired by Rawls’ overlapping consensus. The overlapping design consensus is a well-informed, mutual agreement among all stakeholders based on fairness. Fairness is respected if all stakeholders’ interests are given due and equal attention. For reaching such fair agreement, we apply Rawls’ original position and reflective equilibrium to modeling. We argue that by striving for the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Simplicity, one-shot hypotheses and paleobiological explanation.Adrian Currie - 2019 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 41 (1):10.
    Paleobiologists often provide simple narratives to explain complex, contingent episodes. These narratives are sometimes ‘one-shot hypotheses’ which are treated as being mutually exclusive with other possible explanations of the target episode, and are thus extended to accommodate as much about the episode as possible. I argue that a provisional preference for such hypotheses provides two kinds of productive scaffolding. First, they generate ‘hypothetical difference-makers’: one-shot hypotheses highlight and isolate empirically tractable dependencies between variables. Second, investigations of hypothetical difference-makers provision explanatory (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Developing a Scientific Virtue-Based Approach to Science Ethics Training.Robert T. Pennock & Michael O’Rourke - 2017 - Science and Engineering Ethics 23 (1):243-262.
    Responsible conduct of research training typically includes only a subset of the issues that ought to be included in science ethics and sometimes makes ethics appear to be a set of externally imposed rules rather than something intrinsic to scientific practice. A new approach to science ethics training based upon Pennock’s notion of the scientific virtues may help avoid such problems. This paper motivates and describes three implementations—theory-centered, exemplar-centered, and concept-centered—that we have developed in courses and workshops to introduce students (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Distinguishing Between Legitimate and Illegitimate Values in Climate Modeling.Kristen Intemann - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):217-232.
    While it is widely acknowledged that science is not “free” of non-epistemic values, there is disagreement about the roles that values can appropriately play. Several have argued that non-epistemic values can play important roles in modeling decisions, particularly in addressing uncertainties ; Risbey 2007; Biddle and Winsberg 2010; Winsberg : 111-137, 2012); van der Sluijs 359-389, 2012). On the other hand, such values can lead to bias ; Bray ; Oreskes and Conway 2010). Thus, it is important to identify when (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • The Value of Cognitive Values.Heather Douglas - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):796-806.
    Traditionally, cognitive values have been thought of as a collective pool of considerations in science that frequently trade against each other. I argue here that a finer-grained account of the value of cognitive values can help reduce such tensions. I separate the values into groups, minimal epistemic criteria, pragmatic considerations, and genuine epistemic assurance, based in part on the distinction between values that describe theories per se and values that describe theory-evidence relationships. This allows us to clarify why these values (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Inductive Risk and the Contexts of Communication.Stephen John - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):79-96.
    In recent years, the argument from inductive risk against value free science has enjoyed a revival. This paper investigates and clarifies this argument through means of a case-study: neonicitinoid research. Sect. 1 argues that the argument from inductive risk is best conceptualised as a claim about scientists’ communicative obligations. Sect. 2 then shows why this argument is inapplicable to “public communication”. Sect. 3 outlines non-epistemic reasons why non-epistemic values should not play a role in public communicative contexts. Sect. 4 analyses (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Douglas on Values: From Indirect Roles to Multiple Goals.Kevin C. Elliott - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):375-383.
    In recent papers and a book, Heather Douglas has expanded on the well-known argument from inductive risk, thereby launching an influential contemporary critique of the value-free ideal for science. This paper distills Douglas’s critique into four major claims. The first three claims provide a significant challenge to the value-free ideal for science. However, the fourth claim, which delineates her positive proposal to regulate values in science by distinguishing direct and indirect roles for values, is ambiguous between two interpretations, and both (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Acceptance, Values, and Inductive Risk.Daniel Steel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):818-828.
    The argument from inductive risk attempts to show that practical and ethical costs of errors should influence standards of evidence for accepting scientific claims. A common objection charges that this argument presupposes a behavioral theory of acceptance that is inappropriate for science. I respond by showing that the argument from inductive risk is supported by a nonbehavioral theory of acceptance developed by Cohen, which defines acceptance in terms of premising. Moreover, I argue that theories designed to explain how acceptance can (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Non-Cognitive Values and Methodological Learning in the Decision-Oriented Sciences.Oliver Todt & José Luis Luján - 2017 - Foundations of Science 22 (1):215-234.
    The function and legitimacy of values in decision making is a critically important issue in the contemporary analysis of science. It is particularly relevant for some of the more application-oriented areas of science, specifically decision-oriented science in the field of regulation of technological risks. Our main objective in this paper is to assess the diversity of roles that non-cognitive values related to decision making can adopt in the kinds of scientific activity that underlie risk regulation. We start out, first, by (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Cognitive Attitudes and Values in Science.Kevin Elliott & David Willmes - unknown
    We argue that the analysis of cognitive attitudes should play a central role in developing more sophisticated accounts of the proper roles for values in science. First, we show that the major recent efforts to delineate appropriate roles for values in science would be strengthened by making clearer distinctions among cognitive attitudes. Next, we turn to a specific example and argue that a more careful account of the distinction between the attitudes of belief and acceptance can contribute to a better (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Values, Standpoints, and Scientific/Intellectual Movements.Kristina Rolin - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56:11-19.
  • Scientific Innovation as Eco-Epistemic Warfare: The Creative Role of on-Line Manipulative Abduction.Lorenzo Magnani - 2013 - Mind and Society 12 (1):49-59.
    Humans continuously delegate and distribute cognitive functions to the environment to lessen their limits. They build models, representations, and other various mediating structures, that are thought to be good to think. The case of scientific innovation is particularly important: the main aim of this paper is to revise and criticize the concept of scientific innovation, reframing it in what I will call an eco-epistemic perspective, taking advantage of recent results coming from the area of distributed cognition and abductive cognition . (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What We Talk About When We Talk About Fruitfulness.Silvia Ivani - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):4.
    What are the relevant values to the appraisal of research programs? This question remains hotly debated, as philosophers have recently proposed many lists of values potentially relevant to scientific appraisal. Surprisingly, despite being mentioned in many lists, little attention has been paid to fruitfulness. It is unclear how fruitfulness should be explicated, and whether it has any substantial role in scientific appraisal. In this paper, I argue we should explicate fruitfulness as the capacity to develop of research programs. Moreover, I (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Rational Endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.
    It is valuable for inquiry to have researchers who are committed advocates of their own theories. However, in light of pervasive disagreement, such a commitment is not well explained by the idea that researchers believe their theories. Instead, this commitment, the rational attitude to take toward one’s favored theory during the course of inquiry, is what I call endorsement. Endorsement is a doxastic attitude, but one which is governed by a different type of epistemic rationality. This inclusive epistemic rationality is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • On Rationales for Cognitive Values in the Assessment of Scientific Representations.Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (3):319-331.
    Cognitive values like simplicity, broad scope, and easy handling are properties of a scientific representation that result from the idealization which is involved in the construction of a representation. These properties may facilitate the application of epistemic values to credibility assessments, which provides a rationale for assigning an auxiliary function to cognitive values. In this paper, I defend a further rationale for cognitive values which consists in the assessment of the usefulness of a representation. Usefulness includes the relevance of a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Gender and Scientists’ Views About the Value-Free Ideal.Daniel Steel, Chad Gonnerman, Aaron M. McCright & Itai Bavli - 2018 - Perspectives on Science 26 (6):619-657.
    A small but growing body of philosophically informed survey work calls into question whether the value-free ideal is a dominant viewpoint among scientists. However, the survey instruments in used in these studies have important limitations. Previous work has also made little headway in developing hypotheses that might predict or explain differing views about the value-free ideal among scientists. In this article, we review previous survey work on this topic, describe an improved survey instrument, report results from an initial administration of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Extrapolation, Uncertainty Factors, and the Precautionary Principle.Daniel Steel - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42 (3):356-364.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Extrapolation, Uncertainty Factors, and the Precautionary Principle.Daniel Steel - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 42 (3):356-364.
    This essay examines the relationship between the precautionary principle and uncertainty factors used by toxicologists to estimate acceptable exposure levels for toxic chemicals from animal experiments. It shows that the adoption of uncertainty factors in the United States in the 1950s can be understood by reference to the precautionary principle, but not by cost-benefit analysis because of a lack of relevant quantitative data at that time. In addition, it argues that uncertainty factors continue to be relevant to efforts to implement (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Ontological Choices and the Value-Free Ideal.David Ludwig - 2015 - Erkenntnis (6):1-20.
    The aim of this article is to argue that ontological choices in scientific practice undermine common formulations of the value-free ideal in science. First, I argue that the truth values of scientific statements depend on ontological choices. For example, statements about entities such as species, race, memory, intelligence, depression, or obesity are true or false relative to the choice of a biological, psychological, or medical ontology. Second, I show that ontological choices often depend on non-epistemic values. On the basis of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Values in Science: The Case of Scientific Collaboration.Kristina Rolin - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (2):157-177.
    Much of the literature on values in science is limited in its perspective because it focuses on the role of values in individual scientists’ decision making, thereby ignoring the context of scientific collaboration. I examine the epistemic structure of scientific collaboration and argue that it gives rise to two arguments showing that moral and social values can legitimately play a role in scientists’ decision to accept something as scientific knowledge. In the case of scientific collaboration some moral and social values (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Acceptance, Values, and Probability.Daniel Steel - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:81-88.
  • Disciplinary Capture and Epistemological Obstacles to Interdisciplinary Research: Lessons From Central African Conservation Disputes.Evelyn Brister - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 56:82-91.
    Complex environmental problems require well-researched policies that integrate knowledge from both the natural and social sciences. Epistemic differences can impede interdisciplinary collaboration, as shown by debates between conservation biologists and anthropologists who are working to preserve biological diversity and support economic development in central Africa. Disciplinary differences with regard to 1) facts, 2) rigor, 3) causal explanation, and 4) research goals reinforce each other, such that early decisions about how to define concepts or which methods to adopt may tilt research (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Nonepistemic Values and the Multiple Goals of Science.Kevin Elliott & Daniel McKaughan - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):1-21.
    Recent efforts to argue that nonepistemic values have a legitimate role to play in assessing scientific models, theories, and hypotheses typically either reject the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values or incorporate nonepistemic values only as a secondary consideration for resolving epistemic uncertainty. Given that scientific representations can legitimately be evaluated not only based on their fit with the world but also with respect to their fit with the needs of their users, we show in two case studies that nonepistemic (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • The Role of Non-Epistemic Values in Engineering Models.Sven Diekmann & Martin Peterson - 2013 - Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (1):207-218.
    We argue that non-epistemic values, including moral ones, play an important role in the construction and choice of models in science and engineering. Our main claim is that non-epistemic values are not only “secondary values” that become important just in case epistemic values leave some issues open. Our point is, on the contrary, that non-epistemic values are as important as epistemic ones when engineers seek to develop the best model of a process or problem. The upshot is that models are (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations