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  1. Inductive Logic as Explication: The Evolution of Carnap’s Notion of Logical Probability.Marta Sznajder - 2018 - The Monist 101 (4):417-440.
    According to a popular interpretation, Carnap’s interpretation of probability had evolved from a logical towards a subjective conception. However Carnap himself insisted that his basic philosophical view of probability was always the same. I address this apparent clash between Carnap's self-identification and the subsequent interpretations of his work. Following its original intentions, I reconstruct inductive logic as an explication. The emerging picture is of a versatile linguistic framework, whose main function is not the discovery of objective logical relations in the (...)
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  • The Normativity of Kant's Logical Laws.Jessica Leech - 2017 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 34 (4).
    According to received wisdom, Kant takes the laws of logic to be normative laws of thought. This has been challenged by Tolley (2006). In this paper, I defend the received wisdom, but with an important modification: Kant's logical laws are constitutive norms for thought. The laws of logic do tell us what thinking is, not because all thoughts are in conformity with logical laws, but because all thoughts are, by nature, subject to the standard of logic.
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  • Logic Isn’T Normative.Gillian Russell - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    Some writers object to logical pluralism on the grounds that logic is normative. The rough idea is that the relation of logical consequence has consequences for what we ought to think and how we ought to reason, so that pluralism about the consequence relation would result in an incoherent or unattractive pluralism about those things. In this paper I argue that logic isn’t normative. I distinguish three different ways in which a theory – such as a logical theory – can (...)
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  • Logical Pluralism and Normativity.Teresa Kouri Kissel & Stewart Shapiro - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
    We are logical pluralists who hold that the right logic is dependent on the domain of investigation; different logics for different mathematical theories. The purpose of this article is to explore the ramifications for our pluralism concerning normativity. Is there any normative role for logic, once we give up its universality? We discuss Florian Steingerger’s “Frege and Carnap on the Normativity of Logic” as a source for possible types of normativity, and then turn to our own proposal, which postulates that (...)
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