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  1. Anchoring in Deliberations.Stephan Hartmann & Soroush Rafiee Rad - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-29.
    Deliberation is a standard procedure for making decisions in not too large groups. It has the advantage that group members can learn from each other and that, at the end, often a consensus emerges that everybody endorses. Unfortunately, however, implementing a deliberation procedure also has a number of disadvantages due to the cognitive limitations of the individual group members. What is more, the very process of deliberation introduces an additional bias, which we investigate in this article. We demonstrate that even (...)
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  • Disagreement Behind the Veil of Ignorance.Ryan Muldoon, Chiara Lisciandra, Mark Colyvan, Carlo Martini, Giacomo Sillari & Jan Sprenger - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):377-394.
    In this paper we argue that there is a kind of moral disagreement that survives the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. While a veil of ignorance eliminates sources of disagreement stemming from self-interest, it does not do anything to eliminate deeper sources of disagreement. These disagreements not only persist, but transform their structure once behind the veil of ignorance. We consider formal frameworks for exploring these differences in structure between interested and disinterested disagreement, and argue that consensus models offer us a (...)
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  • Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality.Brian Hedden - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • Consensual Decision-Making Among Epistemic Peers.Stephan Hartmann, Carlo Martini & Jan Sprenger - 2009 - Episteme 6 (2):110-129.
    This paper focuses on the question of how to resolve disagreement and uses the Lehrer-Wagner model as a formal tool for investigating consensual decision-making. The main result consists in a general definition of when agents treat each other as epistemic peers (Kelly 2005; Elga 2007), and a theorem vindicating the “equal weight view” to resolve disagreement among epistemic peers. We apply our findings to an analysis of the impact of social network structures on group deliberation processes, and we demonstrate their (...)
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  • Ambiguous Weighting and Nonsensical Sense: The Problems of “Balance” and “Common Sense” as Commonplace Concepts and Decision-Making Heuristics in Environmental Rhetoric.Derek G. Ross - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (1):115-144.
    Balance and common sense are commonplace concepts used to bring an audience to a place of shared understanding. These commonplaces also function as decision-making heuristics. I argue in this paper that the commonplaces ?balance? and ?common sense? are problematic because they suggest decision-making strategies that strip associated information of complexity and value. Through an examination of theory and responses to interviews conducted in relation to an ongoing project on environmental rhetoric, I problematize these concepts and consider how awareness of the (...)
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  • Resolving Disagreement Through Mutual Respect.Carlo Martini, Jan Sprenger & Mark Colyvan - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):881-898.
    This paper explores the scope and limits of rational consensus through mutual respect, with the primary focus on the best known formal model of consensus: the Lehrer–Wagner model. We consider various arguments against the rationality of the Lehrer–Wagner model as a model of consensus about factual matters. We conclude that models such as this face problems in achieving rational consensus on disagreements about unknown factual matters, but that they hold considerable promise as models of how to rationally resolve non-factual disagreements.
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