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Stephen P. Stich (1978). Beliefs and Subdoxastic States.

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  1. If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - forthcoming - Noûs.
    I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposi-tion, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary (...)
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  2.  55
    Naïve Realism About Unconscious Perception.Paweł J. Zięba - forthcoming - Synthese:1-29.
    Recently, it has been objected that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported claim that mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously (SFK). The main aim of this paper is to establish the following conditional claim: if SFK turns out to be true, the naïve realist can and should accommodate it into her theory. Regarding the antecedent of this conditional, I suggest that empirical evidence renders SFK plausible but not obvious. For it (...)
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  3. Direct Perception and the Predictive Mind.Zoe Drayson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3145-3164.
    Predictive approaches to the mind claim that perception, cognition, and action can be understood in terms of a single framework: a hierarchy of Bayesian models employing the computational strategy of predictive coding. Proponents of this view disagree, however, over the extent to which perception is direct on the predictive approach. I argue that we can resolve these disagreements by identifying three distinct notions of perceptual directness: psychological, metaphysical, and epistemological. I propose that perception is plausibly construed as psychologically indirect on (...)
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  4.  9
    The Epistemology of Rational Constructivism.Mark Fedyk & Fei Xu - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):343-362.
    Rational constructivism is one of the leading theories in developmental psychology. But it is not a purely psychological theory: rational constructivism also makes a number of substantial epistemological claims about both the nature of human rationality and several normative principles that fall squarely into the ambit of epistemology. The aim of this paper is to clarify and defend both theses and several other epistemological claims, as they represent the essential epistemological dimensions of rational constructivism.
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  5.  13
    Showing Our Seams: A Reply to Eric Funkhouser.Neil Levy - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (7):991-1006.
    ABSTRACTIn a recent paper published in this journal, Eric Funkhouser argues that some of our beliefs have the primary function of signaling to others, rather than allowing us to navigate the world. Funkhouser’s case is persuasive. However, his account of beliefs as signals is underinclusive, omitting both beliefs that are signals to the self and less than full-fledged beliefs as signals. The latter set of beliefs, moreover, has a better claim to being considered as constituting a psychological kind in its (...)
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  6.  52
    You Meta Believe It.Neil Levy - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):814-826.
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  7.  41
    What Does Taste Represent?William G. Lycan - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):28-37.
    What does vision represent? What does hearing represent? Smell? Touch? Competing answers to each of these questions have been defended. The present paper argues that the issue of what taste represents is categorically more complicated. In particular, it raises two very difficult dilemmas.
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  8.  61
    Varieties of Inference?Anna‐Sara Malmgren - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):221-254.
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  9.  39
    The Personal and the Subpersonal in the Theory of Mind Debate.Kristina Musholt - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):305-324.
    It is a widely accepted assumption within the philosophy of mind and psychology that our ability for complex social interaction is based on the mastery of a common folk psychology, that is to say that social cognition consists in reasoning about the mental states of others in order to predict and explain their behavior. This, in turn, requires the possession of mental-state concepts, such as the concepts belief and desire. In recent years, this standard conception of social cognition has been (...)
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  10.  26
    Religious Beliefs Are Factual Beliefs: Content Does Not Correlate with Context Sensitivity.Neil Levy - 2017 - Cognition 161:109-116.
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  11.  74
    The Relationship Between Cognitive Penetration and Predictive Coding.Fiona Macpherson - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 47:6-16.
  12.  61
    Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the Concept of Belief.Hans Rott - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2695-2720.
    Pragmatists have argued that doxastic or epistemic norms do not apply to beliefs, but to changes of beliefs; thus not to the holding or not-holding, but to the acquisition or removal of beliefs. Doxastic voluntarism generally claims that humans acquire beliefs in a deliberate and controlled way. This paper introduces Negative Doxastic Voluntarism according to which there is a fundamental asymmetry in belief change: humans tend to acquire beliefs more or less automatically and unreflectively, but they tend to withdraw beliefs (...)
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  13.  79
    Doing Without Believing: Intellectualism, Knowledge-How, and Belief-Attribution.Michael Brownstein & Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2815–2836.
    We consider a range of cases—both hypothetical and actual—in which agents apparently know how to \ but fail to believe that the way in which they in fact \ is a way for them to \. These “no-belief” cases present a prima facie problem for Intellectualism about knowledge-how. The problem is this: if knowledge-that entails belief, and if knowing how to \ just is knowing that some w is a way for one to \, then an agent cannot both know (...)
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  14. Two Types of Psychological Hedonism.Justin Garson - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 56:7-14.
    I develop a distinction between two types of psychological hedonism. Inferential hedonism (or “I-hedonism”) holds that each person only has ultimate desires regarding his or her own hedonic states (pleasure and pain). Reinforcement hedonism (or “R–hedonism”) holds that each person's ultimate desires, whatever their contents are, are differentially reinforced in that person’s cognitive system only by virtue of their association with hedonic states. I’ll argue that accepting R-hedonism and rejecting I-hedonism provides a conciliatory position on the traditional altruism debate, and (...)
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  15. Neither Fish nor Fowl: Implicit Attitudes as Patchy Endorsements.Neil Levy - 2015 - Noûs 49 (4):800-823.
    Implicit attitudes are mental states that appear sometimes to cause agents to act in ways that conflict with their considered beliefs. Implicit attitudes are usually held to be mere associations between representations. Recently, however, some philosophers have suggested that they are, or are very like, ordinary beliefs: they are apt to feature in properly inferential processing. This claim is important, in part because there is good reason to think that the vocabulary in which we make moral assessments of ourselves and (...)
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  16. Meaning and Formal Semantics in Generative Grammar.Stephen Schiffer - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):61-87.
    A generative grammar for a language L generates one or more syntactic structures for each sentence of L and interprets those structures both phonologically and semantically. A widely accepted assumption in generative linguistics dating from the mid-60s, the Generative Grammar Hypothesis , is that the ability of a speaker to understand sentences of her language requires her to have tacit knowledge of a generative grammar of it, and the task of linguistic semantics in those early days was taken to be (...)
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  17. The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction.Zoe Drayson - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):338-346.
    Daniel Dennett's distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations was fundamental in establishing the philosophical foundations of cognitive science. Since it was first introduced in 1969, the personal/subpersonal distinction has been adapted to fit different approaches to the mind. In one example of this, the ‘Pittsburgh school’ of philosophers attempted to map Dennett's distinction onto their own distinction between the ‘space of reasons’ and the ‘space of causes’. A second example can be found in much contemporary philosophy of psychology, where Dennett's (...)
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  18. Thinking is Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):55-96.
  19.  36
    Self-Deception: A Teleofunctional Approach.David Livingstone Smith - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):181-199.
    This paper aims to offer an alternative to the existing philosophical theories of self-deception. It describes and motivates a teleofunctional theory that models self-deception on the subintentional deceptions perpetrated by non-human organisms. Existing theories of self-deception generate paradoxes, are empirically implausible, or fail to account for the distinction between self-deception and other kinds of motivated irrationality. Deception is not a uniquely human phenomenon: biologists have found that many non-human organisms deceive and are deceived. A close analysis of the pollination strategy (...)
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  20. Regarding a Regress.Yuri Cath - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):358-388.
    Is there a successful regress argument against intellectualism? In this article I defend the negative answer. I begin by defending Stanley and Williamson's (2001) critique of the contemplation regress against Noë (2005). I then identify a new argument – the employment regress – that is designed to succeed where the contemplation regress fails, and which I take to be the most basic and plausible form of a regress argument against intellectualism. However, I argue that the employment regress still fails. Drawing (...)
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  21. Against Alief.Eric Mandelbaum - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):197-211.
    This essay attempts to clarify the nature and structure of aliefs. First I distinguish between a robust notion of aliefs and a deflated one. A robust notion of aliefs would introduce aliefs into our psychological ontology as a hitherto undiscovered kind, whereas a deflated notion of aliefs would identify aliefs as a set of pre-existing psychological states. I then propose the following dilemma: one the one hand, if aliefs have propositional content, then it is unclear exactly how aliefs differ from (...)
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  22. Numerical Architecture.Eric Mandelbaum - 2013 - Topics in Cognitive Science 5 (1):367-386.
    The idea that there is a “Number Sense” (Dehaene, 1997) or “Core Knowledge” of number ensconced in a modular processing system (Carey, 2009) has gained popularity as the study of numerical cognition has matured. However, these claims are generally made with little, if any, detailed examination of which modular properties are instantiated in numerical processing. In this article, I aim to rectify this situation by detailing the modular properties on display in numerical cognitive processing. In the process, I review literature (...)
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  23. Knowledge of Grammar and Concept Possession.Edison Barrios - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):577-606.
    This article deals with the cognitive relationship between a speaker and her internal grammar. In particular, it takes issue with the view that such a relationship is one of belief or knowledge (I call this view the ‘Propositional Attitude View’, or PAV). I first argue that PAV entails that all ordinary speakers (tacitly) possess technical concepts belonging to syntactic theory, and second, that most ordinary speakers do not in fact possess such concepts. Thus, it is concluded that speakers do not (...)
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  24. The Uses and Abuses of the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction.Zoe Drayson - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):1-18.
    In this paper, I claim that the personal/subpersonal distinction is first and foremost a distinction between two kinds of psychological theory or explanation: it is only in this form that we can understand why the distinction was first introduced, and how it continues to earn its keep. I go on to examine the different ontological commitments that might lead us from the primary distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations to a derivative distinction between personal and subpersonal states. I argue that (...)
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  25.  72
    Trust and the Doxastic Family.Pascal Engel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):17-26.
    This article examines Keith Lehrer's distinction between belief and acceptance and how it differs from other accounts of belief and of the family of doxastic attitudes. I sketch a different taxonomy of doxastic attitudes. Lehrer's notion of acceptance is mostly epistemic and at the service of his account of the "loop of reason", whereas for other writers acceptance is mostly a pragmatic attitude. I argue, however, that his account of acceptance underdetermines the role that the attitude of trust plays in (...)
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  26.  53
    A Partial Defense of Intuition on Naturalist Grounds.Joseph Shieber - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):321-341.
    The debate concerning the role of intuitions in philosophy has been characterized by a fundamental disagreement between two main camps. The first, the autonomists, hold that, due to the use in philosophical investigation of appeals to intuition, most of the central questions of philosophy can in principle be answered by philosophical investigation and argument without relying on the sciences. The second, the naturalists, deny the possibility of a priori knowledge and are skeptical of the role of intuition in providing evidence (...)
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  27. The Mental Lives of Zombies.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.
    Could there be a cognitive zombie – that is, a creature with the capacity for cognition, but no capacity for consciousness? Searle argues that there cannot be a cognitive zombie because there cannot be an intentional zombie: on this view, there is a connection between consciousness and cognition that is derived from a more fundamental connection between consciousness and intentionality. However, I argue that there are good empirical reasons for rejecting the proposed connection between consciousness and intentionality. Instead, I argue (...)
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  28. Perception and Non-Inferential Knowledge of Action.Thor Grünbaum - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):153 - 167.
    I present an account of how agents can know what they are doing when they intentionally execute object-oriented actions. When an agent executes an object-oriented intentional action, she uses perception in such a way that it can fulfil a justificatory role for her knowledge of her own action and it can fulfil this justificatory role without being inferentially linked to the cognitive states that it justifies. I argue for this proposal by meeting two challenges: in an agent's knowledge of her (...)
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  29. Explaining the Placebo Effect: Aliefs, Beliefs, and Conditioning.Matthew Haug - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):679-698.
    There are a number of competing psychological accounts of the placebo effect, and much of the recent debate centers on the relative importance of classical conditioning and conscious beliefs. In this paper, I discuss apparent problems with these accounts and with?disjunctive? accounts that deny that placebo effects can be given a unified psychological explanation. The fact that some placebo effects seem to be mediated by cognitive states with content that is consciously inaccessible and inferentially isolated from a subject's beliefs motivates (...)
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  30. In Support of Anti-Intellectualism.Victor Kumar - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):135-54.
    Intellectualist theories attempt to assimilate know how to propositional knowledge and, in so doing, fail to properly explain the close relation know how bears to action. I develop here an anti-intellectualist theory that is warranted, I argue, because it best accounts for the difference between know how and mere “armchair knowledge.” Know how is a mental state characterized by a certain world-to-mind direction of fit (though it is non-motivational) and attendant functional role. It is essential of know how, but not (...)
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  31. Sober & Wilson's Evolutionary Arguments for Psychological Altruism: A Reassessment.Armin W. Schulz - 2011 - Biology and Philosophy 26 (2):251-260.
    In their book Unto Others, Sober and Wilson argue that various evolutionary considerations (based on the logic of natural selection) lend support to the truth of psychological altruism. However, recently, Stephen Stich has raised a number of challenges to their reasoning: in particular, he claims that three out of the four evolutionary arguments they give are internally unconvincing, and that the one that is initially plausible fails to take into account recent findings from cognitive science and thus leaves open a (...)
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  32.  18
    Tacit Aspects of Experimental Practices: Analytical Tools and Epistemological Consequences. [REVIEW]LéNa Soler - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (3):393-433.
    In recent decades many sociologists and philosophers of science, especially the so-called ‘new experimentalists’, have stressed the need for detailed studies of real, ongoing experimental practices, and have claimed that a new image of science results from such an approach. Among the new objects of interest that have emerged from laboratory studies, an important one is the tacit dimension of scientific practices. Harry Collins, in particular, has insisted that irreducibly tacit presuppositions and skills are inevitably involved in experimental practices, and (...)
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  33.  22
    Modeling Expressing on Demonstrating.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:43-76.
    We can increase our understanding of expression by considering an analogy to demonstrative reference. The connections between a demonstrative phrase and its referent, in a case of fully successful communication with that phrase, are analogous to the connections between an expressible state and the behavior that expresses it. The connections in each case serve to maintain a certain status for the connected elements: as actions of persons; or as objects, events, or states significant to persons. The analogy to demonstrative reference (...)
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  34. Emotion, the Bodily, and the Cognitive.Rick Anthony Furtak - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):51 – 64.
    In both psychology and philosophy, cognitive theories of emotion have met with increasing opposition in recent years. However, this apparent controversy is not so much a gridlock between antithetical stances as a critical debate in which each side is being forced to qualify its position in order to accommodate the other side of the story. Here, I attempt to sort out some of the disagreements between cognitivism and its rivals, adjudicating some disputes while showing that others are merely superficial. Looking (...)
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  35. Aesthetics and Cognitive Science.Dustin Stokes - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):715-733.
    Experiences of art involve exercise of ordinary cognitive and perceptual capacities but in unique ways. These two features of experiences of art imply the mutual importance of aesthetics and cognitive science. Cognitive science provides empirical and theoretical analysis of the relevant cognitive capacities. Aesthetics thus does well to incorporate cognitive scientific research. Aesthetics also offers philosophical analysis of the uniqueness of the experience of art. Thus, cognitive science does well to incorporate the explanations of aesthetics. This paper explores this general (...)
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  36.  32
    Measuring Consciousness: Relating Behavioural and Neurophysiological Approaches.Luiz Pessoa Anil K. Seth, Zoltán Dienes, Axel Cleeremans, Morten Overgaard - 2008 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (8):314.
  37. In Defence of Non-Conceptual Content.Simone Gozzano - 2008 - Axiomathes 18 (1):117-126.
    In recent times, Evans’ idea that mental states could have non-conceptual contents has been attacked. McDowell (Mind and World, 1994) and Brewer (Perception and reason, 1999) have both argued that that notion does not have any epistemological role because notions such as justification or evidential support, that might relate mental contents to each other, must be framed in conceptual terms. On his side, Brewer has argued that instead of non-conceptual content we should consider demonstrative concepts that have the same fine (...)
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  38. Measuring Consciousness: Relating Behavioural and Neurophysiological Approaches.Anil K. Seth, Zoltán Dienes, Axel Cleeremans, Morten Overgaard & Luiz Pessoa - 2008 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (8):314-321.
  39. What is at Stake in the Debate on Nonconceptual Content?José Luis Bermúdez - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):55–72.
    It is now 25 years since Gareth Evans introduced the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content in The Varieties of Reference. This is a fitting time to take stock of what has become a complex and extended debate both within philosophy and at the interface between philosophy and psychology. Unfortunately, the debate has become increasingly murky as it has become increasingly ramified. Much of the contemporary discussion does not do full justice to the powerful theoretical tool originally proposed by Evans (...)
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  40.  89
    Tacit and Accessible Understanding of Language.Kent Johnson - 2007 - Synthese 156 (2):253 - 279.
    The empirical nature of our understanding of language is explored. I first show that there are several important and different distinctions between tacit and accessible awareness. I then present empirical evidence concerning our understanding of language. The data suggests that our awareness of sentence-meanings is sometimes merely tacit according to one of these distinctions, but is accessible according to another. I present and defend an interpretation of this mixed view. The present project is shown to impact on several diverse areas, (...)
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  41. Social Systems.Heidi L. Maibom - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):557 – 578.
    It used to be thought that folk psychology is the only game in town. Focusing merely on what people do will not allow you to predict what they are likely to do next. For that, you must consider their beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Recent evidence from developmental psychology and fMRI studies indicates that this conclusion was premature. We parse motion in an environment as behavior of a particular type, and behavior thus construed can feature in systematizations that we know. Building (...)
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  42. Metacognition and Metarepresentation: Is a Self-Directed Theory of Mind a Precondition for Metacognition? [REVIEW]Joëlle Proust - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):271 - 295.
    Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries to predict and evaluate one’s own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and inferential promiscuity only occur in metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although metarepresentations can redescribe metacognitive (...)
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  43. Evolution, Altruism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critique of Sober and Wilson’s Argument for Psychological Altruism.Stephen Stich - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (2):267-281.
    Sober and Wilson have propose a cluster of arguments for the conclusion that “natural selection is unlikely to have given us purely egoistic motives” and thus that psychological altruism is true. I maintain that none of these arguments is convincing. However, the most powerful of their arguments raises deep issues about what egoists and altruists are claiming and about the assumptions they make concerning the cognitive architecture underlying human motivation.
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  44. Nonconceptual Content.Josefa Toribio - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):445–460.
    Nonconceptualists maintain that there are ways of representing the world that do not reflect the concepts a creature possesses. They claim that the content of these representational states is genuine content because it is subject to correctness conditions, but it is nonconceptual because the creature to which we attribute it need not possess any of the concepts involved in the specification of that content. Appeals to nonconceptual content have seemed especially useful in attempts to capture the representational properties of perceptual (...)
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  45.  22
    Quel Arrière-Plan Pour L’Esprit?Pierre Steiner - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (3):419-444.
    J’analyse dans cet article la notion d’Arrière-plan teile qu’elle a été développée par John Searle en philosophie de I’esprit depuis une vingtaine d’années. Cette notion désigne, largement, I’ensemble des capacités mentales non-représentationnelles au moyen desquelles les représentations mentales peuvent avoir un contenu sémantique déterminé et être appliquées. Je tente de montrer que, bienqu’originale et pertinente, cette notion, telle qu’elle est caractérisée par Searle, est tout à fait insuffisante pour remplir ses desseins descriptifs et explicatifs. Je m’efforce alors de penser I’Arrière-plan (...)
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  46. Faculty Disputes.John Collins - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):503-33.
    Jerry Fodor, among others, has maintained that Chomsky's language faculty hypothesis is an epistemological proposal, i.e. the faculty comprises propositional structures known (cognized) by the speaker/hearer. Fodor contrasts this notion of a faculty with an architectural (directly causally efficacious) notion of a module. The paper offers an independent characterisation of the language faculty as an abstractly specified nonpropositional structure of the mind/brain that mediates between sound and meaning—a function in intension that maps to a pair of structures that determine soundmeaning (...)
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  47.  25
    Reading the Minds of Others: Radical Interpretation and the Empirical Study of Childhood Cognitive Development.Manuela Ungureanu - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (3):527-554.
    Le point de vue de Davidson sur les concepts de croyance et de signification implicites dans nos pratiques d’attribution de croyance et de signification peut à bon droit être mis à l’épreuve par une élucidation de ses rapports avec la psychologie empirique. Mais une telle mise à l’épreuve n’a de valeur que si elle confronte d’abord l’id’e reçue voulant que sa position a peu ou pas de liens avec l’etude empirique du développement cognitif. Je défends ici une approche du point (...)
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  48.  92
    The Mindreader and the Scientist.Heidi Lene Maibom - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (3):296-315.
    Among theory theorists, it is commonly thought that folk psychological theory is tacitly known. However, folk psychological knowledge has none of the central features of tacit knowledge. But if it is ordinary knowledge, why is it that we have difficulties expressing anything but a handful of folk psychological generalisations? The reason is that our knowledge is of theoretical models and hypotheses, not of universal generalisations. Adopting this alternative view of (scientific) theories, we come to see that, given time and reflection, (...)
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  49.  28
    Tacit Knowledge of Grammar: A Reply to Knowles.Gurpreet Rattan - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):135 – 154.
    I defend the non-cognitivist outlook on knowledge of grammar from the criticisms levelled against it by Jonathan Knowles. The first part of the paper is largely critical. First, I argue that Knowles's argument against Christopher Peacocke and Martin Davies's non-cognitivist account of the psychological reality of grammar fails, and thus that no reason has been given to think that cognitivism is integral to an understanding of Chomskyan theoretical linguistics. Second, I argue that cognitivism is philosophically problematic. In particular, I argue (...)
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  50.  55
    Knowledge of Grammar as a Propositional Attitude.Jonathan Knowles - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):325 – 353.
    Noam Chomsky claims that we know the grammatical principles of our languages in pretty much the same sense that we know ordinary things about the world (e.g. facts), a view about linguistic knowledge that I term ''cognitivism''. In much recent philosophy of linguistics (including that sympathetic to Chomsky's general approach to language), cognitivism has been rejected in favour of an account of grammatical competence as some or other form of mental mechanism, describable at various levels of abstraction (''non-cognitivism''). I argue (...)
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