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  1. Commentary/Elqayam & Evans: Subtracting “Ought” From “Is”.Natalie Gold, Andrew M. Colman & Briony D. Pulfordb - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5).
    Normative theories can be useful in developing descriptive theories, as when normative subjective expected utility theory is used to develop descriptive rational choice theory and behavioral game theory. “Ought” questions are also the essence of theories of moral reasoning, a domain of higher mental processing that could not survive without normative considerations.
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  • Competence, Reflective Equilibrium, and Dual-System Theories.Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):251–252.
    A critique of inferences from 'is' to 'ought' plays a central role in Elqayam and Evans' defense of descriptivism. However, the reflective equilibrium strategy described by Goodman and embraced by Rawls, Cohen and many others poses an important challenge to that critique. Dual system theories may help respond to that challenge.
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  • The Controversy About Irrationality.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):510.
  • Can Irrationality Be Intelligently Discussed?Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):509.
  • A Theory of Probability Should Tutor Our Intuitions.Glenn Shafer - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):508.
  • Human Inference: The Notion of Reasonable Rationality.Russell Revlin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):507.
  • Can Philosophy Resolve Empirical Issues?Clifford R. Mynatt, Ryan D. Tweney & Michael E. Doherty - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):506.
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  • Who Commits the Base Rate Fallacy?Isaac Levi - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):502.
  • Norms, Competence, and the Explanation of Reasoning.Gary S. Kahn & Lance J. Rips - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):501.
  • Inductive Reasoning: Competence or Skill?Christopher Jepson, David H. Krantz & Richard E. Nisbett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):494.
  • Intuition and Inconsistency.Richard E. Grandy - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):494.
  • Is Irrationality Systematic?Robyn M. Dawes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):491.
  • Expert Intuitions and the Interpretation of Social Psychological Experiments.André Gallois & Michael Siegal - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):492.
  • The Plasticity of Human Rationality.Norman Daniels & George E. Smith - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):490.
  • The Epistemological Status of Lay Intuition.Christopher Cherniak - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):489.
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  • Discrepancies Between Human Behavior and Formal Theories of Rationality: The Incompleteness of Bayesian Probability Logic.Lea Brilmayer - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):488.
  • The Rationality of the Scientist: Toward Reconciliation.Jonathan E. Adler - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):487.
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