Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Restating the Role of Phenomenal Experience in the Formation and Maintenance of the Capgras Delusion.Garry Young - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):177-189.
    In recent times, explanations of the Capgras delusion have tended to emphasise the cognitive dysfunction that is believed to occur at the second stage of two-stage models. This is generally viewed as a response to the inadequacies of the one-stage account. Whilst accepting that some form of cognitive disruption is a necessary part of the aetiology of the Capgras delusion, I nevertheless argue that the emphasis placed on this second-stage is to the detriment of the important role played by the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Amending the Revisionist Model of the Capgras Delusion: A Further Argument for the Role of Patient Experience in Delusional Belief Formation.Garry Young - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):89-112.
  • Beliefs, Experiences and Misplaced Being: An Interactionist Account of Delusional Misidentification. [REVIEW]Garry Young - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):195-215.
    This paper contrasts an interactionist account of delusional misidentification with more traditional one- and two-stage models. Unlike the unidirectional nature of these more traditional models, in which the aetiology of the disorder is said to progress from a neurological disruption via an anomalous experience to a delusional belief, the interactionist account posits the interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes to better explain the maintenance of the delusional belief. In addition, it places a greater emphasis on the patient’s underlying phenomenal experience (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Capgras Delusion: An Integrated Approach.Neralie Wise - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):183-205.
    Delusions are studied in two philosophical traditions: the continental or phenomenological tradition and the Anglo-American or analytic tradition. Each has its own view of delusions. Broadly stated, phenomenologists view delusions as a disturbed experience whilst most analytic researchers view them as beliefs. It is my contention that the most plausible account of delusions must ultimately incorporate valuable insights from both traditions. To illustrate the potential value of integration I provide a novel model of the Capgras delusion which describes how an (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Delusions, Dreams, and the Nature of Identification.Sam Wilkinson - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):203-226.
    Delusional misidentification is commonly understood as the product of an inference on the basis of evidence present in the subject's experience. For example, in the Capgras delusion, the patient sees someone who looks like a loved one, but who feels unfamiliar, so they infer that they must not be the loved one. I question this by presenting a distinction between “recognition” and “identification.” Identification does not always require recognition for its epistemic justification, nor does it need recognition for its psychological (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • A Mental Files Approach to Delusional Misidentification.Sam Wilkinson - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):389-404.
    I suggest that we can think of delusional misidentification in terms of systematic errors in the management of mental files. I begin by sketching the orthodox “bottom-up” aetiology of delusional misidentification. I suggest that the orthodox aetiology can be given a descriptivist or a singularist interpretation. I present three cases that a descriptivist interpretation needs to account for. I then introduce a singularist approach, one that is based on mental files, and show how it opens the way for different and (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Delusions and Dispositionalism About Belief.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (5):596-628.
    The imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it tempting to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie argue that adopting a dispositional account of belief can secure the doxastic status of delusions. But dispositionalism can only secure genuinely doxastic status for mental states by giving folk-psychological norms a significant role in the individuation of attitudes. When such norms individuate belief, deluded subjects will not count as believing their delusions. In general, dispositionalism won't confer genuinely doxastic status more often than do (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Mindful Belief: Accountability, Expertise, and Cognitive Kinds.Josefa Toribio - 2002 - Theoria 68 (3):224-49.
    It is sometimes said that humans are unlike other animals in at least one crucial respect. We do not simply form beliefs, desires and other mental states, but are capable of caring about our mental states in a distinctive way. We can care about the justification of our beliefs, and about the desirability of our desires. This kind of observation is usually made in discussions of free will and moral responsibility. But it has profound consequences, or so I shall argue, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Unimpaired Abduction to Alien Abduction: Lessons on Delusion Formation.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (5):679-704.
    An examination of alien abduction belief can inform how we ought to approach constructing explanations of monothematic delusion formation. I argue that the formation and maintenance of alien abduct...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The Role of Emotions in Delusion Formation.Adrianna Smurzyńska - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 48 (1):253-263.
    The text concerns the role of emotions in delusion formation. Provided are definitions from DSM-V and DSM-IV-R and the problems found in those definitions. One of them, the problem of delusion formation, is described when providing cognitive theories of delusions. The core of the paper is a presentation of the emotional and affective disorders in delusions, especially Capgras delusion and Cotard delusion. The author provides a comparison of the kinds of delusions and the conclusions taken from neuroimaging studies. As a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Misidentification delusions as mentalization disorders.Adrianna Smurzyńska - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-16.
    The aim of this article is to analyze those theories that interpret misidentification delusions in terms of mentalization. The hypothesis under examination holds that a mentalization framework is useful for describing misidentification delusions when identification is thought to be partially based on mentalization. The article provides both a characterization and possible interpretations of such delusions, and possible relations between misidentification and mentalization are scrutinized. Whether the mentalization approach may explain or describe such kinds of mental disorders is considered, with the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Delusions and madmen: against rationality constraints on belief.Declan Smithies, Preston Lennon & Richard Samuels - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-30.
    According to the Rationality Constraint, our concept of belief imposes limits on how much irrationality is compatible with having beliefs at all. We argue that empirical evidence of human irrationality from the psychology of reasoning and the psychopathology of delusion undermines only the most demanding versions of the Rationality Constraint, which require perfect rationality as a condition for having beliefs. The empirical evidence poses no threat to more relaxed versions of the Rationality Constraint, which only require only minimal rationality. Nevertheless, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Social Epistemological Conception of Delusion.Alessandro Salice & Kengo Miyazono - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1831-1851.
    The dominant conception of delusion in psychiatry is predominantly epistemic. Delusions are almost always characterized in terms of their epistemic defects, i.e., defects with respect to evidence, reasoning, judgment, etc. However, there is an individualistic bias in the epistemic conception; the alleged epistemic defects and abnormalities in delusions relate to individualistic epistemic processes rather than social epistemic processes. We endorse the social epistemological turn in recent philosophical epistemology, and claim that a corresponding turn is needed in the study of delusions. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Intensity of Experience: Maher’s Theory of Schizophrenic Delusion Revisited.Eisuke Sakakibara - 2018 - Neuroethics 12 (2):171-182.
    Maher proposed in 1974 that schizophrenic delusions are hypotheses formed to explain anomalous experiences. He stated that they are “rational, given the intensity of the experiences that they are developed to explain.” Two-factor theorists of delusion criticized Maher’s theory because 1) it does not explain why some patients with anomalous experiences do not develop delusions, and 2) adopting and adhering to delusional hypotheses is irrational, considering the totality of experiences and patients’ other beliefs. In this paper, the notion of the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Models of Misbelief: Integrating Motivational and Deficit Theories of Delusions.Ryan McKay, Robyn Langdon & Max Coltheart - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):932-941.
    The impact of our desires and preferences upon our ordinary, everyday beliefs is well-documented [Gilovich, T. . How we know what isn’t so: The fallibility of human reason in everyday life. New York: The Free Press.]. The influence of such motivational factors on delusions, which are instances of pathological misbelief, has tended however to be neglected by certain prevailing models of delusion formation and maintenance. This paper explores a distinction between two general classes of theoretical explanation for delusions; the motivational (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Attributional Style in a Case of Cotard Delusion.Ryan McKay & Lisa Cipolotti - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):349-359.
    Young and colleagues . Betwixt life and death: case studies of the Cotard delusion. In P. W. Halligan & J. C. Marshall , Method in madness: Case studies in cognitive neuropsychiatry. Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.) have suggested that cases of the Cotard delusion result when a particular perceptual anomaly occurs in the context of an internalising attributional style. This hypothesis has not previously been tested directly. We report here an investigation of attributional style in a 24-year-old woman with Cotard (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • The Phenomenological Role of Affect in the Capgras Delusion.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2008 - Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):195-216.
    This paper draws on studies of the Capgras delusion in order to illuminate the phenomenological role of affect in interpersonal recognition. People with this delusion maintain that familiars, such as spouses, have been replaced by impostors. It is generally agreed that the delusion involves an anomalous experience, arising due to loss of affect. However, quite what this experience consists of remains unclear. I argue that recent accounts of the Capgras delusion incorporate an impoverished conception of experience, which fails to accommodate (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Interpreting Delusions.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):25-48.
    This paper explores the phenomenology of the Capgras and Cotard delusions. The former is generally characterised as the belief that relatives or friends have been replaced by impostors, and the latter as the conviction that one is dead or has ceased to exist. A commonly reported feature of these delusions is an experienced ''defamiliarisation'' or even ''derealisation'' of things, which is associated with an absence or distortion of affect. I suggest that the importance attributed to affect by current explanations of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Vorhersagefehler und Gehirnverletzungen. Zwei-Faktoren-Theorien über Wahnvorstellungen.Jennifer Radden - 2012 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60 (6):903-918.
    This paper explores the two-factor theoretical model currently widely used to provide an explanatory analysis of the delusions that regularly accompany neurological disease or damage. The model hypothesizes a combination of an experiential factor – a strange or untoward experience – and a cognitive factor, such as an impairment of reasoning. The two-factor model has been devised for monothematic delusions that are usually manifested in a single, implausible idea. These have to be distinguished from the more elaborated, polythematic delusions that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Subjective Misidentification and Thought Insertion.Matthew Parrott - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (1):39-64.
    This essay presents a new account of thought insertion. Prevailing views in both philosophy and cognitive science tend to characterize the experience of thought insertion as missing or lacking some element, such as a ‘sense of agency’, found in ordinary first-person awareness of one's own thoughts. By contrast, I propose that, rather than lacking something, experiences of thought insertion have an additional feature not present in ordinary conscious experiences of one's own thoughts. More specifically, I claim that the structure of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Delusional Predictions and Explanations.Matthew Parrott - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):325-353.
    In both cognitive science and philosophy, many theorists have recently appealed to a predictive processing framework to offer explanations of why certain individuals form delusional beliefs. One aim of this essay will be to illustrate how one could plausibly develop a predictive processing account in different ways to account for the onset of different kinds of delusions. However, the second aim of this essay will be to discuss two significant limitations of the predictive processing framework. First, I shall draw on (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities.Matthew Parrott - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):271-296.
    The Capgras delusion is a condition in which a person believes that an imposter has replaced some close friend or relative. Recent theorists have appealed to Bayesianism to help explain both why a subject with the Capgras delusion adopts this delusional belief and why it persists despite counter-evidence. The Bayesian approach is useful for addressing these questions; however, the main proposal of this essay is that Capgras subjects also have a delusional conception of epistemic possibility, more specifically, they think more (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Phenomenology and Delusions: Who Put the 'Alien' in Alien Control?Elisabeth Pacherie, Melissa Green & Tim Bayne - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.
    Current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusional beliefs are based on unusual experiences of various kinds. For example, it is argued that the Capgras delusion (the belief that a known person has been replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal affective experience in response to seeing a known person; loss of the affective response to a familiar person’s face may lead to the belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, 1990). (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • The Clinical Significance of Anomalous Experience in the Explanation of Monothematic Delusions.Paul Noordhof & Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10277-10309.
    Monothematic delusions involve a single theme, and often occur in the absence of a more general delusional belief system. They are cognitively atypical insofar as they are said to be held in the absence of evidence, are resistant to correction, and have bizarre contents. Empiricism about delusions has it that anomalous experience is causally implicated in their formation, whilst rationalism has it that delusions result from top down malfunctions from which anomalous experiences can follow. Within empiricism, two approaches to the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Intentionality Without Rationality.Lisa Bortolotti - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):369 - 376.
    It is often taken for granted in standard theories of interpretation that there cannot be intentionality without rationality. According to the background argument, a system can be interpreted as having irrational beliefs only against a general background of rationality. Starting from the widespread assumption that delusions can be reasonably described as irrational beliefs, I argue here that the background argument fails to account for their intentional description.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Causal Role Argument Against Doxasticism About Delusions.Kengo Miyazono & Lisa Bortolotti - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):30-50.
  • Précis of Delusions and Beliefs: A Philosophical Inquiry.Kengo Miyazono - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):1-5.
    The central hypothesis of this book, Delusions and Beliefs: A Philosophical Inquiry, is that delusions are malfunctional beliefs ; they belong to the category of belief but, unlike mundane false or irrational beliefs, they fail to perform some functions of belief. More precisely, delusions directly or indirectly involve some malfunctioning cognitive mechanisms, which is empirically supported by the two-factor account of delusion formation.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Delusions as Harmful Malfunctioning Beliefs.Kengo Miyazono - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:561-573.
    Delusional beliefs are typically pathological. Being pathological is clearly distinguished from being false or being irrational. Anna might falsely believe that his husband is having an affair but it might just be a simple mistake. Again, Sam might irrationally believe, without good evidence, that he is smarter than his colleagues, but it might just be a healthy self-deceptive belief. On the other hand, when a patient with brain damage caused by a car accident believes that his father was replaced by (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • The Evolution of Misbelief.Ryan McKay & Daniel Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):493.
    From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise the world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions to this rule? How can we account for mistaken beliefs, bizarre delusions, and instances of self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We begin by articulating a distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a breakdown in (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   130 citations  
  • Delusional Inference.Ryan McKay - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (3):330-355.
    Does the formation of delusions involve abnormal reasoning? According to the prominent ‘two-factor’ theory of delusions (e.g. Coltheart, 2007), the answer is yes. The second factor in this theory is supposed to affect a deluded individual's ability to evaluate candidates for belief. However, most published accounts of the two-factor theory have not said much about the nature of this second factor. In an effort to remedy this shortcoming, Coltheart, Menzies and Sutton (2010) recently put forward a Bayesian account of inference (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Schizophrenia and the Place of Egodystonic States in the Aetiology of Thought Insertion.Pablo López-Silva - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):577-594.
  • Addiction as a Disorder of Belief.Neil Levy - 2014 - Biology and Philosophy 29 (3):337-355.
    Addiction is almost universally held to be characterized by a loss of control over drug-seeking and consuming behavior. But the actions of addicts, even of those who seem to want to abstain from drugs, seem to be guided by reasons. In this paper, I argue that we can explain this fact, consistent with continuing to maintain that addiction involves a loss of control, by understanding addiction as involving an oscillation between conflicting judgments. I argue that the dysfunction of the mesolimbic (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Is the Biological Adaptiveness of Delusions Doomed?Eugenia Lancellotta - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):47-63.
    Delusions are usually considered as harmful and dysfunctional beliefs, one of the primary symptoms of a psychiatric illness and the mark of madness in popular culture. However, in recent times a much more positive role has been advocated for delusions. More specifically, it has been argued that delusions might be an answer to a problem rather than problems in themselves. By delivering psychological and epistemic benefits, delusions would allow people who face severe biological or psychological difficulties to survive in their (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Delusions in the Phenomenological Perspective.Andrzej Kapusta - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):113-125.
  • Unusual Experiences, Reality Testing and Delusions of Alien Control.Jakob Hohwy & Raben Rosenberg - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):141-162.
    Some monothematic types of delusions may arise because subjects have unusual experiences. The role of this experiential component in the pathogenesis of delusion is still not understood. Focussing on delusions of alien control, we outline a model for reality testing competence on unusual experiences. We propose that nascent delusions arise when there are local failures of reality testing performance, and that monothematic delusions arise as normal responses to these. In the course of this we address questions concerning the tenacity with (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Capgras Delusion: An Interactionist Model.Garry Young - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):863-876.
    In this paper I discuss the role played by disturbed phenomenology in accounting for the formation and maintenance of the Capgras delusion. Whilst endorsing a two-stage model to explain the condition, I nevertheless argue that traditional accounts prioritise the role played by some form of second-stage cognitive disruption at the expense of the significant contribution made by the patient’s disturbed phenomenology, which is often reduced to such uninformative descriptions as “anomalous” or “strange”. By advocating an interactionist model, I argue that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • On the Adaptive Advantage of Always Being Right (Even When One is Not).Nathalia L. Gjersoe & Bruce M. Hood - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):521-522.
    We propose another positive illusion that fits with McKay & Dennett's (M&D's) criteria for adaptive misbeliefs. This illusion is pervasive in adult reasoning but we focus on its prevalence in children's developing theories. It is a strongly held conviction arising from normal functioning of the doxastic system that confers adaptive advantage on the individual.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Dream Experience and a Revisionist Account of Delusions of Misidentification.Philip Gerrans - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):217-227.
    Standard accounts of delusion explain them as responses to experience. Cognitive models of feature binding in the face recognition systems explain how experiences of mismatch between feelings of "familiarity" and faces can arise. Similar mismatches arise in phenomena such as déjà and jamais vu in which places and scenes are mismatched to feelings of familiarity. These cognitive models also explain similarities between the phenomenology of these delusions and some dream states which involve mismatch between faces, feelings of familiarity and identities. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Delusional Attitudes and Default Thinking.Philip Gerrans - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):83-102.
    Jennifer Radden has drawn attention to two features of delusion, ambivalence and subjectivity, which are problematic for theories of delusion that treat delusions as empirical beliefs. She argues for an ‘attitude’ theory of delusion. I argue that once the cognitive architecture of delusion formation is properly described the debate between doxastic and attitude theorists loses its edge. That architecture suggests that delusions are produced by activity in the ‘default mode network’ unsupervised by networks required for decontextualized processing. The cognitive properties (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • In What Sense 'Familiar'? Examining Experiential Differences Within Pathologies of Facial Recognition.Garry Young - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):628-638.
    Explanations of Capgras delusion and prosopagnosia typically incorporate a dual-route approach to facial recognition in which a deficit in overt or covert processing in one condition is mirror-reversed in the other. Despite this double dissociation, experiences of either patient-group are often reported in the same way – as lacking a sense of familiarity toward familiar faces. In this paper, deficits in the facial processing of these patients are compared to other facial recognition pathologies, and their experiential characteristics mapped onto the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Une défense logique du modèle de Maher pour les délires polythématiques.Paul Franceschi - 2008 - Philosophiques 35 (2):451-475.
    Dans ce qui suit, je décrirai un modèle pour la formation et la maintenance des délires polythématiques rencontrés dans la schizophrénie, en adéquation avec le modèle pour les délires décrit par Brendan Maher. Les délires polythématiques y sont considérés comme les conclusions d’arguments déclenchés par l’apophénie et qui comportent des erreurs de raisonnement très communes, telles que le sophisme post hoc et le bais de confirmation. Je décris tout d’abord la structure du raisonnement qui conduit au délire de référence, de (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Are There Psychological Species?Joshua Fost - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (2):293-315.
    A common reaction to functional diversity is to group entities into clusters that are functionally similar. I argue here that people are diverse with respect to reasoning-related processes, and that these processes satisfy the basic requirements for evolving entities: they are heritable, mutable, and subject to selective pressures. I propose a metric to quantify functional difference and show how this can be used to place psychological processes into a structure akin to a phylogenetic or evolutionary tree. Three species concepts are (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Delusional Evidence-Responsiveness.Carolina Flores - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6299-6330.
    Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • A Cognitive Account of Belief: A Tentative Road Map.Michael H. Connors & Peter W. Halligan - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
  • Moral Belief Attribution: A Reply to Roskies.Michael Cholbi - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):629 – 638.
    I here defend my earlier doubts that VM patients serve as counterexamples to motivational internalism by highlighting the difficulties of belief attribution in light of holism about the mental and by suggesting that a better understanding of the role of emotions in the self-attribution of moral belief places my earlier Davidsonian "theory of mind" argument in a clearer light.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • False Beliefs and Naive Beliefs: They Can Be Good for You.Roberto Casati & Marco Bertamini - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):512-513.
    Naive physics beliefs can be systematically mistaken. They provide a useful test-bed because they are common, and also because their existence must rely on some adaptive advantage, within a given context. In the second part of the commentary we also ask questions about when a whole family of misbeliefs should be considered together as a single phenomenon.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Recent Work on the Nature and Development of Delusions.Lisa Bortolotti & Kengo Miyazono - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (9):636-645.
    In this paper we review two debates in the current literature on clinical delusions. One debate is about what delusions are. If delusions are beliefs, why are they described as failing to play the causal roles that characterise beliefs, such as being responsive to evidence and guiding action? The other debate is about how delusions develop. What processes lead people to form delusions and maintain them in the face of challenges and counter-evidence? Do the formation and maintenance of delusions require (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Delusional Beliefs and Reason Giving.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew R. Broome - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.
    Philosophers have been long interested in delusional beliefs and in whether, by reporting and endorsing such beliefs, deluded subjects violate norms of rationality (Campbell 1999; Davies & Coltheart 2002; Gerrans 2001; Stone & Young 1997; Broome 2004; Bortolotti 2005). So far they have focused on identifying the relation between intentionality and rationality in order to gain a better understanding of both ordinary and delusional beliefs. In this paper Matthew Broome and I aim at drawing attention to the extent to which (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Intentionality Without Rationality.Lisa Bortolotti - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):385-392.
    It is often taken for granted in standard theories of interpretation that there cannot be intentionality without rationality. According to the background argument, a system can be interpreted as having irrational beliefs only against a general background of rationality. Starting from the widespread assumption that delusions can be reasonably described as irrational beliefs, I argue here that the background argument fails to account for their intentional description.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Delusions and the Background of Rationality.Lisa Bortolotti - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208.
    I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson (1985a) need to be met for the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations