Drawing on Bernard Williams's Truth and Truthfulness and Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Justice, this article presents an epistemic argument for democracy on the basis of its ability to incentivize more people to display the virtues of truth required for the social production and aggregation of knowledge. In particular, the article compares democracy respectively with autocracy and epistocracy, showing that it is likely to be, within the context of a modern pluralistic society, an epistemically superior regime in the sense that it creates (...) more favourable conditions for the pooling of epistemic resources. The article concludes with a multi-dimensional framework of democratic legitimacy, where democracy's epistemic value is directly tied with both the safeguard against elite domination and the development of citizens' ethical and intellectual capabilities. In this regard, the article also helps to bridge the gap between epistemic and non-epistemic approaches in democratic theory and unite what might be called the wisdom, power, and virtue of the multitude. (shrink)

To Father Ernest Fortin: [The] highest achievement … of theology's handmaiden is to show that the arguments leveled against divine revelation are not compelling or demonstrably true.1To the extent that we are now in the midst of the so-called “clash of civilizations,” it may be noteworthy that a major controversy—scholarly and journalistic––has emerged over the bearing of Leo Strauss on the defense of the West. This article explores the roots of the controversy as found in his “The Mutual Influence of (...) Theology and Philosophy,” which raises and answers two questions: what is Western Civilization and is it worthy of defense? It is claimed that the very foundation of Western Civilization is constituted at its core by the twin pillars of revelation and Socratic philosophizing; and that the West merits life only if both of its pillars are defendable by reason against rational attack. In what follows, I attempt to trace Strauss's dialectical defense of the West by means of his demonstration of the irrefutability of revelation by reason and the theological-political bearing of this defense. I come to a dual conclusion: the existence of the monotheistic God of revelation is irrefutable by philosophy; yet, the human relevance of revelation, as the guide for a way of life—politically and individually—remains open to challenge by philosophy. Along the way, I also treat the recent research that is in conflict over Strauss's views. (shrink)

The author revisits H. L. A. Hart's theory of positive law and argues for a major qualification to the thesis of the separation of law and morality based on a concept of systemic legitimacy derived from the social theory of Jurgen Habermas. He argues that standards for assessing the degree of systemic legitimacy in modern legal systems can develop through reflective exercise of “critical legality,” a concept coined to parallel Hart's “critical morality,” and an expanded understanding of the “external” and (...) “internal” perspectives on legal systems. Following Habermas, he argues that modern positive law must retain systemic legitimacy. After suggesting criteria for measuring systemic legitimacy, the author concludes that the concept provides a useful approach to contemporary problems of “lawless” regimes and “law's imperialism.”. (shrink)

Plato and Xenophon had different perspectives on the better governance. In this paper, I study the notion of tyranny in Plato's Republic and Xenophon's Hiero to trace their views on the aptitude of philosophy to redeem the tyrant and indicate some intertextual points. On this basis, I analyse the meaning and extent of Simonides’ proposal in the Hiero rejecting the idea of a mere pragmatic approach. Finally, I examine the platonic Hipparchusto find a key to figure out the election of (...) Simonides as Xenophon’s spokesperson. Paying attention to the context of the discussions among the Socratics, this approach enhances our understanding of these authors, regarding tyranny, the possibility of its abandonment, and the role of the intellectuals in this process. (shrink)

This paper draws attention to the tendency of a range of technologies to reduce pedagogical interactions to a series of datafied transactions of information. This is problematic because such transactions are always by definition reducible to finite possibilities. As the ability to gather and analyse data becomes increasingly fine-grained, the threat that these datafied approaches over-determine the pedagogical space increases. Drawing on the work of Hegel, as interpreted by twentieth century French radical philosopher Alexandre Kojève, this paper develops a model (...) of relational pedagogy which highlights three points of incompatibility with a datafied learning environment reduced to finite measures. Firstly: Kojève’s accont of authority in Hegel posits two aspects to the mimetic relation between teacher and student: recognition and realisation, which belong to the ipseity or about-self-ness of the subject, and are incompatible with a general definition of data. Secondly, the Hegelian approach to human historical time, in particular the assertion that time and desire are begun in the future, not the past, renders it incompatible with mathematical time as used in data processing. Finally, from these it is possible to derive a distinctive notion of the work of pedagogy, grounded in Kojève’s realist reading of Hegel, irreducible to information processing. In consequence of this threefold irreducibility, the paper draws attention to a need for relations of human pedagogical work to be inherent in the design of educational technologies and highlights the dangers of presuming a machine intelligence model in the design of learning environments. (shrink)

Abstract The aim of this article is to make use of recent research on `political eros ' in order to clarify the connection that Plato establishes between eros and tyranny in Republic IX, specifically by elucidating the intertextuality between Plato's work and the various historical accounts of Alcibiades. An examination of the lexicon used in these accounts will allow us to resolve certain interpretive difficulties that, to my knowledge, no other commentator has elucidated: why does Socrates blame eros for the (...) decline from democracy into tyranny? What does he mean by ` eros ' here, and what link existed between eros and tyranny in the minds of his contemporaries? And finally, who are the mysterious `tyrant-makers' ( turannopoioí , 572e5-6) who, according to Socrates, introduce a destructive eros in the soul of the future tyrant? After a careful examination of the passage from book IX on the genesis of the tyrannical man (focused on the last stage of the metamorphosis, which is concerned with éros túrannos , 572d-573b), I will offer answers to these questions by turning to the writings of Thucydides, Aristophanes and Plutarch while examining the portrait of Alcibiades that Plato paints in the Alcibiades I and Symposium. (shrink)

El siguiente trabajo tiene como objetivo analizar e interpretar la teoría del fin de la historia en Alexandre Kojève. El contexto de esta investigación se basa fundamentalmente en la nota a pie de la página añadida por Kojève en la segunda edición de su libro Introduction à la lecture de Hegel. Esta nota a pie de página ha dado lugar a intensos debates e interrogantes filosóficos importantes. En ella, se toma como paradigma el esnobismo japonés como alternativa a la animalización (...) definitiva del hombre posthistórico. En el trabajo, concretamente, se valorará la rectificación kojeviana sobre el fin de la historia a la luz de la obra de Kojève en su conjunto, sus debates con autores de su tiempo y las referencias a la tradición filosófica. Todo ello con la finalidad de desentrañar las implicaciones éticas de la supervivencia de lo humano en el fin de la historia y su relación con los planteamientos postmetafísicos contemporáneos. (shrink)

The political philosopher Leo Strauss is famous for contending that any synthesis of reason and revelation is impossible, since they are irreconcilable antagonists. Yet he is also famous for praising the secular regime of liberal democracy as the best regime for all human beings, even though he is well aware that modern philosophers such as Spinoza thought this regime must make use of biblical morality to promote good citizenship. Is democracy, then, both religious and secular? Strauss thought that Spinoza was (...) contradictory in teaching that reason and revelation should be separated from each other while also insisting that a secular democratic politics still requires the biblical morality of charity. The paradox that liberal democracy is both religious and secular, which is central to Spinoza, was dismissed by Strauss as a Machiavellian subterfuge or the cynical attempt to use religion for political purposes. In order to adhere to his dualistic separation of reason and revelation, Strauss turned to ancient Greek political philosophy, particularly the ideas of Plato and Aristotle, as the true ground of liberal democracy since this classical tradition was never exposed to biblical revelation. Yet, the illiberal and hierarchical implications of Greek political thought, which clash with Strauss’s modern views on human individuality and dignity, ultimately take him back to the biblically based philosophies of Spinoza and Kierkegaard, who teach the paradox that the Bible is the true foundation of human freedom. (shrink)

This article seeks to shed light on some of the problematic assumptions underpinning the contemporary debate over the constitutional identity of the European Union. The central claim put forward here is that the development of the European Union’s constitution is significantly constrained by what Charles Taylor has described as the modern social imaginary. The constraint operates at two levels. First, modern understandings of constitutionalism typically ignore or underemphasize its dynamic and historical characteristics and its relationship with the self-understanding of political (...) subjects. Thus, modern constitutionalism fails to acknowledge the importance of historically conditioned assumptions involved in the formation of the identities of political subjects. In short, it fails to understand constitutionalism as a ‘regime’. Second, modern constitutionalism’s blind-spots result in a relatively unreflective adherence to a particular type of constitutional regime: the modern economy and its associated ‘consumerist’ form of political citizenship. (shrink)

Moral entrepreneurship is the fine art of recycling evil into good by taking advantage of situations given or constructed as crises. It should be seen as the ultimate generalisation of the entrepreneurial spirit, whose peculiar excesses have always sat uneasily with homo oeconomicus as the constrained utility maximiser, an image that itself has come to be universalised. A task of this essay is to reconcile the two images in terms of what by the end I call ‘superutilitarianism’, which draws on (...) the lore of both superheroes and utilitarianism. After briefly surveying the careers of three exemplars of the moral entrepreneur (Robert McNamara, George Soros and Jeffrey Sachs), I explore the motives of moral entrepreneurs in terms of their standing debt to society for having already caused unnecessary harm but which also now equips him with the skill set needed to do significant good. Such a mindset involves imagining oneself a vehicle of divine will, which would be a scary proposition had it not been long presumed by Christians touched by Calvin. In conclusion, I argue that moral entrepreneurship looks most palatable – and perhaps even attractive – if the world is ‘reversible’, in the sense that every crisis, however clumsily handled by the moral entrepreneur, causes people to distinguish more clearly the necessary from contingent features of their existence. This leads them to reconceptualise past damages as new opportunities to assert what really matters; hence, a ‘superutilitarian’ ethic that treats all suffering as less cost than investment in a greater sense of the good. (shrink)

This article maintains that the process of globalization may be best understood as the spatial offspring of modern technology, just as “the end of history” is its temporal offspring. This conclusion is prefigured in the thought of four 20th-century thinkers who, despite their diverse personal and ideological background, came to almost identical conclusions about the role of technology in modernity. These thinkers, Kojève, Strauss, Schmitt, and Heidegger, may be considered as collaborators in deciphering the meaning of modern technology and its (...) planet-transforming capacities. (shrink)

This paper closely examines Strauss’ conception of “Medieval Enlightenment”. It focuses on the central role that Arab philosophy has played in the development of Strauss’s thought and discusses the validity of the uses he makes of it. It also emphasizes the interest of Strauss’s analyses as regards Arab philosophy while drawing attention to the tensions they create. It claims that Strauss’ involvement in the quarrel between Ancients and Moderns aims at showing that medieval philosophy cannot be reduced simply to the (...) effort to reconcile philosophy and religion. The ideas of some Arab philosophers cropped up throughout Strauss’s philosophical development and determined his interpretation of Maimonides and Plato as well as his stance in opposition to the moderns. However Strauss’s idea of the “medieval Enlightenment” remains fundamentally ambiguous. Is that Enlightenment supposed to be an argument for the preservation of faith alongside reason or does it rather express a kind of atheism or disguised materialism? (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} This essay presents a reading of modern liberalism from Leo Strauss´thought. Starting with his analysis of Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political and its critique of liberal “neutralization and depolitization”, Strauss posits an affirmation of the (...) problem of natural right, for which it is a fundamental first step to study the political philosophy of Hobbes. In contrast with Schmitt and Hobbes, Strauss´ thought points towards a consideration of classical natural right as a riposte to the political nihilism or apolitical cosmopolitanism of late-modernity, both products of radical historicism as well as methodological positivism. Strauss considers the search of natural right qua representation of the idea of justice a distinct alternative to the affirmation of the will through sovereign power. Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4. (shrink)

What I am trying to do in the present text is to draw a sketch of postwar French philosophy from the perspective of the question of relations between philosophy and politics. I am showing a distinction between the community and the text that is present in this philosophy from Sartre to Barthes to Foucault and beyond. The general passage from the community-oriented philosophy to the text-oriented philosophy took place in the sixties, following the books by Georges Bataille, Gilles Deleuze, and (...) Pierre Klossowski on Nietzsche. I am discussing the formulation of this opposition by Jean-Paul Sartre, its reversal suggested by Roland Barthes and, finally, an attempt made by Michel Foucault to go beyond the very oppositions pertaining to "writing" as such in his dichotomy of "universal intellectuals"/"specific intellectuals". The passage from the French Hegel to the French Nietzsche as a "master thinker" in French philosphy was also a manifest passage from the community to the text as a main focus of philosophical interest, and the discussion of relations between philosophy and politics is at the same time that of the role, place, tasks and obligations of the philosopher in culture. The detour to these discussions is made in order to stress the continuity of the text/community opposition in current debates on postmodernity and to ask about relations between philosophy and politics today. (shrink)

One wonders whether or not, as alternative to an American-style use of power considered too intimidating, and as such counterproductive, China’s productive fervor means in fact to revamp the old idea that there are, after all, happy slaves despite an overrating of freedom spread globally by the West. To the libertarian ideology claiming that freedom is worth the highest sacrifice, China can be perceived as opposing the naturalism of the wu wei doctrine: avoid confrontation whenever possible and live within your (...) means. Politically, this means accept your stance in life for the sake of general stability and peace, or apply for approval from above if obsessed with change. How does this compare to the Western quest for the next stroke of salutary genius capable of leading the world out of its present crisis into a new horizon? To find out, one needs to disclose the fundamental existential assumptions that exert their unquestioned fascination upon the Chinese mind, inciting it to export its way of being, and not just trinkets. The essay’s conclusion favors the idea that a political super-vision must liberate the minds from the spell of any model and flirt with a dangerous loss of control. (shrink)