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  1. Content, the Possible and the Impossible.Felappi Giulia - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):648-658.
    What are contents? The answer provided by the possible worlds approach is that contents are sets of possible worlds. This approach incurs serious problems and to solve them Jago suggests, in The Impossible, to get rid of the ‘possible’ bit and allowing some impossible worlds to be part of the game. In this note, I briefly consider the metaphysics behind Jago’s account and then focus on whether Jago is right in thinking that his worlds and his worlds only can do (...)
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  • The Advantage of an Empirically Minded Conception of Non-Cognitivism.Wayne Fenske - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (3):513-530.
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  • Émotions et Valeurs.C. Tappolet - 2000 - Presses Universitaires de France.
    Pour contrer le scepticisme au sujet de la connaissance des valeurs, la plupart soutiennent avec John Rawls qu’une croyance comme celle qu’une action est bonne est justifiée dans la mesure où elle appartient à un ensemble de croyances cohérent, ayant atteint un équilibre réfléchi. -/- Christine Tappolet s’inspire des travaux de Max Scheler et d’Alexius von Meinong pour défendre une conception opposée au cohérentisme. La connaissance des valeurs est affirmée dépendre de nos émotions, ces dernières étant conçues comme des perceptions (...)
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  • Moral Reality. A Defence of Moral Realism.Caj Strandberg - 2004 - Lund University.
    The main aim of this thesis is to defend moral realism. In chapter 1, I argue that moral realism is best understood as the view that moral sentences have truth-value, there are moral properties that make some moral sentences true, and moral properties are not reducible to non- moral properties. Realism is contrasted with non-cognitivism, error-theory and reductionism, which, in brief, deny, and, respectively. In the introductory chapter, it is also argued that there are some prima facie reasons to assume (...)
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  • A Defence of Metaphysical Ethical Naturalism.[author unknown] - unknown
    This dissertation is a defence of metaphysical ethical naturalism according to which there is a moral reality which is part of the natural world. The implication of this view is that moral properties, such as moral goodness, justice, compassion and so forth are part of the natural world, and inquiries concerning these moral entities are conducted in similar empirical ways of reasoning to that in which scientific inquiries are conducted. I defend metaphysical ethical naturalism by a variety of explanationist argument (...)
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  • Responsible Choices, Desert-Based Legal Institutions, and the Challenges of Contemporary Neuroscience.Michael S. Moore - 2012 - Social Philosophy and Policy 29 (1):233-279.
    Research Articles Michael S. Moore, Social Philosophy and Policy, FirstView Article.
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  • Non-Contradiction: Oh Yeah and So What?Mark T. Nelson - 2013 - Think 12 (34):87-91.
    ExtractThe logical Law of Non-contradiction – that a proposition cannot be both true and false – enjoys a special, perhaps uniquely privileged, status in philosophy. Most philosophers think that finding a contradiction – the assertion of both P and not-P – in one's reasoning is the best possible evidence that something has gone wrong, the ultimate refutation of a position. But why should this be so? What reason do we have to believe it?Export citation.
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  • V-Moral Error Theory.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):95-111.
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  • Speech and Morality. [REVIEW]Neil Sinclair - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):643-648.
    Nicholas Sturgeon memorably asked: ‘What difference does it make whether moral realism is true?’ His question was prompted by the rise of the metaethical upstart quasi-realism, which urges that an expressivist account of moral discourse is compatible with most, if not all, of its important contours. In his invigorating new book, Cuneo offers a startling new answer to Sturgeon’s question.1 If moral realism were not true, Cuneo argues, we would not be able to speak. But since we evidently can speak, (...)
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  • Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience.Preston J. Werner - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (3):294-317.
    _ Source: _Page Count 24 I defend the thesis that at least some moral properties can be part of the contents of experience. I argue for this claim using a contrast argument, a type of argument commonly found in the literature on the philosophy of perception. I first appeal to psychological research on what I call emotionally empathetic dysfunctional individuals to establish a phenomenal contrast between eedis and normal individuals in some moral situations. I then argue that the best explanation (...)
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  • Review of "Speech and Morality" by T. Cuneo. [REVIEW]Neil Sinclair - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3).
  • واقع‌گرایی در نظام معرفت‌اخلاقی علامه طباطبایی.ابوذر نوروزی & محسن شیراوند - 2018 - پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی 9 (1):85-110.
    چکیده علامه­ طباطبایی فیلسوفی کلاسیک بر ممشای حکمت متعالیه و مفسر بزرگ قرآن کریم است اما اندیشه­ی وی در این دو حوزه محدود و متمرکز نشده و در حوزه‌های معرفتی دیگر نیز دارای اندیشه‌های بدیعی است. یکی از این حوزه‌ها فلسفه‌ی اخلاق است. بی‌تردید اصلی‌ترین بحث در فلسفه‌ی اخلاق به تقسیم‌بندی واقع‌گرایی و غیر واقع‌گرایی اخلاقی تعلق دارد. هدف از این پژوهش پردازش این مسأله است که علامه طباطبایی در کدام‌یک از این دسته‌بندی‌ها جای دارد و تبیین آن با کدام (...)
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  • The Explanationist Argument for Moral Realism.Neil Sinclair - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):1-24.
    In this paper I argue that the explanationist argument in favour of moral realism fails. According to this argument, the ability of putative moral properties to feature in good explanations provides strong evidence for, or entails, the metaphysical claims of moral realism. Some have rejected this argument by denying that moral explanations are ever good explanations. My criticism is different. I argue that even if we accept that moral explanations are (sometimes) good explanations the metaphysical claims of realism do not (...)
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  • Irrealism and Error in Ethics.Mark Timmons - 1993 - Philosophia 22 (3-4):373-406.
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  • Moral Realism in Sport.J. S. Russell - 2004 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 31 (2):142-160.
  • Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived.Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1992 - Synthese 92 (2):221 - 260.
    J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relations of any kind, moral or otherwise, should be explainable rather (...)
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  • Desire as Belief, Lewis Notwithstanding.Ruth Weintraub - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):116-122.
    In two curiously neglected papers, David Lewis claims to reduce to absurdity the supposition (commonly labeled DAB) that (some) desires are belief-like. My aim in this paper is to explain the significance of this claim and rebut the proof.
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  • Normative Judgement.Scott Sturgeon - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):569–587.
  • What Do Our Critical Practices Say About the Nature of Morality?Charlie Kurth - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):45-64.
    A prominent argument for moral realism notes that we are inclined to accept realism in science because scientific inquiry supports a robust set of critical practices—error, improvement, explanation, and the like. It then argues that because morality displays a comparable set of critical practices, a claim to moral realism is just as warranted as a claim to scientific realism. But the argument is only as strong as its central analogy—and here there is trouble. If the analogy between the critical practices (...)
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  • Biting the Bullet on Moral Twin Earth.Michael Rubin - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (2):285-309.
    Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons? Moral Twin Earth thought experiment shows that realist ethical naturalism entails a kind of conceptual relativism about moral predicates. This conceptual relativism implies, further, that Earthlings and Twin Earthlings do not express substantive disagreement with one another. Because this latter implication clashes with considered linguistic intuitions, Horgan and Timmons conclude that we should reject realist ethical naturalism. Against this, several critics recommend that realists ?bite the bullet? with respect to Moral Twin Earth: despite our intuitions, (...)
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  • Reflection, Nature, and Moral Law: The Extent of Catharine Cockburn's Lockeanism in Her Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay.Patricia Sheridan - 2007 - Hypatia 22 (3):133 - 151.
    This essay examines Catharine Cockburn's moral philosophy as it is developed in her Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay on Human Understanding. In this work, Cockburn argues that Locke's epistemological principles provide a foundation for the knowledge of natural law. Sheridan suggests that Cockburn's objective in defending Locke's moral epistemology was conditioned by her own prior commitment to a significantly un-Lockean theory of morality. In exploring Cockbum's views on morality in terms of their divergence from Locke's, the author hopes to underscore (...)
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  • Expressivism and the Normativity of Attitudes.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):233-255.
    Many philosophers believe that judgments about propositional attitudes, or about which mental states are expressed by which sentences, are normative judgments. If this is so, then metanormative expressivism must be given expressivist treatment. This might seem to make expressivism self-defeating or worrisomely circular, or to frustrate the explanatory ambitions central to the view. I argue that recent objections along these lines to giving an expressivist account of expressivism are not successful. I shall also suggest that in order to deal with (...)
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  • V-Moral Error Theory.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):93-109.
  • The Promise and Perils of Hybrid Moral Semantics for Naturalistic Moral Realism.Michael Rubin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):691-710.
    In recent years, several philosophers have recommended to moral realists that they adopt a hybrid cognitivist–expressivist moral semantics. Adopting a hybrid semantics enables the realist to account for the action-guiding character of moral discourse, and to account for the possibility of moral (dis)agreement between speakers whose moral sentences express different cognitive contents. I argue that realists should resist the temptation to embrace a hybrid moral semantics. In granting that moral judgments are partly constituted by conative attitudes, the realist concedes too (...)
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  • Normatively Enriched Moral Meta‐Semantics.Michael Rubin - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):386-410.
    In order to defend the Cornell variety of naturalistic moral realism from Horgan and Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth objection, several philosophers have proposed what I call Normatively Enriched Moral Meta-Semantics. According to NEMMS, the natural properties that serve as the contents of moral predicates are fixed by non- moral normative facts. In this paper, I elucidate two versions of NEMMS: one proposed by David Brink, and the other proposed by Mark van Roojen. I show what these meta-semantics have in common, (...)
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  • Liberty and the Constitution.Michael S. Moore - 2015 - Legal Theory 21 (3-4):156-241.
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  • Empiricism in Science and Ethics.Stefan Sencerz - 1993 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):449-470.
    We elucidate the conditions under which any hypothesis is explanatorily relevant by analyzing several tests of explanatory relevance and explanations based on those tests. A new causal criterion of explanatory relevance is developed and defended. We show how the causal criterion succeeds in establishing, at the very least, a very strong presumption against moral facts.
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  • Years of Moral Epistemology: A Bibliography.Laura Donohue & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):217-229.
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  • All That Jazz: Linguistic Competence and Improvisation.Niklas Möller - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):237-250.
    Recently, theorists have pointed to the role of improvisation in practical reasoning and in gaining new moral knowledge. Laura and François Schroeter have gone even further by suggesting an account of competence with evaluative terms based on holistic improvisation. I argue, however, that they fail in their task. Through a challenge of their key claim against Allan Gibbard’s alternative account, I demonstrate that Schroeter and Schroeter provide only partial constraints on competence, and thus that their account lacks the content to (...)
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  • Critical Notice.Richmond Campbell - 1993 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):299-323.
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  • Confirmation Theory and Moral Justification.Edward D. Sherline - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):225 - 238.
    I defend a naturalist theory of moral justification, "Confirmation Theory", from an objection raised by David Copp and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. Confirmation Theory holds that some moral theory is justified because it is needed in the best empirical explanation of the world. The objection is that moral explanations are "incidental", that even if a moral theory is indispensable, this doesn't establish that any moral standard is justified. I show that the naturalist can concede that moral explanations are incidental and still maintain (...)
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