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  1. Leibniz on Intellectual Pleasure, Perception of Perfection, and Power.Saja Parvizian - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):600-627.
    Leibniz is unclear about the nature of pleasure. In some texts, he describes pleasure as a perception of perfection, while in other texts he describes pleasure as being caused by a perception of perfection. In this article, I disambiguate two senses of “perception of perfection”, which clarifies Leibniz’s considered position. I argue that pleasure is a perception of an increase in a substance’s power which is caused by a substance’s knowledge of a perfection of the universe or God. This reading (...)
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  • Arguing From Reception History for the Viability of Rational Reconstruction: A Case Study Involving The Reception of Cartesian Ethics in an Anglophone Context From 1650.Frits Gåvertsson - unknown
    I argue that Lisa Shapiro’s rational reconstruction of Descartes’s provisional moral code in terms of a broad conception of morality supplies us with an interpretative framework that make historiographical sense of the reception of Descartes’s moral philosophy in an Anglophone context on three occasions: the appeal to Descartes made by Henry More, Henry Sidgwick’s abrupt dismissal, and the ensuing reaction to Sidgwick found in Grace Neal Dolson. This case shows, I maintain, how reception history can be utilized to inform and (...)
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  • Why Virtue Is Not Quite Enough: Descartes on Attaining Happiness.Valtteri Viljanen - 2021 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 103 (1):54-69.
    Descartes explicitly states that virtue is sufficient for attaining happiness. In this paper I argue that, within the framework he develops, this is not exactly true: more than virtuous action is needed to secure happiness. I begin by analyzing, in Section 2, the Cartesian notion of virtue in order to show the way in which it closely connects to what, for Descartes, forms the very essence of morality – the correct use of our free will. Section 3, in turn, discusses (...)
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  • Of Dreams, Demons, and Whirlpools: Doubt, Skepticism, and Suspension of Judgment in Descartes's Meditations.Jan Forsman - 2021 - Dissertation, Tampere University
    I offer a novel reading in this dissertation of René Descartes’s (1596–1650) skepticism in his work Meditations on First Philosophy (1641–1642). I specifically aim to answer the following problem: How is Descartes’s skepticism to be read in accordance with the rest of his philosophy? This problem can be divided into two more general questions in Descartes scholarship: How is skepticism utilized in the Meditations, and what are its intentions and relation to the preceding philosophical tradition? -/- I approach the topic (...)
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  • Non-Eudaimonism, The Sufficiency of Virtue for Happiness, and Two Senses of the Highest Good in Descartes's Ethics.Frans Svensson - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (2):277-296.
    In his reflections on ethics, Descartes distances himself from the eudaimonistic tradition in moral philosophy by introducing a distinction between happiness and the highest good. While happiness, in Descartes’s view, consists in an inner state of complete harmony and satisfaction, the highest good instead consists in virtue, i.e. in ‘a firm and constant resolution' to always use our free will well or correctly. In Section 1 of this paper, I pursue the Cartesian distinction between happiness and the highest good in (...)
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  • When Generosity is Freedom: Cartesian Ethics and the Task of Care.Érico Andrade M. Oliveira - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (1).
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