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Moral judgment and emotions

Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (3):375-381 (2004)

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  1. Weak Motivational Internalism, Lite: Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do.Jesse Steinberg - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):1-24.
    I argue that there is a continuum of judgments ranging from those that are affectively rich, what might be called passionate judgments, to those that are purely cognitive and nonaffective, what might be called dispassionate judgments. The former are akin to desires and other affective states and so are necessarily motivating. Applying this schema to moral judgments, I maintain that the motivational internalist is wrong in claiming that all moral judgments are necessarily motivating, but right in regard to the subset (...)
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  • Rawlsian Compromises in Peacebuilding: A Rejoinder to Begby.Alejandro Agafonow - 2011 - Public Reason 3 (1).
  • David Friedman's Model of Privatized Justice.Ionuţ Sterpan - 2011 - Public Reason 3 (1).