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  1. The Revolutions in English Philosophy and Philosophy of Education.Peter Gilroy - 2013 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 45 (2):202-218.
    This article was first published in 1982 in Educational Analysis (4, 75?91) and republished in 1998 (Hirst, P. H., & White, P. (Eds.), Philosophy of education: Major themes in the analytic tradition, Vol. 1, Philosophy and education, Part 1, pp. 61?78. London: Routledge). I was then a lecturer in philosophy of education at Sheffield University teaching the subject to Master?s students on both full- and part-time programmes. My first degree was in philosophy, read under D. W. Hamlyn and David Cooper (...)
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  • Blackburn’s Problem: On Its Not Insignificant Residue.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361-383.
    Moral properties would supervene upon non-moral properties and be conceptually autonomous. That, according to Simon Blackburn, would make them if not impossible at least mysterious, and evidence for them best explained by theorists who say they are not real. In fact moral properties would not challenge in ways Blackburn has contended. There is, however, something new that can be gathered from his arguments. What would the supervenience of moral properties and their conceptual autonomy from at least total non-moral properties entail (...)
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  • Blackburn’s Problem: On Its Not Insignificant Residue.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361-383.
    Moral properties would supervene upon non-moral properties and be conceptually autonomous. That, according to Simon Blackburn, would make them if not impossible at least mysterious, and evidence for them best explained by theorists who say they are not real. In fact moral properties would not challenge in ways Blackburn has contended. There is, however, something new that can be gathered from his arguments. What would the supervenience of moral properties and their conceptual autonomy from at least total non-moral properties entail (...)
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  • Does Theism Need a Theodicy?Richard Swinburne - 1988 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):287-311.
    To many atheists the existence of evil seems to provide a conclusive argument against the existence of God. God is by definition omnipotent and perfectly good; a perfectly good being will remove evil in so far as he can, an omnipotent being can remove any evil he chooses, so if there is a God there will be no evil, but there is evil, hence there is no God. Theists normally challenge this argument by challenging the premiss that a perfectly good (...)
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  • How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.
    Moral disagreement is widely held to pose a threat for metaethical realism and objectivity. In this paper I attempt to understand how it is that moral disagreement is supposed to present a problem for metaethical realism. I do this by going through several distinct (though often related) arguments from disagreement, carefully distinguishing between them, and critically evaluating their merits. My conclusions are rather skeptical: Some of the arguments I discuss fail rather clearly. Others supply with a challenge to realism, but (...)
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  • Kant, Morality, and Hell.James Edwin Mahon - 2015 - In Robert Arp & Ben McCraw (eds.), The Concept of Hell. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 113-126.
    In this paper I argue that, although Kant argues that morality is independent of God (and hence, agrees with the Euthyphro), and rejects Divine Command Theory (or Theological Voluntarism), he believes that all moral duties are also the commands of God, who is a moral being, and who is morally required to punish those who transgress the moral law: "God’s justice is the precise allocation of punishments and rewards in accordance with men’s good or bad behavior." However, since we lack (...)
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