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  1. Dancing Chief in the Brain or Consciousness as an Entanglement.Yukio-Pegio Gunji & Kyoko Nakamura - 2020 - Foundations of Science 25 (1):151-184.
    Free will in intentional consciousness is exposed to skeptics since it was found that subconscious neural activities, what is called readiness potential, precedes the intention to an action. The question of whether free will is an authentic illusion has been argued not only in psychology but physics and philosophy. Most of scientists, however, think that the intentional consciousness who believes to have his/her own free will, is determined by readiness potential in advance, and that free will cannot coexist with determinism. (...)
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  • The Awareness of Joint Attention.Ouriel Grynszpan, Jacqueline Nadel, Jean-Claude Martin & Philippe Fossati - 2017 - Interaction Studies 18 (2):234-253.
    This study investigates a specific aspect of joint attention, that is, the emergence of the sense that one is leading the attentional focus of others. Thirty participants were placed in front of two avatars and had to pay attention to objects that were also attended to by the avatars. Unbeknownst to the participant, the avatars’ gaze orientations were alternately controlled by the participant’s eyes. Eye-tracking data were collected and participants were enquired about their experience to account for their sense of (...)
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  • Prime and Probability: Causal Knowledge Affects Inferential and Predictive Effects on Self-Agency Experiences.Anouk van der Weiden, Henk Aarts & Kirsten I. Ruys - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1865-1871.
    Experiences of having caused a certain outcome may arise from motor predictions based on action–outcome probabilities and causal inferences based on pre-activated outcome representations. However, when and how both indicators combine to affect such self-agency experiences is still unclear. Based on previous research on prediction and inference effects on self-agency, we propose that their contribution crucially depends on whether people have knowledge about the causal relation between actions and outcomes that is relevant to subsequent self-agency experiences. Therefore, we manipulated causal (...)
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  • Metacognition of Agency and Theory of Mind in Adults with High Functioning Autism.Tiziana Zalla, David Miele, Marion Leboyer & Janet Metcalfe - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 31:126-138.
  • The Influence of Goals on Sense of Control.Wen Wen, Atsushi Yamashita & Hajime Asama - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 37:83-90.
  • Intentional Action Processing Results From Automatic Bottom-Up Attention: An EEG-Investigation Into the Social Relevance Hypothesis Using Hypnosis.Eleonore Neufeld, Elliot C. Brown, Sie-In Lee-Grimm, Albert Newen & Martin Brüne - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 42:101-112.
    Social stimuli grab our attention: we attend to them in an automatic and bottom-up manner, and ascribe them a higher degree of saliency compared to non-social stimuli. However, it has rarely been investigated how variations in attention affect the processing of social stimuli, although the answer could help us uncover details of social cognition processes such as action understanding. In the present study, we examined how changes to bottom-up attention affects neural EEG-responses associated with intentional action processing. We induced an (...)
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  • Things Happen: Individuals with High Obsessive–Compulsive Tendencies Omit Agency in Their Spoken Language.Ela Oren, Naama Friedmann & Reuven Dar - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 42:125-134.
  • Simulated Thought Insertion: Influencing the Sense of Agency Using Deception and Magic.Jay A. Olson, Mathieu Landry, Krystèle Appourchaux & Amir Raz - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 43:11-26.
  • Hearing a Voice as One’s Own: Two Views of Inner Speech Self-Monitoring Deficits in Schizophrenia.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):675-699.
    Many philosophers and psychologists have sought to explain experiences of auditory verbal hallucinations and “inserted thoughts” in schizophrenia in terms of a failure on the part of patients to appropriately monitor their own inner speech. These self-monitoring accounts have recently been challenged by some who argue that AVHs are better explained in terms of the spontaneous activation of auditory-verbal representations. This paper defends two kinds of self-monitoring approach against the spontaneous activation account. The defense requires first making some important clarifications (...)
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  • Grounding Action Representations.Arne M. Weber & Gottfried Vosgerau - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):53-69.
    In this paper we discuss an approach called grounded action cognition, which aims to provide a theory of the interdependencies between motor control and action-related cognitive processes, like perceiving an action or thinking about an action. The theory contrasts with traditional views in cognitive science in that it motivates an understanding of cognition as embodied, through application of Barsalou’s general idea of grounded cognition. To guide further research towards an appropriate theory of grounded action cognition we distinguish between grounding qua (...)
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  • Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Delusions of Control.Shaun Gallagher - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):865-879.
    This article addresses questions about the sense of agency and its distinction from the sense of ownership in the context of understanding schizophrenic thought insertion. In contrast to “standard” approaches that identify problems with the sense of agency as central to thought insertion, two recent proposals argue that it is more correct to think that the problem concerns the subject’s sense of ownership. This view involves a “more demanding” concept of the sense of ownership that, I will argue, ultimately depends (...)
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  • When One’s Sense of Agency Goes Wrong: Absent Modulation of Time Perception by Voluntary Actions and Reduction of Perceived Length of Intervals in Passivity Symptoms in Schizophrenia.Kyran T. Graham-Schmidt, Mathew T. Martin-Iverson, Nicholas P. Holmes & Flavie A. V. Waters - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 45:9-23.
  • Embodied Prosthetic Arm Stabilizes Body Posture, While Unembodied One Perturbs It.Shu Imaizumi, Tomohisa Asai & Shinichi Koyama - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 45:75-88.
  • The Feeling of Agency Hypothesis: A Critique.Thor Grünbaum - 2015 - Synthese 192 (10):3313-3337.
    A dominant view in contemporary cognitive neuroscience is that low-level, comparator-based mechanisms of motor control produce a distinctive experience often called the feeling of agency . An opposing view is that comparator-based motor control is largely non-conscious and not associated with any particular type of distinctive phenomenology . In this paper, I critically evaluate the nature of the empirical evidence researchers commonly take to support FoA-hypothesis. The aim of this paper is not only to scrutinize the FoA-hypothesis and data supposed (...)
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  • Thought Insertion: Abnormal Sense of Thought Agency or Thought Endorsement?Paulo Sousa & Lauren Swiney - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):637-654.
    The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises new issues that enrich (...)
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  • How Does It Feel to Act Together?Elisabeth Pacherie - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):25-46.
    This paper on the phenomenology of joint agency proposes a foray into a little explored territory at the intersection of two very active domains of research: joint action and sense of agency. I explore two ways in which our experience of joint agency may differ from our experience of individual agency. First, the mechanisms of action specification and control involved in joint action are typically more complex than those present in individual actions, since it is crucial for joint action that (...)
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  • The Comparator Account on Thought Insertion, Alien Voices and Inner Speech: Some Open Questions.Agustin Vicente - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):335-353.
    Recently, many philosophers and psychologists have claimed that the explanation that grounds both passivity phenomena in the cognitive domain and passivity phenomena that occur with respect to overt actions is, along broad lines, the same. Furthermore, they claim that the best account we have of such phenomena in both scenarios is the “comparator” account. However, there are reasons to doubt whether the comparator model can be exported from the realm of overt actions to the cognitive domain in general. There is (...)
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  • Out of Nowhere: Thought Insertion, Ownership and Context-Integration.Jean-Remy Martin & Pacherie Elisabeth - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):111-122.
  • Sense of Agency in Continuous Action: Assistance-Induced Performance Improvement is Self-Attributed Even with Knowledge of Assistance.Kazuya Inoue, Yuji Takeda & Motohiro Kimura - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 48:246-252.
  • Multi-Scale Control Influences Sense of Agency: Investigating Intentional Binding Using Event-Control Approach.Devpriya Kumar & Narayanan Srinivasan - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 49:1-14.
  • I Could Have Done Otherwise: Availability of Counterfactual Comparisons Informs the Sense of Agency.Eugenia Kulakova, Nima Khalighinejad & Patrick Haggard - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 49:237-244.
  • The Sense of Agency in OCD.Judit Szalai - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):363-380.
    This paper proposes an integrated account of the etiology of OCD that accommodates both dysfunctional cognitions and sensorimotor features of compulsive action. It is argued that cognitive/metacognitive theories do not aspire to address all obsessive-compulsive phenomenal properties and that empirical evidence concerning some of these requires the incorporation of motor deficits as an independent factor in a plausible conception of OCD. The difference in agency attribution between obsessive-compulsive persons and schizophrenia patients with delusions of control is also accounted for in (...)
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  • Changes in the Sense of Agency During Hypnosis: The Hungarian Version of the Sense of Agency Rating Scale and its Relationship with Phenomenological Aspects of Consciousness.András Költő & Vince Polito - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 49:245-254.
  • Know Thy Agency in Predictive Coding: Meta-Monitoring Over Forward Modeling.Tomohisa Asai - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 51:82-99.
  • The Influence of Performance on Action-Effect Integration in Sense of Agency.Wen Wen, Atsushi Yamashita & Hajime Asama - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 53:89-98.
  • Uncovering Effects of Self-Control and Stimulus-Driven Action Selection on the Sense of Agency.Yuru Wang, Tom G. E. Damen & Henk Aarts - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 55:245-253.
  • Out of Nowhere: Thought Insertion, Ownership and Context-Integration.Jean-Remy Martin & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):111-122.
    We argue that thought insertion primarily involves a disruption of the sense of ownership for thoughts and that the lack of a sense of agency is but a consequence of this disruption. We defend the hypothesis that this disruption of the sense of ownership stems from a fail- ure in the online integration of the contextual information related to a thought, in partic- ular contextual information concerning the different causal factors that may be implicated in their production. Loss of unity (...)
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  • Narrators and Comparators: The Architecture of Agentive Self-Awareness. [REVIEW]Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2007 - Synthese 159 (3):475 - 491.
    This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a high-level, narrative-based account, and a low-level comparator-based account. We argue that an agent's narrative self-conception has a role to play in explaining their agentive judgments, but that agentive experiences are explained by low-level comparator mechanisms that are grounded in the very machinery responsible for action-production.
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  • Learning to Infer the Time of Our Actions and Decisions From Their Consequences.Helena Matute, Carmelo P. Cubillas & Pablo Garaizar - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 56:37-49.
  • Evidence for Pain Attenuation by the Motor System-Based Judgment of Agency.N. Karsh, O. Goldstein & B. Eitam - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 57:134-146.
  • Sense of Agency in Health and Disease: A Review of Cue Integration Approaches. [REVIEW]James W. Moore & P. C. Fletcher - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):59-68.
    Sense of agency is a compelling but fragile experience that is augmented or attenuated by internal signals and by external cues. A disruption in SoA may characterise individual symptoms of mental illness such as delusions of control. Indeed, it has been argued that generic SoA disturbances may lie at the heart of delusions and hallucinations that characterise schizophrenia. A clearer understanding of how sensorimotor, perceptual and environmental cues complement, or compete with, each other in engendering SoA may prove valuable in (...)
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  • Bayes and the First Person: Consciousness of Thoughts, Inner Speech and Probabilistic Inference.Franz Knappik - 2017 - Synthese:1-28.
    On a widely held view, episodes of inner speech provide at least one way in which we become conscious of our thoughts. However, it can be argued, on the one hand, that consciousness of thoughts in virtue of inner speech presupposes interpretation of the simulated speech. On the other hand, the need for such self-interpretation seems to clash with distinctive first-personal characteristics that we would normally ascribe to consciousness of one’s own thoughts: a special reliability; a lack of conscious ambiguity (...)
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  • A New Comparator Account of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations: How Motor Prediction Can Plausibly Contribute to the Sense of Agency for Inner Speech.Lauren Swiney & Paulo Sousa - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
  • Misattribution of Agency in Schizophrenia: An Exploration of Historical First-Person Accounts.Jpma Maes & A. R. Van Gool - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):191-202.
    This paper provides a concise description and discussion of bottom–up and top–down approaches to misattribution of agency in schizophrenia. It explores if first-person accounts of passivity phenomena can provide support for one of these approaches. The focus is on excerpts in which the writers specifically examine their experiences of external influence. None of the accounts provides arguments that fit easily with only one of the possible approaches, which is in line with current attempts to theoretical integration.
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  • A Proposal for Genetically Modifying the Project of “Naturalizing” Phenomenology.Brady Thomas Heiner & Kyle Powys Whyte - 2008 - Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):179-193.
    In this paper, we examine Shaun Gallagher’s project of “naturalizing” phenomenology with the cognitive sciences: front-loaded phenomenology. While we think it is a productive proposal, we argue that Gallagher does not employ genetic phenomenological methods in his execution of FLP. We show that without such methods, FLP’s attempt to locate neurological correlates of conscious experience is not yet adequate. We demonstrate this by analyzing Gallagher’s critique of cognitive neuropsychologist Christopher Frith’s functional explanation of schizophrenic symptoms. In “constraining” Gallagher’s FLP program, (...)
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  • A Problem for Wegner and Colleagues' Model of the Sense of Agency.Glenn Carruthers - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):341-357.
    The sense of agency, that is the sense that one is the agent of one’s bodily actions, is one component of our self-consciousness. Recently, Wegner and colleagues have developed a model of the causal history of this sense. Their model takes it that the sense of agency is elicited for an action when one infers that one or other of one’s mental states caused that action. In their terms, the sense of agency is elicited by the inference to apparent mental (...)
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  • Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2012 - In Keith Frankish & William Ramsey (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press. pp. 92--111.
    In recent years, the integration of philosophical with scientific theorizing has started to yield new insights. This chapter surveys some recent philosophical and empirical work on the nature and structure of action, on conscious agency, and on our knowledge of actions.
     
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  • The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2012 - In Seemann Axel (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments. MIT Press.
    This chapter aims at investigating the phenomenology of joint action and at gaining a better understanding of (1) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs from the sense of agency one has for individual actions and (2) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs according to the type of joint action and to the role one plays in it.
     
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  • Self‐Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2010 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
    We are perceivers, we are thinkers, and we are also agents, bringing about physical events, such as bodily movements and their consequences. What we do tells us, and others, a lot about who we are. On the one hand, who we are determines what we do. On the other hand, acting is also a process of self-discovery and self-shaping. Pivotal to this mutual shaping of self and agency is the sense of agency, or agentive self-awareness, i.e., the sense that one (...)
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  • Reconstructing the Minimal Self, or How to Make Sense of Agency and Ownership.Sanneke de Haan & Leon de Bruin - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):373-396.
    We challenge Gallagher’s distinction between the sense of ownership and the sense of agency as two separable modalities of experience of the minimal self and argue that a careful investigation of the examples provided to promote this distinction in fact reveals that SO and SA are intimately related and modulate each other. We propose a way to differentiate between the various notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably in the debate, and suggest a more gradual reading of (...)
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  • Reply to Carruthers☆.Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):521-523.
  • The Sense of Agency in Driving Automation.Wen Wen, Yoshihiro Kuroki & Hajime Asama - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  • The Sense of Agency and its Role in Strategic Control for Expert Mountain Bikers.Wayne Christensen, Kath Bicknell, Doris McIlwain & John Sutton - 2015 - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 2 (3):340-353.
    Much work on the sense of agency has focused either on abnormal cases, such as delusions of control, or on simple action tasks in the laboratory. Few studies address the nature of the sense of agency in complex natural settings, or the effect of skill on the sense of agency. Working from 2 case studies of mountain bike riding, we argue that the sense of agency in high-skill individuals incorporates awareness of multiple causal influences on action outcomes. This allows fine-grained (...)
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  • Conscious Action/Zombie Action.Joshua Shepherd - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):419-444.
    I argue that the neural realizers of experiences of trying are not distinct from the neural realizers of actual trying . I then ask how experiences of trying might relate to the perceptual experiences one has while acting. First, I assess recent zombie action arguments regarding conscious visual experience, and I argue that contrary to what some have claimed, conscious visual experience plays a causal role for action control in some circumstances. Second, I propose a multimodal account of the experience (...)
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  • Two Problems with the Socio-Relational Critique of Distributive Egalitarianism.Christian Seidel - 2013 - In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico.
    Distributive egalitarians believe that distributive justice is to be explained by the idea of distributive equality (DE) and that DE is of intrinsic value. The socio-relational critique argues that distributive egalitarianism does not account for the “true” value of equality, which rather lies in the idea of “equality as a substantive social value” (ESV). This paper examines the socio-relational critique and argues that it fails because – contrary to what the critique presupposes –, first, ESV is not conceptually distinct from (...)
     
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  • Modulating the Sense of Agency with External Cues.James W. Moore, Daniel M. Wegner & Patrick Haggard - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):1056-1064.
    We investigate the processes underlying the feeling of control over one’s actions . Sense of agency may depend on internal motoric signals, and general inferences about external events. We used priming to modulate the sense of agency for voluntary and involuntary movements, by modifying the content of conscious thought prior to moving. Trials began with the presentation of one of two supraliminal primes, which corresponded to the effect of a voluntary action participants subsequently made. The perceived interval between movement and (...)
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  • Who is Causing What? The Sense of Agency is Relational and Efferent-Triggered.Kai Engbert, Andreas Wohlschläger & Patrick Haggard - 2008 - Cognition 107 (2):693-704.
  • What Is the Sense of Agency and Why Does It Matter?James W. Moore - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Subjective Misidentification and Thought Insertion.Matthew Parrott - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (1):39-64.
    This essay presents a new account of thought insertion. Prevailing views in both philosophy and cognitive science tend to characterize the experience of thought insertion as missing or lacking some element, such as a ‘sense of agency’, found in ordinary first-person awareness of one's own thoughts. By contrast, I propose that, rather than lacking something, experiences of thought insertion have an additional feature not present in ordinary conscious experiences of one's own thoughts. More specifically, I claim that the structure of (...)
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  • The Influence of Belief in Free Will on Immoral Behavior.Emilie A. Caspar, Laurène Vuillaume, Pedro A. Magalhães De Saldanha da Gama & Axel Cleeremans - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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