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  1. Doing Things with Thoughts: Brain-Computer Interfaces and Disembodied Agency.Steffen Steinert, Christoph Bublitz, Ralf Jox & Orsolya Friedrich - 2019 - Philosophy and Technology 32 (3):457-482.
    Connecting human minds to various technological devices and applications through brain-computer interfaces affords intriguingly novel ways for humans to engage and interact with the world. Not only do BCIs play an important role in restorative medicine, they are also increasingly used outside of medical or therapeutic contexts. A striking peculiarity of BCI technology is that the kind of actions it enables seems to differ from paradigmatic human actions, because, effects in the world are brought about by devices such as robotic (...)
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  • Out of Nowhere: Thought Insertion, Ownership and Context-Integration.Jean-Remy Martin & Pacherie Elisabeth - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):111-122.
  • Out of Nowhere: Thought Insertion, Ownership and Context-Integration.Jean-Remy Martin & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):111-122.
    We argue that thought insertion primarily involves a disruption of the sense of ownership for thoughts and that the lack of a sense of agency is but a consequence of this disruption. We defend the hypothesis that this disruption of the sense of ownership stems from a fail- ure in the online integration of the contextual information related to a thought, in partic- ular contextual information concerning the different causal factors that may be implicated in their production. Loss of unity (...)
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  • Sense of Agency in Health and Disease: A Review of Cue Integration Approaches. [REVIEW]James W. Moore & P. C. Fletcher - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):59-68.
    Sense of agency is a compelling but fragile experience that is augmented or attenuated by internal signals and by external cues. A disruption in SoA may characterise individual symptoms of mental illness such as delusions of control. Indeed, it has been argued that generic SoA disturbances may lie at the heart of delusions and hallucinations that characterise schizophrenia. A clearer understanding of how sensorimotor, perceptual and environmental cues complement, or compete with, each other in engendering SoA may prove valuable in (...)
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  • Sense of Agency for Movements.Mark Schram Christensen & Thor Grünbaum - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 65:27-47.
    In this paper, we argue that the comparator model is not a satisfactory model of sense of agency (SoA). We present a theoretical argument and experimental studies. We show (1) most studies of SoA neglect a distinction between SoA associated with movements (narrow SoA) and SoA associated with environmental events (broad SoA); (2) the comparator model emerges from experimental studies of sensory consequences narrowly associated with movements; (3) narrow SoA can be explained by a comparator model, but a motor signal (...)
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  • A New Comparator Account of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations: How Motor Prediction Can Plausibly Contribute to the Sense of Agency for Inner Speech.Lauren Swiney & Paulo Sousa - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
  • Reply to Carruthers☆.Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):521-523.
  • Scientific Challenges to Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (3):197-207.
    Here, I review work from three lines of research in cognitive science often taken to threaten free will and moral responsibility. This work concerns conscious deciding, the experience of acting, and the role of largely unnoticed situational influences on behavior. Whether this work in fact threatens free will and moral responsibility depends on how we ought to interpret it, and depends as well on the nature of free and responsible behavior. I discuss different ways this work has been interpreted and (...)
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  • Homing in on Consciousness in the Nervous System: An Action-Based Synthesis.Ezequiel Morsella, Christine A. Godwin, Tiffany K. Jantz, Stephen C. Krieger & Adam Gazzaley - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:1-70.
    What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, (...)
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  • When Our Thoughts Are Not Our Own: Investigating Agency Misattributions Using the Mind-to-Mind Paradigm.Lauren Swiney & Paulo Sousa - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):589-602.
    At the core of the sense of agency for self-produced action is the sense that I, and not some other agent, am producing and directing those actions. While there is an ever-expanding body of empirical research investigating the sense of agency for bodily action, there has, to date, been little empirical investigation of the sense of agency for thought. The present study uses the novel Mind-to-Mind paradigm, in which the agentive source of a target thought is ambiguous, to measure misattributions (...)
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  • The Brain in Action: A Meta-Analytical Comparison of Imaging Studies on Motor Intentionality and Sense of Agency.Silvia Seghezzi, Eleonora Zirone, Eraldo Paulesu & Laura Zapparoli - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  • Freedom, Choice, and the Sense of Agency.Zeynep Barlas & Sukhvinder S. Obhi - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
  • The Two Selves: Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence.Stan Klein - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    The Two Selves takes the position that the self is not a "thing" easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of their potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to (...)
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  • The Embodied Self, the Pattern Theory of Self, and the Predictive Mind.Albert Newen - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • Action Choice and Outcome Congruency Independently Affect Intentional Binding and Feeling of Control Judgments.Zeynep Barlas & Stefan Kopp - 2018 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 12.
  • The Senses of Agency and Ownership: A Review.Niclas Braun, Stefan Debener, Nadine Spychala, Edith Bongartz, Peter Sörös, Helge H. O. Müller & Alexandra Philipsen - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • The Inevitable Contrast: Conscious Vs. Unconscious Processes in Action Control.Ezequiel Morsella & T. Andrew Poehlman - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4.
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  • The Experience of Agency: An Interplay Between Prediction and Postdiction.Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Martin Voss - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4.
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  • Schizophrenia and the Place of Egodystonic States in the Aetiology of Thought Insertion.Pablo López-Silva - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):577-594.
    Despite the diagnostic relevance of thought insertion for disorders such as schizophrenia, the debates about its aetiology are far from resolved. This paper claims that in paying exclusive attention to the perceptual and cognitive impairments leading to delusional experiences in general, current deficit approaches overlook the role that affective disturbances might play in giving rise to cases of thought insertion. In the context of psychosis, affective impairments are often characterized as a consequence of the stress and anxiety caused by delusional (...)
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  • Feeling of Control of an Action After Supra and Subliminal Haptic Distortions.Sébastien Weibel, Patrick Eric Poncelet, Yvonne Delevoye-Turrell, Antonio Capobianco, André Dufour, Renaud Brochard, Laurent Ott & Anne Giersch - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 35:16-29.
    Here we question the mechanisms underlying the emergence of the feeling of control that can be modulated even when the feeling of being the author of one’s own action is intact. With a haptic robot, participants made series of vertical pointing actions on a virtual surface, which was sometimes postponed by a small temporal delay (15 or 65 ms). Subjects then evaluated their subjective feeling of control. Results showed that after temporal distortions, the hand-trajectories were adapted effectively but that the (...)
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  • The Ecology of Self-Monitoring Effects on Memory of Verbal Productions: Does Speaking to Someone Make a Difference?Alexis Lafleur & Victor J. Boucher - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:139-146.
  • Experience of Agency and Sense of Responsibility.Giovanna Moretto, Eamonn Walsh & Patrick Haggard - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1847-1854.
    The experience of agency refers to the feeling that we control our own actions, and through them the outside world. In many contexts, sense of agency has strong implications for moral responsibility. For example, a sense of agency may allow people to choose between right and wrong actions, either immediately, or on subsequent occasions through learning about the moral consequences of their actions. In this study we investigate the relation between the experience of operant action, and responsibility for action outcomes (...)
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  • What Are Cognitive Processes? An Example-Based Approach.Albert Newen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4251-4268.
    The question “What are cognitive processes?” can be understood variously as meaning “What is the nature of cognitive processes?”, “Can we distinguish epistemically cognitive processes from physical and biochemical processes on the one hand, and from mental or conscious processes on the other?”, and “Can we establish a fruitful notion of cognitive process?” The present aim is to deliver a positive answer to the last question by developing criteria for what would count as a paradigmatic exemplar of a cognitive process, (...)
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  • Self-Referential Emotions.Alexandra Zinck - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):496-505.
    The aim of this paper is to examine a special subgroup of emotion: self-referential emo- tions such as shame, pride and guilt. Self-referential emotions are usually conceptualized as (i) essentially involving the subject herself and as (ii) having complex conditions such as the capacity to represent others’ thoughts. I will show that rather than depending on a fully fledged ‘theory of mind’ and an explicit language-based self-representation, (i) pre-forms of self-referential emotions appear at early developmental stages already exhib- iting their (...)
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  • The Spatial Distance Rule in the Moving and Classical Rubber Hand Illusions.Andreas Kalckert & H. Henrik Ehrsson - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30:118-132.
  • Discrepancy Between Explicit Judgement of Agency and Implicit Feeling of Agency: Implications for Sense of Agency and its Disorders.Naho Saito, Keisuke Takahata, Toshiya Murai & Hidehiko Takahashi - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 37:1-7.
  • The Sense of Agency – a Phenomenological Consequence of Enacting Sensorimotor Schemes.Thomas Buhrmann & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):207-236.
    The sensorimotor approach to perception addresses various aspects of perceptual experience, but not the subjectivity of intentional action. Conversely, the problem that current accounts of the sense of agency deal with is primarily one of subjectivity. But the proposed models, based on internal signal comparisons, arguably fail to make the transition from subpersonal computations to personal experience. In this paper we suggest an alternative direction towards explaining the sense of agency by braiding three theoretical strands: a world-involving, dynamical interpretation of (...)
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  • Beyond the Comparator Model.Matthis Synofzik & Gottfried Vosgerau - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):1-3.
  • The Valence of Action Outcomes Modulates the Perception of One’s Actions.Carlo Wilke, Matthis Synofzik & Axel Lindner - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):18-29.
  • The Paradoxical Self: Awareness, Solipsism and First-Rank Symptoms in Schizophrenia.Clara S. Humpston - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):210-231.
    Schizophrenia as a pathology of self-awareness has attracted much attention from philosophical theorists and empirical scientists alike. I view schizophrenia as a basic self-disturbance leading to a lifeworld of solipsism adopted by the sufferer and explain how this adoption takes place, which then manifests in ways such as first-rank psychotic symptoms. I then discuss the relationships between these symptoms, not as isolated mental events, but as end-products of a loss of agency and ownership, and argue that symptoms like thought insertion (...)
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  • Making Sense of an Endorsement Model of Thought‐Insertion.Michael Sollberger - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):590-612.
    Experiences of thought-insertion are a first-rank, diagnostically central symptom of schizophrenia. Schizophrenic patients who undergo such delusional mental states report being first-personally aware of an occurrent conscious thought which is not theirs, but which belongs to an external cognitive agent. Patients seem to be right about what they are thinking but mistaken about who is doing the thinking. It is notoriously difficult to make sense of such delusions. One general approach to explaining the etiology of monothematic delusions has come to (...)
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  • Self-Recognition of Highly Skilled Actions: A Study of Orchestral Conductors.Clemens Wöllner - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (3):1311-1321.
    The influence of movement skill on action representations and identification of agency was investigated. Point-light displays were created of highly skilled gestures of thirteen orchestral conductors in visual, auditory, and audiovisual versions and compared to two control conditions . In subsequent experimental sessions, participants indicated whether displays presented them or other conductors, whether the soundtrack contained their or others’ musical interpretations, and rated the quality and emotional content of the gestures. Self-recognition was more accurate in conditions presenting highly skilled conducting (...)
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  • The Relationship Between Human Agency and Embodiment.Emilie A. Caspar, Axel Cleeremans & Patrick Haggard - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:226-236.
  • Impaired Self-Reflection in Psychiatric Disorders Among Adults: A Proposal for the Existence of a Network of Semi Independent Functions.Giancarlo Dimaggio, Stijn Vanheule, Paul H. Lysaker, Antonino Carcione & Giuseppe Nicolò - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):653-664.
    Self-reflection plays a key role in healthy human adaptation. Self-reflection might involve different capacities which may be impaired to different degrees relatively independently of one another. Variation in abilities for different forms of self-reflection are commonly seen as key aspects of many adult mental disorders. Yet little has been written about whether there are different kinds of deficits in self-reflection found in mental illness, how those deficits should be distinguished from one another and how to characterize the extent to which (...)
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  • Body and Self in Dolphins.Louis M. Herman - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):526-545.
    In keeping with recent views of consciousness of self as represented in the body in action, empirical studies are reviewed that demonstrate a bottlenose dolphin’s conscious awareness of its own body and body parts, implying a representational “body image” system. Additional work reviewed demonstrates an advanced capability of dolphins for motor imitation of self-produced behaviors and of behaviors of others, including imitation of human actions, supporting hypotheses that dolphins have a sense of agency and ownership of their actions and may (...)
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  • Mental Actions and Mental Agency.Anika Fiebich & John Michael - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):683-693.
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