This article analyzes the moral and political implications of strong moral character for political action. The treatment provides reason to hold that strong moral character should play a role in a robust normative account of political leadership. The case is supported by empirical findings on character dispositions and the political viability of the account’s normative prescriptions.

This paper discusses the establishment of a governance framework to secure the development and deployment of “good AI”, and describes the quest for a morally objective compass to steer it. Asserting that human rights can provide such compass, this paper first examines what a human rights-based approach to AI governance entails, and sets out the promise it propagates. Subsequently, it examines the pitfalls associated with human rights, particularly focusing on the criticism that these rights may be too Western, too individualistic, (...) too narrow in scope and too abstract to form the basis of sound AI governance. After rebutting these reproaches, a plea is made to move beyond the calls for a human rights-based approach, and start taking the necessary steps to attain its realisation. It is argued that, without elucidating the applicability and enforceability of human rights in the context of AI; adopting legal rules that concretise those rights where appropriate; enhancing existing enforcement mechanisms and securing an underlying societal infrastructure that enables human rights in the first place, any human rights-based governance framework for AI risks falling short of its purpose. (shrink)

In this review essay, I first set out and then subject to criticism the main claims advanced by William Talbott in his excellent recent book, “Which Rights Should be Universal?”. Talbott offers a conception of basic universal human rights as the minimally necessary and sufficient conditions to political legitimacy. I argue that his conception is at once too robustly liberal and democratic and too inattentive to key features of the rule of law to play this role. I suggest that John (...) Rawls’s conception of human rights comes closer to hitting the mark Talbott sets for himself and that Talbott incorrectly rejects Rawls’s view. I conclude that what likely divides Talbott and Rawls is that Rawls, but not Talbott, explicitly frames the inquiry into the minimally necessary and sufficient conditions to political legitimacy in terms of a liberal democratic people attempting to determine, as a matter of its just foreign policy, whether or not to recognize other organized polities as independent and self-determining within the international order. (shrink)

As political instruments, human rights can be challenged in two important ways: first, by undermining the claim to universality by appealing to a kind of cultural relativism, and second, by accusing human rights of unjustifiably imposing values that are not genuinely universal (which I dub the problem of parochialism). The human right to health is no exception. If a human right to health is to be a useful instrument in mobilizing action for global health justice, then we need to take (...) seriously the ways that health intersects with culture. Universal applicability is essential to both the legitimacy and efficacy of human rights. But without cultural sensitivity, additional injustices and imperialistic harms may be perpetuated. There are two goals within this paper—(1) to show that cultural imperialism is a moral and practical hazard, both in general and for the human right to health in particular and (2) to articulate a way of thinking about the human right to health that can minimize these hazards and arm it with moral credibility and political weight. (shrink)

This paper provides a critical exploration of the capability approach to human rights (CAHR) with the specific aim of developing its potential for achieving a synthesis between “humanist” or “naturalistic” and “political” or “practical” perspectives in the philosophy of human rights. Section II presents a general strategy for achieving such a synthesis. Section III provides an articulation of the key insights of CAHR (its focus on actual realizations given diverse circumstances, its pluralism of grounds, its emphasis on freedom of choice, (...) its demand for public reasoning, its context-sensitive universalism, and its broad view of obligations). These insights go some way toward the achievement of the desired synthesis. But, as explained in IV.1, in its current form CAHR faces two serious objections by the defenders of the political perspective: the Gap Between Capabilities-Interests and Rights Objection and the Disconnect From Practice Objection. Answering these criticisms requires some amendments to CAHR. Section IV.2 suggests a response to the first objection based on the introduction of a contractualist framework of justification. Sections IV.3 and IV.4 tackle the second objection by introducing a re-characterization of the cosmopolitan standard underlying the humanist perspective and by identifying the differences and relations between various dimensions of a conception of human rights and their significance for actual political practice. The paper illustrates the practical implications of CAHR, in its modified form, for the pursuit of some important rights. (shrink)

En este trabajo se hace una crítica a la interpretación que hacen Ulises Schmill y Carlos Silva Nava de la noción de interés legítimo. La primera parte de la crítica consiste en advertir serios problemas en la tradición doctrinal que ha combinado la concepción de Ihering de interés jurídico con la noción kelseniana de derecho subjetivo, la cual ha influido en la jurisprudencia desarrollada por los tribunales en México. La segunda parte de la crítica apunta a que dichos autores no (...) tomaron en consideración el nuevo contexto normativo que existe en México a partir de la reforma en materia de derechos humanos. El autor propone entonces una interpretación de la noción de interés legítimo compatible con el artículo 1o. de la Constitución, relativo a los derechos humanos. Esta interpretación implica el abandono de la doctrina tradicional. (shrink)

J’aborde tout d’abord l’objection relativiste aux droits humains, afin de pouvoir ensuite me concentrer sur d’autres questions soulevées par la question des droits humains et des minorités culturelles. Le but de ma discussion est d’identifier et d’interroger les tensions potentielles entre minorités culturelles et droits humains, afin de montrer en quoi les droits humains peuvent protéger les minorités culturelles et, ultimement, de problématiser la manière dont cette protection peut se déployer. Dans ce but, je commence par clarifier deux notions-clés de (...) ce débat : les minorités culturelles et les droits différenciés selon l’appartenance à un groupe, en en proposant une typologie. J’examine ensuite dans quelle mesure les aspects collectiviste et particulariste des droits différenciés se trouvent ou non en tension respectivement avec les aspects individualiste et universaliste des droits humains. Prenant comme points de référence quelques droits humains particuliers, je me penche enfin sur la situation de certaines minorités culturelles dans les démocraties libérales occidentales pour dégager les conditions délibératives de la réalisation de ces droits humains. Au fil de ces trois sections, une de mes préoccupations est de mettre en lumière les enjeux méthodologiques qui sous-tendent ces différents débats et de montrer la nécessité d’adopter une approche améliorative. I first address the relativist challenge to human rights, so as to be able to focus next on other questions raised by the question of human rights and cultural minorities. The aim of my discussion is to identify and to question the potential tensions between cultural minorities and human rights, in order to show how human rights can protect cultural minorities, and ultimately to problematize the way in which this protection can take place. To that end, I start by clarifying two key notions in this debate : cultural minorities and group-differentiated rights, by proposing a typology. I then examine to what extent the collectivist and the particularist aspects of group-differentiated rights are in tension respectively with the individualist and the universalist aspects of human rights. Taking as reference points a few particular human rights, I turn, finally, to the situation of certain cultural minorities in western liberal democracies to draw out the deliberative conditions of the realization of those human rights. Throughout all three sections, one of my concerns is to shed light on the methodological stakes underlying those different debates and to show that we should adopt an ameliorative approach. (shrink)

I argue that theoretical developments in the study of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) should occur alongside progress in moral psychology, particularly moral cognition. More specifically, I argue that Universal Moral Grammar (UMG), a model positing an innate, regulative, and universal moral faculty characterizable in terms of rules and principles, fulfills the role of the foundational model needed to usefully conceptualize the UDHR. As such, I provide a detailed account of UMG against competing models in moral psychology. Furthermore, (...) I combine UMG with Talbott’s Historical-Social Process of Moral Discovery and Rawls’s reflective equilibrium to show how the UDHR represents a major development in moral exploration, one indicating a more penetrative look into the inner moral nature of humans that attempts to reach, but does not attain, one interpretation of reflective equilibrium tied to cognitive moral psychology. (shrink)

1. The International Convention on the Rights of Child (CRC) (UNGA 1989) stands as the lighthouse which guides discussions on how to address global justice for children. Consensus exist both in the...

Despite being a seemingly straightforward moral concept (that all humans have certain rights by virtue of their humanity), human rights is a contested concept in theory and practice. Theorists debate (among other things) the meaning of “rights,” the priority of rights, whether collective rights are universal, the foundations of rights, and whether there are universal human rights at all. These debates are of relatively greater interest to theorists; however, a given meaning of “human rights” implies a corresponding theory of change (...) and through that can be an important guide to the practice of human rights activists and their funders. In practice, any organization can describe their work as “rights based.” This article clarifies the practices of human rights activists and their funders that are consistent with a theory of human rights as (1) universal, (2) interdependent across groups and categories of people, (3) indivisible across issue areas and claims, and (4) measured by the enjoyment of rights. (shrink)

In a recent article Allan Buchanan and Robert Keohane defend the view that one of the necessary conditions for the legitimacy of global governance institutions such as the WTO and the IMF is that they respect basic human rights. I certainly agree that setting the minimal threshold of moral acceptability any lower would be entirely unreasonable. But, unfortunately, the view that global governance institutions have human rights obligations is far from uncontroversial. These institutions themselves go to great lengths to deny (...) such a claim. Their official stance finds strong normative support in the state-centric conception of human rights that dominates both normative debates about human rights and current human rights practice. In this article I challenge some of the normative assumptions behind the state-centric conception in order to defend a pluralist conception that ascribes human rights obligations not only to states but also to non-state actors such as global governance institutions. After briefly analyzing some of the proposals currently under discussion about how to legally entrench the obligation to respect human rights in those institutions, I will defend the feasibility of those proposals against the objection that their implementation is incompatible with the current state-system and thus it would require the creation of a world state. (shrink)