Vann McGee has recently argued that Belnap’s criteria constrain the formal rules of classical natural deduction to uniquely determine the semantic values of the propositional logical connectives and quantifiers if the rules are taken to be open-ended, i.e., if they are truth-preserving within any mathematically possible extension of the original language. The main assumption of his argument is that for any class of models there is a mathematically possible language in which there is a sentence true in just those models. (...) I show that this assumption does not hold for the class of models of classical propositional logic. In particular, I show that the existence of non-normal models for negation undermines McGee’s argument. (shrink)

We show that Pitts' modeling of propositional quantification in intuitionistic logic (as the appropriate interpolants) does not coincide with the topological interpretation. This contrasts with the case of the monadic language and the interpretation over sufficiently regular topological spaces. We also point to the difference between the topological interpretation over sufficiently regular spaces and the interpretation of propositional quantifiers in Kripke models.

We study hybrid logics in topological semantics. We prove that hybrid logics of separation axioms are complete with respect to certain classes of finite topological models. This characterisation allows us to obtain several further results. We prove that aforementioned logics are decidable and PSPACE-complete, the logics of T 1 and T 2 coincide, the logic of T 1 is complete with respect to two concrete structures: the Cantor space and the rational numbers.

Let $\mathcal{P}_w$ be the lattice of Muchnik degrees of nonempty $\Pi^0_1$ subsets of $2^\omega$. The lattice $\mathcal{P}$ has been studied extensively in previous publications. In this note we prove that the lattice $\mathcal{P}$ is not Brouwerian.

This paper is an historical study of Tarski's methodology of deductive sciences (in which a logic S is identified with an operator Cn S, called the consequence operator, on a given set of expressions), from its appearance in 1930 to the end of the 1970s, focusing on the work done in the field by Roberto Magari, Piero Mangani and by some of their pupils between 1965 and 1974, and comparing it with the results achieved by Tarski and the Polish school (...) (Łoś, Suszko, Słupecki, Pogorzelski, Wójcicki). In the last section of the paper we will then compare these works with some recent developments in algebraic logic: this will lead to a better understanding of the results of the methodology of deductive science, but at the same time will show some intrinsic limits to such an approach to logic. Even if Magari's work on diagonizable algebras and universal algebra and Mangani's axiomatization of MV-algebras and results in model theory are rather famous, the articles on closure operators, published in the 1960s, are almost totally unknown outside Italy (mainly because of a linguistic limitation, the papers we analyse having been written and published in Italian). This paper aims to fill the gap in the literature and to enable the international community to get acquainted with this part of Italian logic. The same applies to some works published in Barcelona (in Catalan) at the end of the 1970s, analysed in the last section. (shrink)

This paper introduces a generalized version of inquisitive semantics, denoted as GIS, and concentrates especially on the role of disjunction in this general framework. Two alternative semantic conditions for disjunction are compared: the first one corresponds to the so-called tensor operator of dependence logic, and the second one is the standard condition for inquisitive disjunction. It is shown that GIS is intimately related to intuitionistic logic and its Kripke semantics. Using this framework, it is shown that the main results concerning (...) inquisitive semantics, especially the axiomatization of inquisitive logic, can be viewed as particular cases of more general phenomena. In this connection, a class of non-standard superintuitionistic logics is introduced and studied. These logics share many interesting features with inquisitive logic, which is the strongest logic of this class. (shrink)

Dynamic Topological Logic ( ) is a modal logic which combines spatial and temporal modalities for reasoning about dynamic topological systems , which are pairs consisting of a topological space X and a continuous function f : X → X . The function f is seen as a change in one unit of time; within one can model the long-term behavior of such systems as f is iterated. One class of dynamic topological systems where the long-term behavior of f is (...) particularly interesting is that of minimal systems ; these are dynamic topological systems which admit no proper, closed, f -invariant subsystems. In such systems the orbit of every point is dense, which within translates into a non-trivial interaction between spatial and temporal modalities. This interaction, however, turns out to make the logic simpler, and while s in general tend to be undecidable, interpreted over minimal systems we obtain decidability, although not in primitive recursive time; this is the main result that we prove in this paper. We also show that interpreted over minimal systems is incomplete for interpretations on relational Kripke frames and hence does not have the finite model property; however it does have a finite non-deterministic quasimodel property. Finally, we give a set of formulas of which characterizes the class of minimal systems within the class of dynamic topological systems, although we do not offer a full axiomatization for the logic. (shrink)

In the pioneering article and two papers, written jointly with McKinsey, Tarski developed the so-called algebraic and topological frameworks for the Intuitionistic Logic and the Lewis modal system. In this paper, we present an outline of modern systems with a topological tinge. We consider topological interpretation of basic systems GL and G of the provability logic in terms of the Cantor derivative and the Hausdorff residue.

We constructively prove completeness for intuitionistic first-order logic, iFOL, showing that a formula is provable in iFOL if and only if it is uniformly valid in intuitionistic evidence semantics as defined in intuitionistic type theory extended with an intersection operator.Our completeness proof provides an effective procedure that converts any uniform evidence into a formal iFOL proof. Uniform evidence can involve arbitrary concepts from type theory such as ordinals, topological structures, algebras and so forth. We have implemented that procedure in the (...) Nuprl proof assistant.Our result demonstrates the value of uniform validity as a semantic notion for studying logical theories, and it provides new techniques for showing that formulas are not intuitionistically provable. Here we demonstrate its value for minimal and intuitionistic first-order logic. (shrink)

Stalnaker, 169–199 2006) introduced a combined epistemic-doxastic logic that can formally express a strong concept of belief, a concept of belief as ‘subjective certainty’. In this paper, we provide a topological semantics for belief, in particular, for Stalnaker’s notion of belief defined as ‘epistemic possibility of knowledge’, in terms of the closure of the interior operator on extremally disconnected spaces. This semantics extends the standard topological interpretation of knowledge with a new topological semantics for belief. We prove that the belief (...) logic KD45 is sound and complete with respect to the class of extremally disconnected spaces and we compare our approach to a different topological setting in which belief is interpreted in terms of the derived set operator. We also study belief revision as well as belief dynamics by providing a topological semantics for conditional belief and belief update modalities, respectively. Our setting based on extremally disconnected spaces, however, encounters problems when extended with dynamic updates. We then propose a solution consisting in interpreting belief in a similar way based on hereditarily extremally disconnected spaces, and axiomatize the belief logic of hereditarily extremally disconnected spaces. Finally, we provide a complete axiomatization of the logic of conditional belief and knowledge, as well as a complete axiomatization of the corresponding dynamic logic. (shrink)

Since the early days of physics, space has called for means to represent, experiment, and reason about it. Apart from physicists, the concept of space has intrigued also philosophers, mathematicians and, more recently, computer scientists. This longstanding interest has left us with a plethora of mathematical tools developed to represent and work with space. Here we take a special look at this evolution by considering the perspective of Logic. From the initial axiomatic efforts of Euclid, we revisit the major milestones (...) in the logical representation of space and investigate current trends. In doing so, we do not only consider classical logic, but we indulge ourselves with modal logics. These present themselves naturally by providing simple axiomatizations of different geometries, topologies, space-time causality, and vector spaces. (shrink)

It is well-established that topos theory is inherently connected with intuitionistic logic. In recent times several works appeared concerning so-called complement-toposes, which are allegedly connected to the dual to intuitionistic logic. In this paper I present this new notion, some of the motivations for it, and some of its consequences. Then, I argue that, assuming equivalence of certain two definitions of a topos, the concept of a complement-classifier is, at least in general and within the conceptual framework of category theory, (...) not appropriately defined. For this purpose, I first analyze the standard notion of a subobject classifier, show its connection with the representability of the functor Sub via the Yoneda lemma, recall some other properties of the internal structure of a topos and, based on these, I critically comment on the notion of a complement-classifier. (shrink)

A recognizable topological model construction shows that any consistent principles of classical set theory, including the validity of the law of the excluded third, together with a standard class theory, do not suffice to demonstrate the general validity of the law of the excluded third. This result calls into question the classical mathematician's ability to offer solid justifications for the logical principles he or she favors.