Switch to: References

Citations of:

Many Worlds in Context

In Simon Saunders, Jonathan Barrett, Adrian Kent & David Wallace (eds.), Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory & Reality. Oxford University Press (2010)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Privileged-Perspective Realism in the Quantum Multiverse.Nora Berenstain - forthcoming - In David Glick, George Darby & Anna Marmodoro (eds.), The Foundation of Reality: Fundamentality, Space, and Time. Oxford University Press.
    Privileged-perspective realism (PPR) is a version of metaphysical realism that takes certain irreducibly perspectival facts to be partly constitutive of reality. PPR asserts that there is a single metaphysically privileged standpoint from which these perspectival facts obtain. This chapter discusses several views that fall under the category of privileged-perspective realism. These include presentism, which is PPR about tensed facts, and non-multiverse interpretations of quantum mechanics, which the chapter argues, constitute PPR about world-indexed facts. Using the framework of the bird perspective (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Ollivier–Poulin–Zurek Definition of Objectivity.Chris Fields - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (1):137-156.
    The Ollivier–Poulin–Zurek definition of objectivity provides a philosophical basis for the environment as witness formulation of decoherence theory and hence for quantum Darwinism. It is shown that no account of the reference of the key terms in this definition can be given that does not render the definition inapplicable within quantum theory. It is argued that this is not the fault of the language used, but of the assumption that the laws of physics are independent of Hilbert-space decomposition. All evidence (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • A Physics-Based Metaphysics is a Metaphysics-Based Metaphysics.Chris Fields - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (2):131-148.
    The common practice of advancing arguments based on current physics in support of metaphysical conclusions has been criticized on the grounds that current physics may well be wrong. A further criticism is leveled here: current physics itself depends on metaphysical assumptions, so arguing from current physics is in fact arguing from yet more metaphysics. It is shown that the metaphysical assumptions underlying current physics are often deeply embedded in the formalism in which theories are presented, and hence impossible to dismiss (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations