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  1. Duality of Motivation and the Guise of the Good in Kant’s Practical Philosophy.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (1):75-92.
    Although Kant is clearly committed to some version of the Guise of the Good thesis, he only explicitly endorses a very weak version of it; namely, that under the direction of reason, we only p...
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  • A Puzzle for Evaluation Theories of Desire.Alex Grzankowski - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):90-98.
    How we evaluate things and what we desire are closely connected. In typical cases, the things we desire are things that we evaluate as good or desirable. According to evaluation theories of desire, this connection is a very tight one: desires are evaluations of their objects as good or as desirable. There are two main varieties of this view. According to Doxastic Evaluativism, to desire that p is to believe or judge that p is good. According to Perceptual Evaluativism, to (...)
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  • Perverse Reasons.Francesco Orsi - forthcoming - Philosophy:1-24.
    For an agent to be motivated by a normatively perverse reason is to be motivated by a normative or evaluative thought as such which, if true, would count as such against the action that it motivates the agent to perform, or against the attitude that it motivates the agent to take. For example, that an action is morally wrong or prudentially bad counts, as such, against performing the action. When the thought that an action is morally wrong or prudentially bad (...)
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  • Hume and the Guise of the Bad.Francesco Orsi - 2020 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 18 (1):39-56.
    In Treatise 2.3.4.5 Hume provides an explanation of why ‘we naturally desire what is forbid, and take a pleasure in performing actions, merely because they are unlawful’. Hume's explanation of this phenomenon has barely received any attention so far. But a detailed analysis bears fruit for both Humean scholarship and contemporary moral psychology. After putting the passage in its context, I explain why desiring and taking pleasure in performing certain actions merely because they are unlawful poses a challenge to Hume's (...)
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  • On Fundamental Responsibility.Anna‐Sara Malmgren - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):198-213.
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