The harmful effects of Covid 19 on children living in poverty have refocused attention on the complex nature of child poverty and the vexed question of its relationship to education. The paper examines a tension at the heart of much discussion of child poverty and education. On the one hand, education is often regarded as essential for children’s flourishing and a means by which children can “escape” poverty; yet on the other hand, education systems, institutions, and practices, often reflect and (...) entrench the disadvantages associated with poverty. Narratives concerning education as an escape from poverty tend not to deal in any depth with the injustices associated with poverty, stressing instead the transformative potential of education. By contrast, largely sociological analyses of the ways in which schooling reproduces inequalities tend to stop short of developing a normative account of how education can contribute to transforming the structural injustices related to poverty and its effects on children’s lives. In working to move beyond this analytic impasse, the paper shows how the cluster of concepts, which Robeyns (2018) locates as central to the capability approach, give insights which help to address these two different lacunae. The notion of conversion factors highlights the significance of taking account of existing relationships in education, while the distinction between capabilities and functionings helps guide practices regarding the education of children living in poverty. Drawing on literature on the heightened inequalities associated with poor children’s experience of lack of schooling during the COVID pandemic, the paper sketches some of the ways in which sociological analysis and normative evaluation can be linked in taking forward an “ethically engaged political philosophy” (Wolff, 2018) to discuss child poverty and education in real schools. (shrink)

Intellectually disabled students face particular barriers to epistemic participation within schooling contexts. While negative forms of bias against intellectually disabled people play an important role in creating these barriers, this paper suggests that it is often because of the best intentions of educators and peers that intellectually disabled students are vulnerable to forms of epistemic injustice. The author outlines a form of epistemic injustice that operates through an educational practice widely regarded as serving the interests of intellectually disabled students. ‘Epistemic (...) ability profiling’ involves the identification of the epistemic consequences of disability in the service of promoting students’ best interests, or to create opportunities for their participation in epistemic communities. Epistemic ability profiling is a double-edged sword: it is important that educators understand and attend to the ways in which differences in ability shape students’ epistemic agency, and yet epistemic ability profiling operates against the background of a conceptually ableist conceptual terrain. As a result, epistemic ability profiling runs the risk of legitimating structural forms of injustice against intellectually disabled people. (shrink)

Recently, scholars have argued that disability activists' redefinition of disability' as a social problem, rather than a medical problem, is maleficent, unjust, and inconsistent. It seems that the discussion on whether disability is a medical or a social category is not settled and that disability is an essentially contested concept. However, the question is: What is the social aspect in disability? It appears that there is some confusion as to what the social is in a social definition of disability. The (...) article pursues possible reasons for this confusion by investigating the critique of the social model. This is followed by a discussion on what a possible space for the social might be in a social definition of disability. Such a space is illuminated by using the framework of the World Health Organization's International Classification of Functioning Disability and Health. The article suggests that disability as a social category is not inconsistent if reframed within a social relational model of disability. (shrink)

Discussions on diversity and disability in dialogue with special educationalists and philosophers of education are not often found in the research literature. Researchers within disability studies have been critical towards the enterprise of special education and vice versa, and the language they use is often different, as they draw on various subject fields. In this article, I bring these fields of research together and draw on research from the philosophy of education, special education and Disability Studies. My argument is that (...) a language of diversity needs to be embedded in a language about educational ends and other fundamental questions discussed in the philosophy of education, and not solely in discussions within the field of inclusive education, as is often found in the research literature relating to special education. I argue that the language of diversity related to disability should be embedded in the language of the person, being someone. In order to build my argument, I sketch out three distinctions: disability and impairment, education as cultivation versus an existential education and the distinction between being someone and being something. I argue that an understanding of diversity and the case of disability within the framework of education should preferably be: interpreted within a social relational model of disability, drawing on an adjusted capabilities approach, an existential educational paradigm and seeing the person as someone, and not as something that is associated with a series of facts that happen to relate to what we call persons. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to examine ways in which localized research runs the risk of becoming a boundary discourse in a negative sense. The exaggerated emphasis on immanent critique, contextualization and incommensurability may lead discourse and disciplines to an isolationist self-understanding that leaves unchallenged or even entrenches existing discursive hegemonies. Or, it may side with the kind of facile and hasty fusion of discourses and disciplines that ignores epistemic demands and concerns for validity and semantic accuracy. That is, (...) it may overlook the necessity for positively understood discursive boundaries. Clearly demarcated, a-porous boundaries block osmosis and fruitful exchange and facilitate what is called here ?stronghold fortification?. And they make common cause with a disregard for all boundaries, i.e. with what is called here ?frame demolition?. Discourses of educational research, and particularly of ?special? versus ?inclusive? education, supply examples that are all the more telling since the very possibility of pedagogy reminds us that relativism is not an option here. To discuss interdisciplinarity and discursivity with an eye to such risks, I refer to Habermas? outlook on the position of philosophy after Kant alongside Derrida's rethinking of the right to philosophy ? a rethinking that is grounded in a reading of Kant's cosmopolitical point of view. (shrink)

This paper reports findings from a study about school staff’s perceptions of the preferences for social interaction that young people have with similar and different others. This tension was explored empirically using scenarios of moral dilemmas to conduct in-depth semi-structured interviews with school staff from special and mainstream secondary schools. The issue was explored with reference to a tension between social inclusion, the principle of embracing difference, and homophily, the concept that similarity breeds connection. The data suggest that homophily and (...) inclusion can come into a tension with an ethical dimension. In education, the homophily/inclusion tension is one between students’ preferences for being among similar others and the moral imperative of including everybody; or between individuality and commonality. Inclusion is often translated into a demand for full participation as the only way to respond ethically to difference. However, the recognition of students’ rights to negotiate their preferences, even when they come into tension with what is considered to be politically correct, is also an ethical position. The paper concludes that the homophily/inclusion tension is constructive as it challenges the moral necessity of inclusion for all, and opens a debate about participatory decision-making and democratic school management. (shrink)

This paper examines learning as a capability, taking as its starting point the work of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. The paper is concerned to highlight the relation between learning and truth, and it does so by examining the idea of a genealogy of truth and also Donald Davidson’s coherence theory. Thus the notion of truth is understood to be not only built into the capability of learning but also translated across into other capabilities.

This paper examines learning as a capability, taking as its starting point the work of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. The paper is concerned to highlight the relation between learning and truth, and it does so by examining the idea of a genealogy of truth and also Donald Davidson’s coherence theory. Thus the notion of truth is understood to be not only built into the capability of learning but also translated across into other capabilities.

The diagnosis of autism is on the rise. Autistic people, parents, professionals, and policy makers alike face important questions about the right approach toward autism. For example, there are questions about the desirability of early detection, the role and consequences of underlying cognitive theories, and whether autism is a disorder to be treated or an identity to be respected. How does the fact that autism is a heterogeneous concept affect the answers to these questions? Who has the authority or knowledge (...) to speak on behalf of people with autism? In this paper, we describe a cluster of research topics which should be on the agenda of the emerging field of autism ethics. These topics include the very concept of autism itself, the question whether autism is primarily an identity or a disorder, the ethical questions that parents of autistic children face, metaethical questions, the ethical consequences of epistemological questions, and a cluster of questions related to social justice, stigma, and paternalism. (shrink)

In recent years inclusion has become one of the most dominant values and objectives in education. However, there is still considerable disagreement concerning the theoretical concept of inclusion and its normative implications. This article suggests an understanding of inclusion that first differentiates analytically between societal and communal forms of inclusion, and second, situates the value of inclusion in the debate around recognition and freedom. Furthermore, it connects the discussion to some dilemmas and difficulties we might face in education. The overall (...) approach and goal of the article is to contribute to the on-going debate on the nature and value of inclusion and inclusive education. (shrink)

I use Ian Hacking 's views to explore ways of classifying people, exploiting his distinction between indifferent kinds and interactive kinds, and his accounts of how we 'make up' people. The natural kind/essentialist approach to indifferent kinds is explored in some depth. I relate this to debates in psychiatry about the existence of mental illness, and to educational controversies about the credentials of learner classifications such as 'dyslexic'. Claims about the 'existence' of learning disabilities cannot be given a clear, simple (...) and unambiguous interpretation. In particular I show that science cannot deliver a definitive taxonomy of learner categories, and that this has important implications for teachers and policy makers. (shrink)

I use Ian Hacking’s views to explore ways of classifying people, exploiting his distinction between indifferent kinds and interactive kinds, and his accounts of how we ‘make up’ people. The natural kind/essentialist approach to indifferent kinds is explored in some depth. I relate this to debates in psychiatry about the existence of mental illness, and to educational controversies about the credentials of learner classifications such as ‘dyslexic’. Claims about the ‘existence’ of learning disabilities cannot be given a clear, simple and (...) unambiguous interpretation. In particular I show that science cannot deliver a definitive taxonomy of learner categories, and that this has important implications for teachers and policy makers. (shrink)