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Frege on Judging as Acknowledging the Truth

Mind 119 (475):615-655 (2010)

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  1. Frege on Judgement and the Judging Agent.Maria van der Schaar - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):225-250.
    How is Frege able to claim that the notion of judgement is essential to his logic without introducing a form of psychologism? I argue first that Frege’s logical notion of judgement is to be distinguished from an empirical notion of judgement, that it cannot be understood as an abstract, idealized notion, and that there are doubts concerning a transcendental reading of Frege’s writings. Then, I explain that the logical notion of judgement has to be understood from a first-person perspective, to (...)
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  • The Logical Significance of Assertion: Frege on the Essence of Logic.B. Pedriali Walter - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (8).
    Assertion plays a crucial dual role in Frege's conception of logic, a formal and a transcendental one. A recurrent complaint is that Frege's inclusion of the judgement-stroke in the Begriffsschrift is either in tension with his anti-psychologism or wholly superfluous. Assertion, the objection goes, is at best of merely psychological significance. In this paper, I defend Frege against the objection by giving reasons for recognising the central logical significance of assertion in both its formal and its transcendental role.
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  • How to Be an Optimist About Aesthetic Testimony.Rachel McKinnon - 2017 - Episteme 14 (2):177-196.
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  • Frege on Negative Judgement and Assertion.Dirk Greimann - 2018 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (140):409-428.
    ABSTRACT In “Die Verneinung”, Frege discusses two types of negation, a semantic one and a pragmatic one. Semantic negation consists in the application of the logical function denoted by ‘it is false that p’ to a thought, and pragmatic negation in the act of asserting or judging a thought as false. According to the standard interpretation, Frege does not acknowledge pragmatic negation, because it is logically redundant. He therefore rejects the classical dualistic view that both truth and falsity are qualities (...)
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  • Frege on the Normativity and Constitutivity of Logic for Thought II.Daniele Mezzadri - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (9):592-600.
    This two-part paper reviews a scholarly debate on an alleged tension in Frege's philosophy of logic. In Section 1 of Part I, I discuss Frege's view that logic is concerned with establishing norms for correct thinking and is therefore a normative science. In Section 2, I explore a different understanding of the role of logic that Frege seems to advance: logic is constitutive of the very possibility of thought, because it sets forth necessary conditions for thought. Hence, the tension the (...)
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  • A New–Old Characterisation of Logical Knowledge.Ivor Grattan-Guinness - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (3):245 - 290.
    We seek means of distinguishing logical knowledge from other kinds of knowledge, especially mathematics. The attempt is restricted to classical two-valued logic and assumes that the basic notion in logic is the proposition. First, we explain the distinction between the parts and the moments of a whole, and theories of ?sortal terms?, two theories that will feature prominently. Second, we propose that logic comprises four ?momental sectors?: the propositional and the functional calculi, the calculus of asserted propositions, and rules for (...)
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  • Frege on the Normativity and Constitutivity of Logic for Thought I.Daniele Mezzadri - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (9):583-591.
    This two-part paper reviews a scholarly debate on an alleged tension in Frege ’s philosophy of logic. In Section 1 of Part I, I discuss Frege ’s view that logic is concerned with establishing norms for correct thinking and is therefore a normative science. In Section 2, I explore a different understanding of the role of logic that Frege seems to advance: logic is constitutive of the very possibility of thought, because it sets forth necessary conditions for thought. Hence, the (...)
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  • Frege on Anti‐Psychologism and the Role of Logic in Thinking.Thomas Lockhart - 2016 - Theoria 82 (4):302-328.
    According to the Explanatory Problem with Frege's Platonism about Thoughts, the sharp separation between the psychological and the logical on which Frege famously insists is too sharp, leaving Frege no resources to show how it could be legitimate to invoke logical laws in an explanation of our activities of thinking. I argue that there is room in Frege's philosophy for such justificatory explanations. To see how, we need first to understand correctly the lesson of Frege's attack on psychologism as fundamentally (...)
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