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  1. Colour Vision, Evolution, and Perceptual Content.Evan Thompson - 1995 - Synthese 104 (1):1-32.
    b>. Computational models of colour vision assume that the biological function of colour vision is to detect surface reflectance. Some philosophers invoke these models as a basis for 'externalism' about perceptual content (content is distal) and 'objectivism' about colour (colour is surface reflectance). In an earlier article (Thompson et al. 1992), I criticized the 'computational objectivist' position on the basis of comparative colour vision: There are fundmental differences among the colour vision of animals and these differences do not converge on (...)
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  • Animals and Humans, Thinking and Nature.David Morris - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):49-72.
    Studies that compare human and animal behaviour suspend prejudices about mind, body and their relation, by approaching thinking in terms of behaviour. Yet comparative approaches typically engage another prejudice, motivated by human social and bodily experience: taking the lone animal as the unit of comparison. This prejudice informs Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s comparative studies, and conceals something important: that animals moving as a group in an environment can develop new sorts of “sense.” The study of animal group-life suggests a new way (...)
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  • Comparative Color Vision and the Objectivity of Color.David Hilbert - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):38-39.
  • Colour Physicalism, Naïve Realism, and the Argument From Structure.Keith Allen - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):193-212.
    Colours appear to instantiate a number of structural properties: for instance, they stand in distinctive relations of similarity and difference, and admit of a fundamental distinction into unique and binary. Accounting for these structural properties is often taken to present a serious problem for physicalist theories of colour. This paper argues that a prominent attempt by Byrne and Hilbert to account for the structural properties of the colours, consistent with the claim that colours are types of surface spectral reflectance, is (...)
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  • Shadow‐Experiences and the Phenomenal Structure of Colors.René Jagnow - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):187-212.
    It is a common assumption among philosophers of perception that phenomenal colors are exhaustively characterized by the three phenomenal dimensions of the color solid: hue, saturation and lightness. The hue of a color is its redness, blueness or yellowness, etc. The saturation of a color refers to the strength of its hue in relation to gray. The lightness of a color determines its relation to black and white. In this paper, I argue that the phenomenology of shadows forces us to (...)
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  • Novel Colours and the Content of Experience.Fiona Macpherson - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):43-66.
    I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore that one cannot fully explain the nature of (...)
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  • The Grammar of the Human Life Process: John Dewey's New Theory of Language.Fred Harris - 2012 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 44 (s1):18-30.
    Dewey proposed a new theory of language, in which the form (such as symbols) and content of language are not separated. The content of language includes the physical aspects of the world, which are purely quantitative: the life process, which involves functional responses to qualities, and the human life process, which involves the conscious integration of the potentiality of qualities to form a functional whole. The pinnacle of this process is individuality, or the emergence of a unique function to change (...)
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  • Précis of The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology.Jonathan Cohen - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (3):288-296.
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  • A Relationalist's Guide to Error About Color Perception.Jonathan Cohen - 2007 - Noûs 41 (2):335–353.
    Color relationalism is the view that colors are constituted in terms of relations to perceiving subjects. Among its explanatory virtues, relation- alism provides a satisfying treatment of cases of perceptual variation. But it can seem that relationalists lack resources for saying that a representa- tion of x’s color is erroneous. Surely, though, a theory of color that makes errors of color perception impossible cannot be correct. In this paper I’ll argue that, initial appearances notwithstanding, relationalism contains the resources to account (...)
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  • Color and Perceptual Variation Revisited: Unknown Facts, Alien Modalities, and Perfect Psychosemantics.Jonathan Cohen - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):307-319.
    An adequate ontology of color must face the empirical facts about per- ceptual variation. In this paper I begin by reviewing a range of data about perceptual variation, and showing how they tell against color physicalism and motivate color relationalism. Next I consider a series of objections to the argument from perceptual variation, and argue that they are un- persuasive. My conclusion will be that the argument remains a powerful obstacle for color physicalism, and a powerful reason to believe in (...)
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  • The Inscrutability of Colour Similarity.Will Davies - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):289-311.
    This paper presents a new response to the colour similarity argument, an argument that many people take to pose the greatest threat to colour physicalism. The colour similarity argument assumes that if colour physicalism is true, then colour similarities should be scrutable under standard physical descriptions of surface reflectance properties such as their spectral reflectance curves. Given this assumption, our evident failure to find such similarities at the reducing level seemingly proves fatal to colour physicalism. I argue that we should (...)
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  • Looks as Powers.Philip Pettit - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):221-52.
    Although they may differ on the reason why, many philosophers hold that it is a priori that an object is red if and only if it is such as to look red to normal observers in normal conditions.
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  • The New Naturalism.Don Dedrick - 1993 - Metaphilosophy 24 (4):390-399.
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  • What’s That Smell?Clare Batty - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):321-348.
    In philosophical discussions of the secondary qualities, color has taken center stage. Smells, tastes, sounds, and feels have been treated, by and large, as mere accessories to colors. We are, as it is said, visual creatures. This, at least, has been the working assumption in the philosophy of perception and in those metaphysical discussions about the nature of the secondary qualities. The result has been a scarcity of work on the “other” secondary qualities. In this paper, I take smells and (...)
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  • The Appearance and Nature of Color.Peter W. Ross - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):227-252.
    The problem of the nature of color is typically put in terms of the following question about the intentional content of visual experiences: what’s the nature of the property we attribute to physical objects in virtue of our visual experiences of color? This problem has proven to be tenacious largely because it’s not clear what the constraints are for an answer. With no clarity about constraints, the proposed solutions range widely, the most common dividing into subjectivist views which hold that (...)
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  • Author’s Response.Paul Griffiths - 1999 - Metascience 8 (1):49-62.
    The air of consensus in these reviews is, as McNaughton notes, methodological. The future of philosophical emotion theory is in synthesising what a wide range of science has to tell us and using this to reflect on the nature of mind in general. In this respect the philosophy of emotion has been seriously out of step with the rest of a very exciting contemporary scene in the philosophy of mind. Whatever the shortcomings of my own attempt to bring the philosophy (...)
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  • The Individual Variability Problem.Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (3):533-554.
    Studies show that there are widespread intrasubjective and intersubjective color variations among normal perceivers. These variations have serious ramifications in the debate about the nature and ontology of color. It is typical to think of the debate about color as a dispute between objectivists and subjectivists. Objectivists hold that colors are perceiver-independent physical properties of objects while subjectivists hold that they are either projections onto external objects or dispositions objects have to look colored. I argue that individual color variations present (...)
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  • Monstrous Faces and a World Transformed: Merleau-Ponty, Dolezal, and the Enactive Approach on Vision Without Inversion of the Retinal Image.Susan M. Bredlau - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):481-498.
    The world perceived by a person undergoing vision without inversion of the retinal image has traditionally been described as inverted. Drawing on the philosophical work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the empirical research of Hubert Dolezal, I argue that this description is more reflective of a representationist conception of vision than of actual visual experience. The world initially perceived in vision without inversion of the retinal image is better described as lacking in lived significance rather than inverted; vision without inversion of (...)
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  • In Search of the Enactive: Introduction to Special Issue on Enactive Experience. [REVIEW]Steve Torrance - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):357-368.
    In the decade and a half since the appearance of Varela, Thompson and Rosch's workThe Embodied Mind,enactivism has helped to put experience and consciousness, conceived of in a distinctive way, at the forefront of cognitive science. There are at least two major strands within the enactive perspective: a broad view of what it is to be an agent with a mind; and a more focused account of the nature of perception and perceptual experience. The relation between these two strands is (...)
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  • Common Sense About Qualities and Senses.Peter W. Ross - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):299 - 316.
    There has been some recent optimism that addressing the question of how we distinguish sensory modalities will help us consider whether there are limits on a scientific understanding of perceptual states. For example, Block has suggested that the way we distinguish sensory modalities indicates that perceptual states have qualia which at least resist scientific characterization. At another extreme, Keeley argues that our common-sense way of distinguishing the senses in terms of qualitative properties is misguided, and offers a scientific eliminativism about (...)
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  • The Indeterminacy of Color Vision.Richard Montgomery - 1996 - Synthese 106 (2):167-203.
    A critical survey of recent work on the ontological status of colors supports the conclusion that, while some accounts of color can plausibly be dismissed, no single account can yet be endorsed. Among the remaining options are certain forms of color realism according which familiar colors are instantiated by objects in our extra-cranial visual environment. Also still an option is color anti-realism, the view that familiar colors are, at best, biologically adaptive fictions, instantiated nowhere.I argue that there is simply no (...)
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  • Colour, Wavelength and Turbidity in the Light of Goethe’s Colour Studies.Gopi Krishna Vijaya - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (4):569-594.
    The polarity of light and dark in the treatment of the Newtonian spectrum and the inverse spectrum is studied further and the validity of heterogeneity of light and darkness in relation to Goethe’s views is examined. In order to clarify the reality of the “darkness rays”, the experimentum crucis is re-evaluated. It is shown that the commonly accepted analysis contains assumptions in the choice of the spectrum and background, which mask the inherent dynamic of the spectrum. The relation between colour (...)
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  • Representation and Constraints: The Inverse Problem and the Structure of Visual Space.Gary Hatfield - 2003 - Acta Psychologica 114:355-378.
    Visual space can be distinguished from physical space. The first is found in visual experience, while the second is defined independently of perception. Theorists have wondered about the relation between the two. Some investigators have concluded that visual space is non-Euclidean, and that it does not have a single metric structure. Here it is argued that visual space exhibits contraction in all three dimensions with increasing distance from the observer, that experienced features of this contraction are not the same as (...)
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  • Parsing the Rainbow.Pendaran Roberts - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1793-1811.
    Navigating the ontology of color used to be a simple affair. There was the naive view that colors really are in objects the way they appear, and the view that they are secondary qualities to cause certain experiences in us. Today, there are myriad well-developed views but no satisfactory taxonomy of philosophical theories on color. In this article, I first examine the two newest taxonomies on offer and argue that they are inadequate. In particular, I look at Brogaard’s taxonomy and (...)
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  • Merleau-Ponty on Human Development and the Retrospective Realization of Potential.Kym Maclaren - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (4):609-621.
    In this essay, I propose that human development is the emergence of something significantly new out of a past situation that does not hold that novel achievement as a determinate potential except retrospectively. Development, in other words, might best be understood as a “realization” in the sense of a making-real of some new form of being that had no prior place in reality, that was not programmed in advance, but that once realized can have its roots traced back to determinate (...)
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  • A Determinable-Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy.Jessica M. Wilson - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):359-385.
    ABSTRACT Many phenomena appear to be indeterminate, including material macro-object boundaries and certain open future claims. Here I provide an account of indeterminacy in metaphysical, rather than semantic or epistemic, terms. Previous accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy have typically taken this to involve its being indeterminate which of various determinate states of affairs obtain. On my alternative account, MI involves its being determinate that an indeterminate state of affairs obtains. I more specifically suggest that MI involves an object's having a determinable (...)
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  • Neuropragmatism, Knowledge, and Pragmatic Naturalism.John Shook - 2013 - Human Affairs 23 (4):576-593.
    Neuropragmatism is a research program taking sciences about cognitive development and learning methods most seriously, in order to reevaluate and reformulate philosophical issues. Knowledge, consciousness, and reason are among the crucial philosophical issues directly affected. Pragmatism in general has allied with the science-affirming philosophy of naturalism. Naturalism is perennially tested by challenges questioning its ability to accommodate and account for knowledge, consciousness, and reason. Neuropragmatism is in a good position to evaluate those challenges. Some ways to defuse them are suggested (...)
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  • Reductionism and Subjectivism Defined and Defended.Austen Clark - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):32-33.
  • Ecumenicism, Comparability, and Color, Or: How to Have Your Cake and Eat It, Too.Jonathan Cohen - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):149-175.
    Data about perceptual variation motivate the ecumenicist view that distinct color representations are mutually compatible. On the other hand, data about agreement and disagreement motivate making distinct color representations mutually incompatible. Prima facie, these desiderata appear to conflict. I’ll lay out and assess two strategies for managing the conflict—color relationalism, and the self-locating property theory of color—with the aim of deciding how best to have your cake and eat it, too.
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  • More Than Mere Coloring: The Art of Spectral Vision.Kathleen A. Akins & John Lamping - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):26-27.
  • Confusing Structure and Function.Kenneth M. Steele - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):52-53.
  • Ecological Subjectivism?Christine A. Skarda - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):51-52.
  • What in the World Determines the Structure of Color Space?Roger N. Shepard - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):50-51.
  • Areas of Ignorance and Confusion in Color Science.Adam Reeves - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):49-50.
  • On Perceived Colors.Christa Neumeyer - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):49-49.
  • Colors Really Are Only in the Head.James A. McGilvray - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):48-49.
  • On Possible Perceptual Worlds and How They Shape Their Environments.Rainer J. Mausfeld, Reinhard M. Niederée & K. Dieter Heyer - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):47-48.
  • Color Vision: Content Versus Experience.Mohan Matthen - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):46-47.
  • A Mathematical Framework for Biological Color Vision.Laurence T. Maloney - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):45-46.
  • In Search of Common Features of Animals' Color Vision Systems and the Constraints of Environment.Erhard Maier & Dietrich Burkhardt - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):44-45.
  • Ontogeny and Ontology: Ontophyletics and Enactive Focal Vision.Barry Lia - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):43-44.
  • Objectivism-Subjectivim: A False Dilemma?Joseph Levine - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):42-43.
  • Ethological and Ecological Aspects of Color Vision.Sergei L. Kondrashev - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):42-42.
  • Color Enactivism: A Return to Kant?Paul R. Kinnear - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):41-41.
  • Data and Interpretation in Comparative Color Vision.Gerald H. Jacobs - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):40-41.
  • The View of a Computational Animal.Anya Hurlbert - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):39-40.
  • Color for Pigeons and Philosophers.C. L. Hardin - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):37-38.
  • Multivariant Color Vision.Peter Gouras - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):37-37.
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  • Psychophysical Modeling: The Link Between Objectivism and Subjectivism.Marcia A. Finkelstein - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):36-37.
  • Enactivist vision.Jerome A. Feldman - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):35-36.
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