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  1. William James and Kitaro Nishida on “Pure Experience”, Consciousness, and Moral Psychology.Joel Krueger - 2007 - Dissertation, Purdue University
    The question “What is the nature of experience?” is of perennial philosophical concern. It deals not only with the nature of experience qua experience, but additionally with related questions about the experiencing subject and that which is experienced. In other words, to speak of the philosophical problem of experience, one must also address questions about mind, world, and the various relations that link them together. Both William James and Kitarō Nishida were deeply concerned with these issues. Their shared notion of (...)
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  • Enactive Autonomy in Computational Systems.Mario Villalobos & Joe Dewhurst - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):1891-1908.
    In this paper we will demonstrate that a computational system can meet the criteria for autonomy laid down by classical enactivism. The two criteria that we will focus on are operational closure and structural determinism, and we will show that both can be applied to a basic example of a physically instantiated Turing machine. We will also address the question of precariousness, and briefly suggest that a precarious Turing machine could be designed. Our aim in this paper is to challenge (...)
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  • Intentionality.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In G. Stanghellini, M. Broome, A. Fernandez, P. Fusar Poli, Raballo A. & R. Rosfort (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology. Oxford University Press.
  • A Second-Person Model to Anomalous Social Cognition.Inês Hipólito & Jorge Martins - 2018 - In J. Gonçalves, J. G. Pereira & Inês Hipólito (eds.), Studies in Brain and Mind. Springer Verlag. pp. 55-69.
    Reports of patients with schizophrenia show a fragmented and anomalous subjective experience. This pathological subjective experience, we suggest, can be related to the fact that disembodiment inhibits the possibility of intersubjective experience, and more importantly of common sense. In this paper, we ask how to investigate the anomalous experience both from qualitative and quantitative viewpoints. To our knowledge, few studies have focused on a clinical combination of both first- phenomenological assessment and third-person biological methods, especially for Schizophrenia, or ASD therapeutics (...)
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  • Book Review: Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory. [REVIEW]Tom Froese & Franklenin Sierra - 2015 - Frontiers in Robotics and AI 2 (26):1-2.
    Consciousness, with its irreducible subjective character, was almost exclusively a philosophical topic until relatively recently. Today, however, the problem of explaining the felt quality of experience has also become relevant to science and engineering, including robotics and AI: “What would we have to build into a robot so that it really felt the touch of a finger, the redness of red, or the hurt of a pain?”(O’Regan, 2014, p. 23). Yet a practical response still requires an adequate theory of consciousness,which (...)
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  • Toward a Phenomenological Pragmatics of Enactive Perception.Mr Tom Froese & Mr Adam Spiers - unknown
    The enactive approach to perception is generating an extensive amount of interest and debate in the cognitive sciences. One particularly contentious issue has been how best to characterize the perceptual experiences reported by subjects who have mastered the skillful use of a perceptual supplementation (PS) device. This paper argues that this issue cannot be resolved with the use of third-person methodologies alone, but that it requires the development of a phenomenological pragmatics. In particular, it is necessary that the experimenters become (...)
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  • Being-in-the-World-With: Presence Meets Social and Cognitive Neuroscience.Prof G. Riva - 2006 - In Riva, Prof. G. (2006) Being-in-the-World-With: Presence Meets Social and Cognitive Neuroscience. [Book Chapter].
    In this chapter we will discuss the concepts of “presence” (Inner Presence) and “social presence” (Co-presence) within a cognitive and ecological perspective. Specifically, we claim that the concepts of “presence” and “social presence” are the possible links between self, action, communication and culture. In the first section we will provide a capsule view of Heidegger’s work by examining the two main features of the Heideggerian concept of “being”: spatiality and “being with”. We argue that different visions from social and cognitive (...)
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  • Participatory Sense-Making.Hanne De Jaegher & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):485-507.
    As yet, there is no enactive account of social cognition. This paper extends the enactive concept of sense-making into the social domain. It takes as its departure point the process of interaction between individuals in a social encounter. It is a well-established finding that individuals can and generally do coordinate their movements and utterances in such situations. We argue that the interaction process can take on a form of autonomy. This allows us to reframe the problem of social cognition as (...)
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  • Enacting Musical Experience.Joel Krueger - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):98-123.
    I argue for an enactive account of musical experience — that is, the experience of listening ‘deeply’(i.e., sensitively and understandingly) to a piece of music. The guiding question is: what do we do when we listen ‘deeply’to music? I argue that these music listening episodes are, in fact, doings. They are instances of active perceiving, robust sensorimotor engagements with and manipulations of sonic structures within musical pieces. Music is thus experiential art, and in Nietzsche’s words, ‘we listen to music with (...)
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  • First-Person Experience and Yoga Research: Studying Neural Correlates of an Intentional Practice.Elizaveta Solomonova - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
  • A Mosquito Bite Against the Enactive Approach to Bodily Experiences.Frédérique De Vignemont - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (4):188-204.
    The enactive approach aims at providing a unified account of perceptual experiences in terms of bodily activities. Most enactive arguments come from the analysis of visual experiences, but there is one domain of consciousness where the enactive theses seem to be less controversial, namely, bodily experiences. After drawing the agenda for an enactive view of tactile experiences, I shall highlight the difficulties that it has to face, both conceptual and empirical.
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  • The Body and the Experience of Presence.Joerg Fingerhut - 2012 - In Joerg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive. de Gruyter. pp. 8--167.
    We experience our encounters with the world and others in different degrees of intensity – the presence of things and others is gradual. I introduce this kind of presence as a ubiquitous feature of every phenomenally conscious experience, as well as a key ingredient of our ‘feeling of being alive’, and distinguish explanatory agendas that might be relevant with regard to this phenomenon (1 – 3). My focus will be the role of the body-brain nexus in realizing these experiences and (...)
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  • Movement-Based Embodied Contemplative Practices: Definitions and Paradigms.Laura Schmalzl, Mardi A. Crane-Godreau & Peter Payne - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
  • We Can Work It Out: An Enactive Look at Cooperation.Valentina Fantasia, Hanne De Jaegher & Alessandra Fasulo - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • An Enactive Approach to Pain: Beyond the Biopsychosocial Model.Peter Stilwell & Katherine Harman - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-29.
    We propose a new conceptualization of pain by incorporating advancements made by phenomenologists and cognitive scientists. The biomedical understanding of pain is problematic as it inaccurately endorses a linear relationship between noxious stimuli and pain, and is often dualist or reductionist. From a Cartesian dualist perspective, pain occurs in an immaterial mind. From a reductionist perspective, pain is often considered to be “in the brain.” The biopsychosocial conceptualization of pain has been adopted to combat these problematic views. However, when considering (...)
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  • Mearleau-Ponty Meets Enactivism. A Book Review. [REVIEW]Jakub Ryszard Matyja - 2015 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):160-163.
    A book review of 'The Intercorporeal Self. Merleau-Ponty on Subjectivity'.
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  • What is Self-Specific? Theoretical Investigation and Critical Review of Neuroimaging Results.Dorothée Legrand & Perrine Ruby - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (1):252-282.
  • Enacting Space in Virtual Reality: A Comparison Between Money’s Road Map Test and Its Virtual Version.Francesca Morganti - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content.Robert Hanna - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):323 - 398.
    In this essay I argue that a broadly Kantian strategy for demonstrating and explaining the existence, semantic structure, and psychological function of essentially non-conceptual content can also provide an intelligible and defensible bottom-up theory of the foundations of rationality in minded animals. Otherwise put, if I am correct, then essentially non-conceptual content constitutes the semantic and psychological substructure, or matrix, out of which the categorically normative a priori superstructure of epistemic rationality and practical rationality - Sellars's "logical space of reasons" (...)
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  • Dynamic Embodied Cognition.Leon C. de Bruin & Lena Kästner - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):541-563.
    Abstract In this article, we investigate the merits of an enactive view of cognition for the contemporary debate about social cognition. If enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to bridge the “cognitive gap”, i.e. provide us with a convincing account of those higher forms of cognition that have traditionally been the focus of its cognitivist opponents. We show that, when it comes to social cognition, current articulations of enactivism are—despite their celebrated successes (...)
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  • The Enactive Approach to Architectural Experience: A Neurophysiological Perspective on Embodiment, Motivation, and Affordances.Andrea Jelić, Gaetano Tieri, Federico De Matteis, Fabio Babiloni & Giovanni Vecchiato - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Aplasic Phantoms and the Mirror Neuron System: An Enactive, Developmental Perspective.Rachel Wood & Susan A. J. Stuart - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):487-504.
    Phantom limb experiences demonstrate an unexpected degree of fragility inherent in our self-perceptions. This is perhaps most extreme when congenitally absent limbs are experienced as phantoms. Aplasic phantoms highlight fundamental questions about the physiological bases of self-experience and the ontogeny of a physical, embodied sense of the self. Some of the most intriguing of these questions concern the role of mirror neurons in supporting the development of self–other mappings and hence the emergence of phantom experiences of congenitally absent limbs. In (...)
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  • Toward an Objective Phenomenological Vocabulary: How Seeing a Scarlet Red is Like Hearing a Trumpet’s Blare.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):837-858.
    Nagel’s challenge is to devise an objective phenomenological vocabulary that can describe the objective structural similarities between aural and visual perception. My contention is that Charles Sanders Peirce’s little studied and less understood phenomenological vocabulary makes a significant contribution to meeting this challenge. I employ Peirce’s phenomenology to identify the structural isomorphism between seeing a scarlet red and hearing a trumpet’s blare. I begin by distinguishing between the vividness of an experience and the intensity of a quality. I proceed to (...)
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  • Delusion and Affective Framing.Rachel Gunn - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Birmingham
    Clinically significant delusion is a symptom of a number of mental illnesses. We rely on what a person says and how she behaves in order to identify if she has this symptom and it is clear from the literature that delusions are heterogeneous and extremely difficult to define. People with active delusions were interviewed to explore what it is like to develop and experience delusion. The transcribed interview data was analysed to identify themes and narrative trajectories that help to explain (...)
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  • Enacting Phenomenological Gestalts in Ultra-Trail Running: An Inductive Analysis of Trail Runners’ Courses of Experience.Nadège Rochat, Vincent Gesbert, Ludovic Seifert & Denis Hauw - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • Toward an Expansion of an Enactive Ethics with the Help of Care Ethics.Petr Urban - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • Tchnąć nowe życie w kognitywistykę.Tom Froese - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (1).
    [Przekład] W artykule tym opowiadam się za zunifikowaną kognitywistyką, przyjmując dla swej argumentacji niecodzienny punkt wyjścia: stanowisko określane czasem jako „teza o kontinuum życia-umysłu”. Zamiast więc traktować jako pewnik powszechnie akceptowane założenia początkowe, a następnie proponować odpowiedzi na pewne dobrze określone pytania, muszę najpierw dowieść, że koncepcja kontinuum życia-umysłu może w ogóle stanowić właściwy punkt startowy. Zacznę zatem od oceny pojęciowych narzędzi, odpowiednich do budowania teorii umysłu na tej podstawie. Czerpiąc spostrzeżenia z wielu różnych dziedzin – szczególnie z połączenia egzystencjalistycznej (...)
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  • Pre-Reflective Self-as-Subject From Experiential and Empirical Perspectives.Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):583-599.
    In the first part of this paper I characterize a minimal form of self-consciousness, namely pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is a constant structural feature of conscious experience, and corresponds to the consciousness of the self-as-subject that is not taken as an intentional object. In the second part, I argue that contemporary cognitive neuroscience has by and large missed this fundamental form of self-consciousness in its investigation of various forms of self-experience. In the third part, I exemplify how the notion of pre-reflective (...)
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  • More Than Our Body: Minimal and Enactive Selfhood in Global Paralysis.Miriam Kyselo - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-18.
    This paper looks to phenomenology and enactive cognition in order to shed light on the self and sense of self of patients with locked-in syndrome. It critically discusses the concept of the minimal self, both in its phenomenological and ontological dimension. Ontologically speaking, the self is considered to be equal to a person’s sensorimotor embodiment. This bodily self also grounds the minimal sense of self as being a distinct experiential subject. The view from the minimal bodily self presupposes that sociality (...)
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  • Phenomenal Consciousness and the Sensorimotor Approach. A Critical Account.Dell’Anna Alessandro & Paternoster Alfredo - 2013 - Open Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):435.
    The paper discusses some recent suggestions offered by the so-called sensorimotor (or enactivist) theorists as to the problem of the explanatory gap, that is, the alleged impossibility of accounting for phenomenal consciousness in any scientific theory. We argue in the paper that, although some enactivist theorists’ suggestions appear fresh and eye-opening, the claim that the explanatory gap is (dis)solved is much overstated.
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  • Autonomy and Enactivism: Towards a Theory of Sensorimotor Autonomous Agency.Xabier E. Barandiaran - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):409-430.
    The concept of “autonomy”, once at the core of the original enactivist proposal in The Embodied Mind, is nowadays ignored or neglected by some of the most prominent contemporary enactivists approaches. Theories of autonomy, however, come to fill a theoretical gap that sensorimotor accounts of cognition cannot ignore: they provide a naturalized account of normativity and the resources to ground the identity of a cognitive subject in its specific mode of organization. There are, however, good reasons for the contemporary neglect (...)
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  • Embodiment, Sociality, and the Life Shaping Thesis.Michelle Maiese - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (2):353-374.
    What Kyselo calls the “body-social problem” concerns whether to individuate the human self in terms of its bodily aspects or social aspects. In her view, either approach risks privileging one dimension while reducing the other to a mere contextual element. However, she proposes that principles from enactivism can help us to find a middle ground and solve the body-social problem. Here Kyselo looks to the notions of “needful freedom” and "individuation through and from a world" and extends them from the (...)
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  • Enactive Intersubjectivity: Participatory Sense-Making and Mutual Incorporation.Thomas Fuchs & Hanne De Jaegher - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):465-486.
    Current theories of social cognition are mainly based on a representationalist view. Moreover, they focus on a rather sophisticated and limited aspect of understanding others, i.e. on how we predict and explain others’ behaviours through representing their mental states. Research into the ‘social brain’ has also favoured a third-person paradigm of social cognition as a passive observation of others’ behaviour, attributing it to an inferential, simulative or projective process in the individual brain. In this paper, we present a concept of (...)
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  • Enacting Care.Petr Urban - 2015 - Ethics and Social Welfare 9 (2):216-222.
  • Associations Between Attention, Affect and Cardiac Activity in a Single Yoga Session for Female Cancer Survivors: An Enactive Neurophenomenology-Based Approach.Michael J. Mackenzie, Linda E. Carlson, David M. Paskevich, Panteleimon Ekkekakis, Amanda J. Wurz, Kathryn Wytsma, Katie A. Krenz, Edward McAuley & S. Nicole Culos-Reed - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 27:129-146.
  • Locked-in Syndrome: A Challenge for Embodied Cognitive Science.Miriam Kyselo & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):517-542.
    Embodied approaches in cognitive science hold that the body is crucial for cognition. What this claim amounts to, however, still remains unclear. This paper contributes to its clarification by confronting three ways of understanding embodiment—the sensorimotor approach, extended cognition and enactivism—with Locked-in syndrome. LIS is a case of severe global paralysis in which patients are unable to move and yet largely remain cognitively intact. We propose that LIS poses a challenge to embodied approaches to cognition requiring them to make explicit (...)
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  • Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge.Robert Hanna & Monima Chadha - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):184-223.
    In this paper we (i) identify the notion of ‘essentially non-conceptual content’ by critically analyzing the recent and contemporary debate about non-conceptual content, (ii) work out the basics of broadly Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content in relation to a corresponding theory of conceptual content, and then (iii) demonstrate one effective application of the Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content by using this theory to provide a ‘minimalist’ solution to the problem of perceptual self-knowledge which is raised by Strong Externalism.
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  • Thinking-is-Moving: Dance, Agency, and a Radically Enactive Mind. [REVIEW]Michele Merritt - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):95-110.
    Recently, in cognitive science, the enactivist account of cognition has been gaining ground, due in part to studies of movement in conjunction with thought. The idea, as Noë , has put it, that “cognition is not something happening inside us or to us, but it’s something we do, something we achieve,” is increasingly supported by research on joint attention, movement coordination, and gesture. Not surprisingly, therefore, enactivists have also begun to look at “movement specialists”—dancers—for both scientific and phenomenological accounts of (...)
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  • The Sense of Agency – a Phenomenological Consequence of Enacting Sensorimotor Schemes.Thomas Buhrmann & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):207-236.
    The sensorimotor approach to perception addresses various aspects of perceptual experience, but not the subjectivity of intentional action. Conversely, the problem that current accounts of the sense of agency deal with is primarily one of subjectivity. But the proposed models, based on internal signal comparisons, arguably fail to make the transition from subpersonal computations to personal experience. In this paper we suggest an alternative direction towards explaining the sense of agency by braiding three theoretical strands: a world-involving, dynamical interpretation of (...)
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  • Gestural Sense-Making: Hand Gestures as Intersubjective Linguistic Enactments. [REVIEW]Elena Cuffari - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):599-622.
    The ubiquitous human practice of spontaneously gesturing while speaking demonstrates the embodiment, embeddedness, and sociality of cognition. The present essay takes gestural practice to be a paradigmatic example of a more general claim: human cognition is social insofar as our embedded, intelligent, and interacting bodies select and construct meaning in a way that is intersubjectively constrained and defeasible. Spontaneous co-speech gesture is markedly interesting because it at once confirms embodied aspects of linguistic meaning-making that formalist and linguistic turn-type philosophical approaches (...)
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  • Can the Mind Be Embodied, Enactive, Affective, and Extended?Michelle Maiese - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):343-361.
    In recent years, a growing number of thinkers have begun to challenge the long-held view that the mind is neurally realized. One strand of critique comes from work on extended cognition, a second comes from research on embodied cognition, and a third comes from enactivism. I argue that theorists who embrace the claim that the mind is fully embodied and enactive cannot consistently also embrace the extended mind thesis. This is because once one takes seriously the central tenets of enactivism, (...)
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  • The Enactive Approach and Disorders of the Self - the Case of Schizophrenia.Miriam Kyselo - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (4):591-616.
    The paper discusses two recent approaches to schizophrenia, a phenomenological and a neuroscientific approach, illustrating how new directions in philosophy and cognitive science can elaborate accounts of psychopathologies of the self. It is argued that the notion of the minimal and bodily self underlying these approaches is still limited since it downplays the relevance of social interactions and relations for the formation of a coherent sense of self. These approaches also illustrate that we still lack an account of how 1st (...)
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  • Face to Face with an Enactive Approach: A Sensorimotor Account of Face Detection and Recognition. [REVIEW]Aaron Kagan - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):509-525.
    The enactive approach to perception describes experience as a temporally extended activity of skillful engagement with the environment. This paper pursues this view and focuses on prosopagnosia both for the light that the theory can throw on the phenomenon, and for the critical light the phenomenon can throw on the theory. I argue that the enactive theory is insufficient to characterize the unique nature of experience specific to prosopagnosic subjects. There is a distinct difference in the overall process of detection (...)
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  • Sensorimotor Theory and Enactivism.Jan Degenaar & J. Kevin O’Regan - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):393-407.
    The sensorimotor theory of perceptual consciousness offers a form of enactivism in that it stresses patterns of interaction instead of any alleged internal representations of the environment. But how does it relate to forms of enactivism stressing the continuity between life and mind? We shall distinguish sensorimotor enactivism, which stresses perceptual capacities themselves, from autopoietic enactivism, which claims an essential connection between experience and autopoietic processes or associated background capacities. We show how autopoiesis, autonomous agency, and affective dimensions of experience (...)
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  • Enacting Musical Emotions. Sense-Making, Dynamic Systems, and the Embodied Mind.Andrea Schiavio, Dylan van der Schyff, Julian Cespedes-Guevara & Mark Reybrouck - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (5):785-809.
    The subject of musical emotions has emerged only recently as a major area of research. While much work in this area offers fascinating insights to musicological research, assumptions about the nature of emotional experience seem to remain committed to appraisal, representations, and a rule-based or information-processing model of cognition. Over the past three decades alternative ‘embodied’ and ‘enactive’ models of mind have challenged this approach by emphasising the self-organising aspects of cognition, often describing it as an ongoing process of dynamic (...)
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  • Close to Me: Multisensory Space Representations for Action and Pre-Reflexive Consciousness of Oneself-in-the-World.Dorothée Legrand, Claudio Brozzoli, Yves Rossetti & Alessandro Farnè - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):687-699.
    Philosophical considerations as well as several recent studies from neurophysiology, neuropsychology, and psychophysics converged in showing that the peripersonal space is structured in a body-centred manner and represented through integrated sensory inputs. Multisensory representations may deserve the function of coding peripersonal space for avoiding or interacting with objects. Neuropsychological evidence is reviewed for dynamic interactions between space representations and action execution, as revealed by the behavioural effects that the use of a tool, as a physical extension of the reachable space, (...)
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  • Naturalizing the Acting Self: Subjective Vs. Anonymous Agency.Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):457 – 478.
    This paper considers critically the enterprise of naturalizing the subjective experience of acting intentionally. I specifically expose the limits of the model that conceives of agency as composed of two stages. The first stage consists in experiencing an anonymous intention without being conscious of it as anybody's in particular. The second stage disambiguates this anonymous experience thanks to a mechanism of identification and attribution answering the question: "who is intending to act?" On the basis of phenomenological, clinical, methodological and empirical (...)
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  • Kantian Non-Conceptualism.Robert Hanna - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.
    There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true, then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or (...)
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  • Ethics and Consciousness in Artificial Agents.Steve Torrance - 2008 - AI and Society 22 (4):495-521.
    In what ways should we include future humanoid robots, and other kinds of artificial agents, in our moral universe? We consider the Organic view, which maintains that artificial humanoid agents, based on current computational technologies, could not count as full-blooded moral agents, nor as appropriate targets of intrinsic moral concern. On this view, artificial humanoids lack certain key properties of biological organisms, which preclude them from having full moral status. Computationally controlled systems, however advanced in their cognitive or informational capacities, (...)
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  • Living Systems: Autonomy, Autopoiesis and Enaction.Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward - 2015 - Philosophy and Technology 28 (2):225-239.
    The autopoietic theory and the enactive approach are two theoretical streams that, in spite of their historical link and conceptual affinities, offer very different views on the nature of living beings. In this paper, we compare these views and evaluate, in an exploratory way, their respective degrees of internal coherence. Focusing the analyses on certain key notions such as autonomy and organizational closure, we argue that while the autopoietic theory manages to elaborate an internally consistent conception of living beings, the (...)
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