Citations of work:

Travis Timmerman (2016). Reconsidering Categorical Desire Views.

4 found
Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

Search for work by author name and title
Add directly by record ID

  1.  64
    The Worseness of Nonexistence.Theron Pummer - forthcoming - In Saving People from the Harm of Death. Oxford University Press.
    Most believe that it is worse for a person to die than to continue to exist with a good life. At the same time, many believe that it is not worse for a merely possible person never to exist than to exist with a good life. I argue that if the underlying properties that make us the sort of thing we essentially are can come in small degrees, then to maintain this commonly-held pair of beliefs we will have to embrace (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Should I Choose to Never Die? Williams, Boredom, and the Significance of Mortality.David Beglin - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2009-2028.
    Bernard Williams’ discussion of immortality in “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality” has spawned an entire philosophical literature. This literature tends to focus on one of Williams’ central claims: if we were to relinquish our mortality, we would necessarily become alienated from our existence and environment—“bored,” in his terms. Many theorists have defended this claim; many others have challenged it. Even if this claim is false, though, it still isn’t obvious that we should choose to relinquish our (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  13
    Victims.Christopher Belshaw - 2016 - In Michael Cholbi (ed.), Immortality and the Philosophy of Death. Rowman & Littlefield.
  4. Your Death Might Be the Worst Thing Ever to Happen to You (but Maybe You Shouldn't Care).Travis Timmerman - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):18-37.
    Deprivationism cannot accommodate the common sense assumption that we should lament our death iff, and to the extent that, it is bad for us. Call this the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption. As such, either this assumption needs to be rejected or deprivationism does. I first argue that the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption is false. I then attempt to figure out which facts our attitudes concerning death should track. I suggest that each person should have two distinct (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations