Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Death: 'Nothing' Gives Insight.Eric J. Ettema - 2013 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (3):575-585.
    According to a widely accepted belief, we cannot know our own death—death means ‘nothing’ to us. At first sight, the meaning of ‘nothing’ just implies the negation or absence of ‘something’. Death then simply refers to the negation or absence of life. As a consequence, however, death has no meaning of itself. This leads to an ontological paradox in which death is both acknowledged and denied: death is … nothing. In this article, I investigate whether insight into the ontological paradox (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Survivalism, Corruptionism, and Mereology.David S. Oderberg - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4):1-26.
    Corruptionism is the view that following physical death, the human being ceases to exist but their soul persists in the afterlife. Survivalism holds that both the human being and their soul persist in the afterlife, as distinct entities, with the soul constituting the human. Each position has its defenders, most of whom appeal both to metaphysical considerations and to the authority of St Thomas Aquinas. Corruptionists claim that survivalism violates a basic principle of any plausible mereology, while survivalists tend to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Not Just a Terminological Difference: Cartesian Substance Dualism Vs Thomistic Hylomorphism.Jeremy W. Skrzypek - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):103-117.
    In Are We Bodies or Souls? Richard Swinburne presents an updated formulation and defense of his dualist theory of the human person. On this theory, human persons are compound substances, composed of both bodies and souls. The soul is the only essential component of the human person, however, and so each of us could, in principle, continue to exist without our bodies, composed of nothing more than our souls. As Swinburne himself points out, his theory of the human person shares (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Contemporary Hylomorphism.Andrew M. Bailey & Shane Wilkins - 2018 - Oxford Bibliographies 3:1-12.
    Aristotle famously held that objects are comprised of matter and form. That is the central doctrine of hylomorphism (sometimes rendered “hylemorphism”—hyle, matter; morphe, form), and the view has become a live topic of inquiry today. Contemporary proponents of the doctrine include Jeffrey Brower, Kit Fine, David Hershenov, Mark Johnston, Kathrin Koslicki, Anna Marmodoro, Michael Rea, and Patrick Toner, among others. In the wake of these contemporary hylomorphic theories the doctrine has seen application to various topics within mainstream analytic metaphysics. Here, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Death as Material Kenosis: A Thomistic Proposal.Marco Stango - 2020 - Heythrop Journal 61 (2):327-346.
    This paper explores the possibility of developing a new understanding of the traditional notion of human death as the separation of soul and body by relying on the resources of St Thomas’s hylomorphism. It therefore develops the concept of material kenosis, showing in what way the Thomistic understanding of death should be broadened beyond the mere understanding of it as substantial change. The paper concludes by suggesting that this view of human death supplements St Thomas’s interpretation of the notion of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Disembodied Animals.Allison Thornton - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):203-217.
    This paper defends a hylomorphic version of animalism according to which human persons survive as immaterial, bodiless animals after death. According to the hylomorphism under consideration, human persons have souls that survive death, and according to the animalism under consideration, human persons are necessarily animals. One might think this implies that human persons don't survive their deaths since if they were to survive their deaths, they would be immaterial animals after death, but necessarily animals are material. This paper shows that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Hylemorphism, Remnant Persons and Personhood.Patrick Toner - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):76-96.
    Animalism is the doctrine that we human beings are – are identical with – animals. Hylemorphism is a form of animalism. In this paper, I defend hylemorphism by showing that while other forms of animalism fall prey to the problem of ‘Remnant Persons,’ hylemorphism does not. But hylemorphism's account of personhood seems to have some very implausible implications. I address one of those implications, and argue that it isn't nearly as objectionable as it might at first appear.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The Problems of Life After Death.Thomas Charles Atkinson - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (10).
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Varieties of Animalism.Allison Krile Thornton - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (9):515-526.
    Animalism in its basic form is the view that we are animals. Whether it is a thesis about anything else – like what the conditions of our persistence through time are or whether we're wholly material things – depends on the facts about the persistence conditions and ontology of animals. Thus, I will argue, there are different varieties of animalism, differing with respect to which other theses are taken in conjunction with animalism in its basic form. The different varieties of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Thomistic Hylomorphism and Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Religion.James Madden - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):664-676.
    Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to accept either some version of dualism or physicalism when considering the mind–body problem. Likewise, recent philosophers of religion typically assume that we must work within these two categories when considering problems related to the possibility of bodily resurrection. Recently, some philosophers have reintroduced the Thomistic version of hylomorphism. In this article, we will consider the distinctive doctrines of Thomistic hylomorphism and how they can be used to address concerns about both the mind–body problem and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations