This study investigates priming in an implicit Word Stem Completion (WSC) task. A total of 305 participants performed a WSC task in two phases (study and test). The test phase included 63 unique-solution stems and 63 multiple-solution stems. After confirming the presence of priming (mean = 0.22), analysis revealed that it was stronger in the case of multiple-solution stems, indicating that the stems were not a homogeneous group of stimuli. Thus, further analyses were performed only for the data of the (...) unique-solution stems. The correlations between priming and a set of conceptual (familiarity, frequency of use, number of meanings) and non-conceptual (letters/blanks ratio and difficulty of completed) variables showed significant relationships between two conceptual variables (familiarity and frequency) and priming. Difficulty was also significantly correlated with priming. The most familiar and frequent words were those that produced a greater magnitude of priming. At the same time, the most difficult stems were those generating more priming. A regression analysis showed that the difficulty of completing a stem was the strongest predictor of priming. When difficulty was the dependent variable in the regression analysis, the significant variables in the regression were familiarity and letters-blanks ratio. Finally, a comparison was made between these results and those obtained in a previous study of WFC by Soler et al. (2009) in which the same words and procedure were employed. A comparison of results from these two sets of data suggested that the only relevant difference between the two tasks was the influence of the variable letters-blanks ratio. This perceptual variable had a significant correlation with priming only in the WFC task. These results highlight the importance of controlling the characteristics (conceptual and non-conceptual) of stimuli used in WFC and WSC tasks when exploring the nature of priming. (shrink)

Models of memory in cognitive science and philosophy have traditionally explained human remembering in terms of storage and retrieval. This tendency has been entrenched by reliance on computationalist explanations over the course of the twentieth century; even research programs that eschew computationalism in name, or attempt the revision of traditional models, demonstrate tacit commitment to computationalist assumptions. It is assumed that memory must be stored by means of an isomorphic trace, that memory processes must divide into conceptually distinct systems and (...) phases, and that human remembering consists in inner, cognitive processes that are implemented by distinct neural processes. This dissertation draws on recent empirical work, and on philosophical arguments from Ludwig Wittgenstein and others, to demonstrate that this latent computationalism in the study of memory is problematic, and that it can and should be eliminated. Cognitive psychologists studying memory have encountered numerous data in recent decades that belie archival models. In cognitive neuroscience, establishing the neural basis of storage and retrieval processes has proven elusive. A number of revised models on offer in memory science, that have taken these issues into account, fail to sufficiently extricate the archival framework. Several impasses in memory science are products of these underlying computationalist assumptions. Wittgenstein and other philosophers offer a number of arguments against the need for, and the efficacy of, the storage and retrieval of traces in human remembering. A study of these arguments clarifies the ways that these computationalist assumptions are presently impeding the science of memory, and provides ways forward in removing them. We can and should characterize and model human memory without invoking the storage and retrieval of traces. A range of work in connectionism, dynamical systems theory, and recent philosophical accounts of memory demonstrate how the science of memory can proceed without these assumptions, toward non-archival models of remembering. (shrink)