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John Turri (2012). A Puzzle About Withholding.

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  1.  40
    A Neo-Pyrrhonian Response to the Disagreeing About Disagreement Argument.Diego E. Machuca - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    An objection that has been raised to the conciliatory stance on the epistemic significance of peer disagreement known as the Equal Weight View is that it is self-defeating, self-undermining, or self-refuting. The proponent of that view claims that equal weight should be given to all the parties to a peer dispute. Hence, if one of his epistemic peers defends the opposite view, he is required to give equal weight to the two rival views, thereby undermining his confidence in the correctness (...)
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    Resolving Turri's Puzzle About Withholding.Sebastian Becker - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (2):229-243.
    Turri describes a case in which a group of experts apparently correctly advise you not to withhold on a proposition P, but where your evidence neither supports believing nor disbelieving P. He claims that this presents a puzzle about withholding: on the one hand, it seems that you should not withhold on P, since the experts say so. On the other hand, we have the intuition that you should neither believe nor disbelieve P, since your evidence doesn't support it. Thus, (...)
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    Sceptical Rationality.Jan Willem Wieland - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):222-238.
    It is widely assumed that it is rational to suspend one’s belief regarding a certain proposition only if one’s evidence is neutral regarding that proposition. In this paper I broaden this condition, and defend, on the basis of an improved ancient argument, that it is rational to suspend one’s belief even if the available evidence is not neutral – or even close to neutral.
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