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John Turri (2017). Knowledge Attributions in Iterated Fake Barn Cases.

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  1. Sosa Versus Kornblith on Grades of Knowledge.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In a series of works Ernest Sosa (see Sosa 1991, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2015, 2017) has defended the view that there are two kinds or ‘grades’ of knowledge, animal and reflective. One of the most persistent critics of Sosa’s attempts to bifurcate knowledge is Hilary Kornblith (see Kornblith 2004, 2009, 2012). Our aim in this paper is to outline and evaluate Kornblith’s criticisms. We will argue that, while they raise a range of difficult (exegetical and substantive) questions about Sosa’s (...)
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    Lessons for Experimental Philosophy From the Rise and “Fall” of Neurophilosophy.John Bickle - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (1):1-22.
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  3. Lucky Achievement: Virtue Epistemology on the Value of Knowledge.Tsung‐Hsing Ho - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):303-311.
    Virtue epistemology argues that knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief because knowledge is an achievement, but Gettierized belief is not. The key premise in the achievement argument is that achievement is apt (successful because competent) and Gettierized belief is inapt (successful because lucky). I first argue that the intuition behind the achievement argument is based wrongly on the fact that ‘being successful because lucky’ implicates ‘being not competent enough’. I then offer an argument from moral luck to argue that (...)
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