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  1. A New Argument for the Incompatibility of Content Externalism with Justification Internalism.Mahmoud Morvarid - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):2333-2353.
    Several lines of reasoning have been proposed to show the incompatibility of content externalism with justification internalism. In this paper I examine two such lines of reasoning, which both rely on the general idea that since content externalism is incompatible with certain aspects of the alleged privileged character of self-knowledge, it would tend to undermine justification internalism as well. I shall argue that both lines of reasoning, as they stand, lack plausibility, though the core idea of the second line can (...)
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  • Content Externalism and Brute Logical Error.John M. Collins - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):pp. 549-574.
    Most content externalists concede that even if externalism is compatible with the thesis that one has authoritative self-knowledge of thought contents, it is incompatible with the stronger claim that one is always able to tell by introspection whether two of one’s thought tokens have the same, or different, content. If one lacks such authoritative discriminative self-knowledge of thought contents, it would seem that brute logical error – non-culpable logical error – is possible. Some philosophers, such as Paul Boghossian, have argued (...)
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  • Illusion of Transparency.Laura Schroeter - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):597 – 618.
    It's generally agreed that, for a certain a class of cases, a rational subject cannot be wrong in treating two elements of thought as co-referential. Even anti-individualists like Tyler Burge agree that empirical error is impossible in such cases. I argue that this immunity to empirical error is illusory and sketch a new anti-individualist approach to concepts that doesn't require such immunity.
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  • Memory and Externalism.Sven Bernecker - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):605-632.
    Content externalism about memory says that the individuation of memory contents depends on relations the subject bears to his past environment. I defend externalism about memory by arguing that neither philosophical nor psychological considerations stand in the way of accepting the context dependency of memory that follows from externalism.
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  • Introspective Availability.John Kulvicki - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):208-228.
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  • Introspective Availability.John Kulvicki - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):208-228.
  • Social Construction and Achieving Reference.Ron Mallon - 2017 - Noûs 51 (1):113-131.
    One influential view is that at least some putatively natural human kinds are actually social constructions, understood as some real kind of thing that is produced or sustained by our social and conceptual practices. Category constructionists share two commitments: they hold that human category terms like “race” and “sex” and “homosexuality” and “perversion” actually refer to constructed categories, and they hold that these categories are widely but mistakenly taken to be natural kinds. But it is far from clear that these (...)
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  • Anti-Individualism, Content Preservation, and Discursive Justification.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2007 - Noûs 41 (2):178-203.
    Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), (...)
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  • Arguments From Reference and the Worry About Dependence.Ron Mallon - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):160-183.
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  • Externalism and the Memory Argument.Yujin Nagasawa - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (4):335-46.
    Pa ul Boghos s i a n’ s ‘ Me mor y Ar gume nt ’ a l l ege dl y s hows , us i ng t he f ami l i a r s l ow-switching scenario, that externalism and authoritative self-knowledge are incompatible. The aim of this paper is to undermine the argument by examining..
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  • The Discrimination Argument: A Reply to Dierig.Mahmoud Morvarid - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):1209-1219.
    Boghossian’s discrimination argument aims to show that content externalism undermines the privileged access thesis. Simon Dierig has recently proposed a new objection to Boghossian’s argument according to which having a “twater thought” is not an alternative, and a fortiori not a relevant alternative, to possessing a “water thought”. Dierig also considers, and criticizes, a modified version of the discrimination argument which would be immune to his objection. I shall argue, first, that he fails to advance a successful objection to the (...)
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  • The Transparency of Mental Content Revisited. [REVIEW]Paul Boghossian - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):457-465.
  • Dangerous Liaisons.Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira - 2019 - Ratio 32 (3):192-204.
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  • Conceptual Equivocation and Epistemic Relevance.Mikkel Gerken - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (2):117-132.
    Much debate has surrounded "switching" scenarios in which a subject's reasoning is said to exhibit the fallacy of equivocation ( Burge 1988 ; Boghossian 1992, 1994 ). Peter Ludlow has argued that such scenarios are "epistemically prevalent" and, therefore, epistemically relevant alternatives ( Ludlow 1995a ). Since a distinctive feature of the cases in question is that the subject blamelessly engages in conceptual equivocation, we may label them 'equivocational switching cases'. Ludlow's influential argument occurs in a discussion about compatibilism with (...)
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  • Conceptual Equivocation and Epistemic Relevance.Mikkel Gerken - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (2):117-132.
    Much debate has surrounded “switching” scenarios in which a subject's reasoning is said to exhibit the fallacy of equivocation. Peter Ludlow has argued that such scenarios are “epistemically prevalent” and, therefore, epistemically relevant alternatives. Since a distinctive feature of the cases in question is that the subject blamelessly engages in conceptual equivocation, we may label them ‘equivocational switching cases’.Ludlow's influential argument occurs in a discussion about compatibilism with regards to anti‐individualism and self‐knowledge. However, the issue has wide‐reaching consequences for many (...)
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  • Externalism and the Memory Argument.Yujin Nagasawa - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (4):335-346.
    Paul Boghossian's‘Memory Argument’allegedly shows, using the familiar slow‐switching scenario, that externalism and authoritative self‐knowledge are incompatible. The aim of this paper is to undermine the argument by examining two distinct externalist responses. I demonstrate that the Memory Argument equivocates on the notion of forgetting.
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