Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Equilibrium in Gibbsian Statistical Mechanics.Roman Frigg & Charlotte Werndl - 2021 - In Eleanor Knox & Alistair Wilson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics. Routledge.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Information Gain and Approaching True Belief.Jonas Clausen Mork - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):77-96.
    Recent years have seen a renewed interest in the philosophical study of information. In this paper a two-part analysis of information gain—objective and subjective—in the context of doxastic change is presented and discussed. Objective information gain is analyzed in terms of doxastic movement towards true belief, while subjective information gain is analyzed as an agent’s expectation value of her objective information gain for a given doxastic change. The resulting expression for subjective information gain turns out to be a familiar one (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Physics of Uncertainty, the Gibbs Paradox and Indistinguishable Particles.Demetris Koutsoyiannis - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44 (4):480-489.
    The idea that, in the microscopic world, particles are indistinguishable, interchangeable and without identity has been central in quantum physics. The same idea has been enrolled in statistical thermodynamics even in a classical framework of analysis to make theoretical results agree with experience. In thermodynamics of gases, this hypothesis is associated with several problems, logical and technical. For this case, an alternative theoretical framework is provided, replacing the indistinguishability hypothesis with standard probability and statistics. In this framework, entropy is a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Information in Statistical Physics.Roger Balian - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 36 (2):323-353.
  • Compendium of the Foundations of Classical Statistical Physics.Jos Uffink - 2005 - In Jeremy Butterfield & John Earman (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Physics. Elsevier.
    Roughly speaking, classical statistical physics is the branch of theoretical physics that aims to account for the thermal behaviour of macroscopic bodies in terms of a classical mechanical model of their microscopic constituents, with the help of probabilistic assumptions. In the last century and a half, a fair number of approaches have been developed to meet this aim. This study of their foundations assesses their coherence and analyzes the motivations for their basic assumptions, and the interpretations of their central concepts. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations  
  • Generalizing the Lottery Paradox.Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.
    This paper is concerned with formal solutions to the lottery paradox on which high probability defeasibly warrants acceptance. It considers some recently proposed solutions of this type and presents an argument showing that these solutions are trivial in that they boil down to the claim that perfect probability is sufficient for rational acceptability. The argument is then generalized, showing that a broad class of similar solutions faces the same problem. An argument against some formal solutions to the lottery paradox The (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  • Learning From Conditionals.Benjamin Eva, Stephan Hartmann & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):461-508.
    In this article, we address a major outstanding question of probabilistic Bayesian epistemology: how should a rational Bayesian agent update their beliefs upon learning an indicative conditional? A number of authors have recently contended that this question is fundamentally underdetermined by Bayesian norms, and hence that there is no single update procedure that rational agents are obliged to follow upon learning an indicative conditional. Here we resist this trend and argue that a core set of widely accepted Bayesian norms is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • A New Resolution of the Judy Benjamin Problem.Igor Douven & Jan-Willem Romeijn - 2011 - Mind 120 (479):637 - 670.
    A paper on how to adapt your probabilisitc beliefs when learning a conditional.
    Direct download (17 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Philosophy of Science in the Netherlands.James W. McAllister - 1997 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (2):191 – 204.
    Conditions for philosophy of science in the Netherlands are not optimal. The climate of opinion in Dutch philosophy is unsympathetic to the sciences, partly because of the influence of theology. Dutch universities offer no taught graduate programmes in philosophy of science, which would provide an entry route for science graduates. A great deal of Dutch research in philosophy of science is affected by an exegetical attitude, which fosters the interpretation and evaluation of other writers rather than the development of original (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Field Guide to Recent Work on the Foundations of Statistical Mechanics.Roman Frigg - 2008 - In Dean Rickles (ed.), The Ashgate Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Physics. London, U.K.: Ashgate. pp. 991-96.
    This is an extensive review of recent work on the foundations of statistical mechanics.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  • A Bayesian Interpretation of First-Order Phase Transitions.Sergio Davis, Joaquín Peralta, Yasmín Navarrete, Diego González & Gonzalo Gutiérrez - 2016 - Foundations of Physics 46 (3):350-359.
    In this work we review the formalism used in describing the thermodynamics of first-order phase transitions from the point of view of maximum entropy inference. We present the concepts of transition temperature, latent heat and entropy difference between phases as emergent from the more fundamental concept of internal energy, after a statistical inference analysis. We explicitly demonstrate this point of view by making inferences on a simple game, resulting in the same formalism as in thermodynamical phase transitions. We show that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Statistical Mechanics: A Tale of Two Theories.Roman Frigg & Charlotte Werndl - 2019 - The Monist 102 (4):424-438.
    There are two theoretical approaches in statistical mechanics, one associated with Boltzmann and the other with Gibbs. The theoretical apparatus of the two approaches offer distinct descriptions of the same physical system with no obvious way to translate the concepts of one formalism into those of the other. This raises the question of the status of one approach vis-à-vis the other. We answer this question by arguing that the Boltzmannian approach is a fundamental theory while Gibbsian statistical mechanics is an (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Constraint Rule of the Maximum Entropy Principle.Jos Uffink - 1996 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 27 (1):47-79.
    The principle of maximum entropy is a method for assigning values to probability distributions on the basis of partial information. In usual formulations of this and related methods of inference one assumes that this partial information takes the form of a constraint on allowed probability distributions. In practical applications, however, the information consists of empirical data. A constraint rule is then employed to construct constraints on probability distributions out of these data. Usually one adopts the rule that equates the expectation (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • On Bertrand's Paradox.Sorin Bangu - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):30-35.
    The Principle of Indifference is a central element of the ‘classical’ conception of probability, but, for all its strong intuitive appeal, it is widely believed that it faces a devastating objection: the so-called (by Poincare´) ‘Bertrand paradoxes’ (in essence, cases in which the same probability question receives different answers). The puzzle has fascinated many since its discovery, and a series of clever solutions (followed promptly by equally clever rebuttals) have been proposed. However, despite the long-standing interest in this problem, an (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Entropy - A Guide for the Perplexed.Roman Frigg & Charlotte Werndl - 2011 - In Claus Beisbart & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Probabilities in Physics. Oxford University Press. pp. 115-142.
    Entropy is ubiquitous in physics, and it plays important roles in numerous other disciplines ranging from logic and statistics to biology and economics. However, a closer look reveals a complicated picture: entropy is defined differently in different contexts, and even within the same domain different notions of entropy are at work. Some of these are defined in terms of probabilities, others are not. The aim of this chapter is to arrive at an understanding of some of the most important notions (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Refutation by Elimination.John Turri - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):35-39.
    This paper refutes two important and influential views in one fell stroke. The first is G.E. Moore’s view that assertions of the form ‘Q but I don’t believe that Q’ are inherently “absurd.” The second is Gareth Evans’s view that justification to assert Q entails justification to assert that you believe Q. Both views run aground the possibility of being justified in accepting eliminativism about belief. A corollary is that a principle recently defended by John Williams is also false, namely, (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • More Trouble for Regular Probabilitites.Matthew W. Parker - 2012
    In standard probability theory, probability zero is not the same as impossibility. But many have suggested that only impossible events should have probability zero. This can be arranged if we allow infinitesimal probabilities, but infinitesimals do not solve all of the problems. We will see that regular probabilities are not invariant over rigid transformations, even for simple, bounded, countable, constructive, and disjoint sets. Hence, regular chances cannot be determined by space-time invariant physical laws, and regular credences cannot satisfy seemingly reasonable (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Probabilistic Issues in Statistical Mechanics.Gérard G. Emch - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 36 (2):303-322.
  • Maximum Entropy and Probability Kinematics Constrained by Conditionals.Stefan Lukits - 2015 - Entropy 17 (4):1690-1700.
    Two open questions of inductive reasoning are solved: (1) does the principle of maximum entropy (pme) give a solution to the obverse Majerník problem; and (2) is Wagner correct when he claims that Jeffrey’s updating principle (jup) contradicts pme? Majerník shows that pme provides unique and plausible marginal probabilities, given conditional probabilities. The obverse problem posed here is whether pme also provides such conditional probabilities, given certain marginal probabilities. The theorem developed to solve the obverse Majerník problem demonstrates that in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation