Is capitalism compatible with democratic equality? Rawls’s critique of welfare-state capitalism implies a negative answer. I argue that Rawls’s critique fails and that welfare-state capitalism can satisfy the demands of democratic equality. I articulate a social democratic interpretation of the ideal of democratic equality and show that it justifies welfare-state capitalism. This argument also implies that welfare-state capitalism can satisfy the demands of democratic equality as interpreted by Rawls’s justice as fairness. So, whether we accept Rawls’s interpretation of democratic equality (...) or the social democratic alternative, welfare-state capitalism can satisfy the demands of democratic equality. (shrink)

Large-scale land acquisitions (LaSLA), otherwise ‘land grabbing’ in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), raise difficult normative questions the current literature does not sufficiently explore. LaSLA is associated with development opportunities; however, it also threatens the well-being of local people because of displacement and dispossession. To investigate the processes and outcomes for LaSLA to be considered as ‘just and fair,’ we evaluate the impacts of a LaSLA project on local livelihoods in Tanzania. Specifically, we apply John Rawls’ Theory of Justice to the project (...) and compare the results with empirical insights gained from our fieldwork. We find that LaSLA has the potential to improve the living standards of local people, we cannot consider LaSLA as just and fair because it contradicts Rawls’s principles of justice and deteriorates the livelihoods of local people. Our findings suggest that it is critical to scrutinize LaSLA investments, involve local people in decision-making, and build the capacity of host governments to negotiate better LaSLA deals. (shrink)

Substantially increased wealth inequality across the developed world has prompted many philosophers, economists and legal theorists to support comprehensive taxes on all forms of wealth. Proposals include levying taxes on the basis of total wealth, or alternatively the change in the value of capital holdings measured from year-to-year. This contrasts with most existing policies that tax capital assets at the point they are transferred from one beneficiary to another through sale or gifts. Are these tax reforms likely to meet their (...) aims of greater economic and political equality? We argue that these policies are likely to fail because, following neoclassical economic theory, they are based on a conception of capital as possessing given values in what amounts to a static equilibrium. This mischaracterizes the dynamic and subjective character of market economies and the contested value of real instantiations of capital goods. This makes them very difficult, often impossible, to value apart from at the point of voluntary transfer or profit realization. This means most taxes levied on a mark-to-market basis will be arbitrary and unfair. We propose alternative policies based on an income realization approach to taxation that are more likely to curb excessive wealth holdings. This includes introducing international treaties that prohibit preferential tax treatment for individual companies and specific sectors, and broadening the income tax base to include the imputed rent of personal housing wealth. (shrink)

Substantially increased wealth inequality across the developed world has prompted many philosophers, economists and legal theorists to support comprehensive taxes on all forms of wealth. Proposals include levying taxes on the basis of total wealth, or alternatively the change in the value of capital holdings measured from year-to-year. This contrasts with most existing policies that tax capital assets at the point they are transferred from one beneficiary to another through sale or gifts. Are these tax reforms likely to meet their (...) aims of greater economic and political equality? We argue that these policies are likely to fail because, following neoclassical economic theory, they are based on a conception of capital as possessing given values in what amounts to a static equilibrium. This mischaracterizes the dynamic and subjective character of market economies and the contested value of real instantiations of capital goods. This makes them very difficult, often impossible, to value apart from at the point of voluntary transfer or profit realization. This means most taxes levied on a mark-to-market basis will be arbitrary and unfair. We propose alternative policies based on an income realization approach to taxation that are more likely to curb excessive wealth holdings. This includes introducing international treaties that prohibit preferential tax treatment for individual companies and specific sectors, and broadening the income tax base to include the imputed rent of personal housing wealth. (shrink)

How important is the experience of risk in business endeavors for self-respect and moral development? Tomasi prompts this question with his attempt to reconcile Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness with free-market capitalism, by claiming that economic activity is a way for people to exercise their autonomy, responsibility, and self-authorship, including through voluntary risk-taking. Critics argue that the social environment generated through market institutions is ill-suited for developing a sense of responsibility and autonomy among citizens. We refine the case for (...) economic liberty by looking at the link between risk-taking and attitudes toward democratic citizenship. We highlight the critical role of ethical business practice as a contributor to the stability of liberal-democratic societies. (shrink)

The paper deals with “perfect institutional regimes”, defined as regimes that optimally satisfy a given value. Assuming that a PIR is unfeasible in the short term to agents willing to achieve it, what reasons do we have to spend time on a PIR? One answer is that knowing about PIRs is interesting enough to warrant an inquiry into the subject, even if it is not likely to change the world. Another is that searching for a PIR helps to set up (...) the principles under which more modest proposals of change are to be evaluated. Another, finally, is that theorizing about a PIR may have a motivational impact: although there are no motivated agents to whom the realization of a PIR is nowadays feasible, talking about it might lead to a change of this scenario. (shrink)