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  1. Is ‘No’ a Force-Indicator? Yes, Sooner or Later!Fabien Schang & James Trafford - 2017 - Logica Universalis 11 (2):225-251.
    This paper discusses the philosophical and logical motivations for rejectivism, primarily by considering a dialogical approach to logic, which is formalized in a Question–Answer Semantics. We develop a generalized account of rejectivism through close consideration of Mark Textor's arguments against rejectivism that the negative expression ‘No’ is never used as an act of rejection and is equivalent with a negative sentence. In doing so, we also shed light upon well-known issues regarding the supposed non-embeddability and non-iterability of force indicators.
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  • Assertion and Grounding: A Theory of Assertion for Constructive Type Theory.Maria Schaar - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):187-210.
    Taking Per Martin-Löf’s constructive type theory as a starting-point a theory of assertion is developed, which is able to account for the epistemic aspects of the speech act of assertion, and in which it is shown that assertion is not a wide genus. From a constructivist point of view, one is entitled to assert, for example, that a proposition A is true, only if one has constructed a proof object a for A in an act of demonstration. One thereby has (...)
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  • Locke and Arnauld on Judgment and Proposition.Maria van der Schaar - 2008 - History and Philosophy of Logic 29 (4):327-341.
    To understand pre-Fregean theories of judgment and proposition, such as those found in Locke and the Port-Royal logic, it is important to distinguish between propositions in the modern sense and propositions in the pre-Fregean sense. By making this distinction it becomes clear that these pre-Fregean theories cannot be meant to solve the propositional attitude problem. Notwithstanding this fact, Locke and Arnauld are able to make a distinction between asserted and unasserted propositions (in their sense). The way Locke makes this distinction (...)
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  • The Cognitive Act and the First-Person Perspective: An Epistemology for Constructive Type Theory.Schaar Maria van der - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):391 - 417.
    The notion of cognitive act is of importance for an epistemology that is apt for constructive type theory, and for epistemology in general. Instead of taking knowledge attributions as the primary use of the verb 'to know' that needs to be given an account of, and understanding a first-person knowledge claim as a special case of knowledge attribution, the account of knowledge that is given here understands first-person knowledge claims as the primary use of the verb 'to know'. This means (...)
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  • Assertion and Grounding: A Theory of Assertion for Constructive Type Theory.Maria van der Schaar - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):187-210.
    Taking Per Martin-Löf’s constructive type theory as a starting-point a theory of assertion is developed, which is able to account for the epistemic aspects of the speech act of assertion, and in which it is shown that assertion is not a wide genus. From a constructivist point of view, one is entitled to assert, for example, that a proposition A is true, only if one has constructed a proof object a for A in an act of demonstration. One thereby has (...)
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