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  1. Artificial Intelligence and African Conceptions of Personhood.C. S. Wareham - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (2):127-136.
    Under what circumstances if ever ought we to grant that Artificial Intelligences are persons? The question of whether AI could have the high degree of moral status that is attributed to human persons has received little attention. What little work there is employs western conceptions of personhood, while non-western approaches are neglected. In this article, I discuss African conceptions of personhood and their implications for the possibility of AI persons. I focus on an African account of personhood that is prima (...)
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  • Response to Millstein.Gary Varner - 2020 - Biology and Philosophy 35 (1):1-8.
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  • Introduction: Children and Consent to Treatment. [REVIEW]James Stacey Taylor - 2013 - HEC Forum 25 (4):285-287.
    Some of the most difficult ethical issues that arise in clinical bioethics concern the practice of medicine upon children. Unlike adults, children are incapable of providing informed consent either to undergoing the procedures that might be performed upon them, or to taking the drugs that might benefit them. Since this is so, children—like impaired adults—often have decisions made for them by competent adults who can consent on their behalf. This leads to a series of well-known philosophical problems concerning the basis (...)
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  • Genetically Modifying Livestock for Improved Welfare: A Path Forward.Adam Shriver & Emilie McConnachie - 2018 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 31 (2):161-180.
    In recent years, humans’ ability to selectively modify genes has increased dramatically as a result of the development of new, more efficient, and easier genetic modification technology. In this paper, we argue in favor of using this technology to improve the welfare of agricultural animals. We first argue that using animals genetically modified for improved welfare is preferable to the current status quo. Nevertheless, the strongest argument against pursuing gene editing for welfare is that there are alternative approaches to addressing (...)
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  • Meaning in the Lives of Humans and Other Animals.Duncan Purves & Nicolas Delon - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):317-338.
    This paper argues that contemporary philosophical literature on meaning in life has important implications for the debate about our obligations to non-human animals. If animal lives can be meaningful, then practices including factory farming and animal research might be morally worse than ethicists have thought. We argue for two theses about meaning in life: that the best account of meaningful lives must take intentional action to be necessary for meaning—an individual’s life has meaning if and only if the individual acts (...)
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  • Transferring Morality to Human–Nonhuman Chimeras.Monika Piotrowska - 2014 - American Journal of Bioethics 14 (2):4-12.
    Human–nonhuman chimeras have been the focus of ethical controversies for more than a decade, yet some related issues remain unaddressed. For example, little has been said about the relationship between the origin of transferred cells and the morally relevant capacities to which they may give rise. Consider, for example, a developing mouse fetus that receives a brain stem cell transplant from a human and another that receives a brain stem cell transplant from a dolphin. If both chimeras acquire morally relevant (...)
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  • Rethinking the Oversight Conditions of Human–Animal Chimera Research.Monika Piotrowska - 2021 - Bioethics 35 (1):98-104.
    New discoveries are improving the odds of human cells surviving in host animals, prompting regulatory and funding agencies to issue calls for additional layers of ethical oversight for certain types of human–animal chimeras. Of interest are research proposals involving chimeric animals with humanized brains. But what is motivating the demand for additional oversight? I locate two, not obviously compatible, motivations, each of which provides the justificatory basis for paying special attention to different sets of human–animal chimeras. Surprisingly, the sets of (...)
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  • The Replaceability Argument in the Ethics of Animal Husbandry.Nicolas Delon - 2016 - Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics.
    Most people agree that inflicting unnecessary suffering upon animals is wrong. Many fewer people, including among ethicists, agree that painlessly killing animals is necessarily wrong. The most commonly cited reason is that death (without pain, fear, distress) is not bad for them in a way that matters morally, or not as significantly as it does for persons, who are self-conscious, make long-term plans and have preferences about their own future. Animals, at least those that are not persons, lack a morally (...)
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  • How to Tell If Animals Can Understand Death.Susana Monsó - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):117-136.
    It is generally assumed that humans are the only animals who can possess a concept of death. However, the ubiquity of death in nature and the evolutionary advantages that would come with an understanding of death provide two prima facie reasons for doubting this assumption. In this paper, my intention is not to defend that animals of this or that nonhuman species possess a concept of death, but rather to examine how we could go about empirically determining whether animals can (...)
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  • Utilitarianism About Animals and the Moral Significance of Use.David Killoren & Robert Streiffer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1043-1063.
    The Hybrid View endorses utilitarianism about animals and rejects utilitarianism about humans. This view has received relatively little sustained attention in the philosophical literature. Yet, as we show, the Hybrid View underlies many widely held beliefs about zoos, pet ownership, scientific research on animal and human subjects, and agriculture. We develop the Hybrid View in rigorous detail and extract several of its main commitments. Then we examine the Hybrid View in relation to the view that human use of animals constitutes (...)
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  • Three and a half ways to a hybrid view in animal ethics.David Killoren & Robert Streiffer - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    The distinctive feature of a hybrid view is that it divides moral patients into two classes: call them dersons and uersons. Dersons have a deontological kind of moral status: they have moral rights against certain kinds of optimific harms. Uersons, by contrast, have a utilitarian kind of moral status: their interests are morally important, but uersons do not have deontological moral rights or any other kinds of deontological protections. In this paper, we discuss and critically evaluate three ways of supporting (...)
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  • Nussbaum and the Capacities of Animals.T. J. Kasperbauer - 2013 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 26 (5):977-997.
    Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach emphasizes species-specific abilities in grounding our treatment of animals. Though this emphasis provides many action-guiding benefits, it also generates a number of complications. The criticism registered here is that Nussbaum unjustifiably restricts what is allowed into our concept of species norms, the most notable restrictions being placed on latent abilities and those that arise as a result of human intervention. These restrictions run the risk of producing inaccurate or misleading recommendations that fail to correspond to the (...)
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  • Mentalizing Animals: Implications for Moral Psychology and Animal Ethics.T. J. Kasperbauer - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):465-484.
    Ethicists have tended to treat the psychology of attributing mental states to animals as an entirely separate issue from the moral importance of animals’ mental states. In this paper I bring these two issues together. I argue for two theses, one descriptive and one normative. The descriptive thesis holds that ordinary human agents use what are generally called phenomenal mental states to assign moral considerability to animals. I examine recent empirical research on the attribution of phenomenal states and agential states (...)
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  • Does It Matter Whether We Do Wrong?Adam Kadlac - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2279-2298.
    This paper examines the relationship between monadic and bipolar forms of normativity. As the distinction is usually drawn, monadic normativity concerns whether a given action is right or wrong while bipolar normativity concerns who, if anyone, is wronged in any putative instance of wrongdoing. My central thesis is that in the moral realm, we do well to discard the notion of monadic normativity altogether and focus instead on the contours and limits of bipolar normativity. For by placing greater weight on (...)
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  • Environmental Ethics for the Long Term: An Introduction. [REVIEW]Trevor Hedberg - 2017 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 20 (1):121-124.
    In this book review, I assess the merits of John Nolt's Environmental Ethics for the Long Term: An Introduction. Although the book is written as a primary text for an environmental ethics course, some of its later chapters are clearly written more for academic philosophers than undergraduate students. As a textbook, Nolt's book is excellent and an ideal choice for those who want to emphasize the long-term impacts of various environmental problems (e.g., climate change, biodiversity loss) in their courses. Regarding (...)
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  • The Psychological Speciesism of Humanism.Carrie Figdor - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178:1545-1569.
    Humanists argue for assigning the highest moral status to all humans over any non-humans directly or indirectly on the basis of uniquely superior human cognitive abilities. They may also claim that humanism is the strongest position from which to combat racism, sexism, and other forms of within-species discrimination. I argue that changing conceptual foundations in comparative research and discoveries of advanced cognition in many non-human species reveal humanism’s psychological speciesism and its similarity with common justifications of within-species discrimination.
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  • What’s Love Got to Do with It? An Ecofeminist Approach to Inter-Animal and Intra-Cultural Conflicts of Interest.Karen S. Emmerman - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1):77-91.
    Many familial and cultural traditions rely on animals for their fulfillment - think of Christmas ham, Rosh Hashannah chicken soup, Fourth of July barbeques, and so forth. Though philosophers writing in animal ethics often dismiss interests in certain foods as trivial, these food-based traditions pose a significant moral problem for those who take animals’ lives and interests seriously. One must either turn one’s back on one’s community or on the animals. In this paper, I consider the under-theorized area of intra-cultural (...)
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  • Animal Sentience.Heather Browning & Jonathan Birch - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (5):e12822.
    ‘Sentience’ sometimes refers to the capacity for any type of subjective experience, and sometimes to the capacity to have subjective experiences with a positive or negative valence, such as pain or pleasure. We review recent controversies regarding sentience in fish and invertebrates and consider the deep methodological challenge posed by these cases. We then present two ways of responding to the challenge. In a policy-making context, precautionary thinking can help us treat animals appropriately despite continuing uncertainty about their sentience. In (...)
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  • Categorical Desires and the Badness of Animal Death.Matt Bower & Bob Fischer - 2018 - Journal of Value Inquiry 52 (1):97-111.
    One way to defend humane animal agriculture is to insist that the deaths of animals aren’t bad for them. Christopher Belshaw has argued for this position in the most detail, maintaining that death is only bad when it frustrates categorical desires, which he thinks animals lack. We are prepared to grant his account of the badness of death, but we are skeptical of the claim that animals don’t have categorical desires. We contend that Belshaw’s argument against the badness of animal (...)
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  • The Search for Invertebrate Consciousness.Jonathan Birch - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):133-153.
    There is no agreement on whether any invertebrates are conscious and no agreement on a methodology that could settle the issue. How can the debate move forward? I distinguish three broad types of approach: theory-heavy, theory-neutral and theory-light. Theory-heavy and theory-neutral approaches face serious problems, motivating a middle path: the theory-light approach. At the core of the theory-light approach is a minimal commitment about the relation between phenomenal consciousness and cognition that is compatible with many specific theories of consciousness: the (...)
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  • Eight Kinds of Critters: A Moral Taxonomy for the Twenty-Second Century.Michael Bess - 2018 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (5):585-612.
    Over the coming century, the accelerating advance of bioenhancement technologies, robotics, and artificial intelligence may significantly broaden the qualitative range of sentient and intelligent beings. This article proposes a taxonomy of such beings, ranging from modified animals to bioenhanced humans to advanced forms of robots and AI. It divides these diverse beings into three moral and legal categories—animals, persons, and presumed persons—describing the moral attributes and legal rights of each category. In so doing, the article sets forth a framework for (...)
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  • Virtuous Vs. Utilitarian Artificial Moral Agents.William A. Bauer - 2020 - AI and Society (1):263-271.
    Given that artificial moral agents—such as autonomous vehicles, lethal autonomous weapons, and automated financial trading systems—are now part of the socio-ethical equation, we should morally evaluate their behavior. How should artificial moral agents make decisions? Is one moral theory better suited than others for machine ethics? After briefly overviewing the dominant ethical approaches for building morality into machines, this paper discusses a recent proposal, put forward by Don Howard and Ioan Muntean (2016, 2017), for an artificial moral agent based on (...)
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  • Expanding Nallur's Landscape of Machine Implemented Ethics.William A. Bauer - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (5):2401-2410.
    What ethical principles should autonomous machines follow? How do we implement these principles, and how do we evaluate these implementations? These are some of the critical questions Vivek Nallur asks in his essay “Landscape of Machine Implemented Ethics (2020).” He provides a broad, insightful survey of answers to these questions, especially focused on the implementation question. In this commentary, I will first critically summarize the main themes and conclusions of Nallur’s essay and then expand upon the landscape that Nallur presents (...)
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  • Children’s Agency, Interests, and Medical Consent.Jennifer Baker - 2013 - HEC Forum 25 (4):311-324.
    In this paper I argue that reference to a developmental account of agency can help explain, and in cases also alter, our current practices when it comes to the non-consensual medical treatment of children. It does this through its explanation of how stages of development impact the types of interests we have.
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  • Animal Consciousness.Colin Allen & Michael Trestman - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Normative Practices of Other Animals.Sarah Vincent, Rebecca Ring & Kristin Andrews - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology. New York: pp. 57-83.
    Traditionally, discussions of moral participation – and in particular moral agency – have focused on fully formed human actors. There has been some interest in the development of morality in humans, as well as interest in cultural differences when it comes to moral practices, commitments, and actions. However, until relatively recently, there has been little focus on the possibility that nonhuman animals have any role to play in morality, save being the objects of moral concern. Moreover, when nonhuman cases are (...)
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  • Just Meat: Chicken-Pain, Intergenerational Justice, and the American Diet.Scales Stephen - 2017 - Between the Species 20 (1).
    Peter Singer’s arguments against the morality of the typical American diet focus on the pain of animals, and lead to the conclusion that we must become committed vegans. His approach ignores the impact that different psychological capacities can legitimately have on our moral appraisal of the interests of beings. Although we ought to eat less meat because of the externalized environmental costs that factory farming inflicts upon future people, an ideal diet may contain some environmentally sustainably raised meat. Finally, the (...)
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  • Animal Sentience and the Precautionary Principle.Jonathan Birch - 2017 - Animal Sentience 2:16(1).
    In debates about animal sentience, the precautionary principle is often invoked. The idea is that when the evidence of sentience is inconclusive, we should “give the animal the benefit of the doubt” or “err on the side of caution” in formulating animal protection legislation. Yet there remains confusion as to whether it is appropriate to apply the precautionary principle in this context, and, if so, what “applying the precautionary principle” means in practice regarding the burden of proof for animal sentience. (...)
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  • Richard Mervyn Hare.Anthony W. Price - unknown
    A long encyclopedia entry, sketching his life, analysing his work.
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  • What (If Anything) Do We Owe Wild Animals?Clare A. Palmer - 2013 - Between the Species 16 (1):4.
    It’s widely agreed that animal pain matters morally – that we shouldn’t, for instance, starve our animal companions, and that we should provide medical care to sick or injured agricultural animals, and not only because it benefits us to do so. But do we have the same moral responsibilities towards wild animals? Should we feed them if they are starving, and intervene to prevent them from undergoing other forms of suffering, for instance from predation? Using an example that includes both (...)
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