The legal-ethical dynamism in Islamic law which allows it to respond to the challenges of modernity is said to reside in the institution of ijtihād (independent legal thinking and hermeneutics). However, jurists like Mohsen Kadivar and Ayatollah Faḍlalla have argued that the “traditional ijtihād” paradigm has reached its limits of flexibility as it allows for only minor adaptations and lacks a rigorous methodology because of its reliance on vague and highly subjective juridical devices such as public welfare (maṣlaḥa), imperative necessity (...) (ḍarūra), emergency (iḍtirār), need (ḥāja), averting difficulty (‘usr) and distress (ḥaraj), hardship (mashaqqa), and harm (ḍarar) without interrogating the fundamentals (uṣūl) of ijtihād. In contrast, in the “foundational ijtihād” model theology, ethics, intellect, epistemology, linguistics, hermeneutics, modern sciences, history, cosmology, anthropology, and the sources of Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) interact with one another to obtain resolutions that are just and non-discriminatory. (shrink)

The present article proceeds in three parts: first, I describe George F. Hourani's approach and its continued relevance in the study of Islamic ethics. Next, I demonstrate the weaknesses of Hourani's approach, particularly his commitment to mapping Islamic thought anachronistically onto a menu of “isms” derived from modern ethical theory. To highlight the urgency of reexamining Hourani's approach and influence, I also demonstrate how scholars' continued reliance upon Hourani perpetuates the limitations of his approach in the study of Islamic ethics (...) today. Finally, I call attention to the ongoing efforts of scholars in the study of Islamic ethics to do better. I conclude that if Islamic ethics is to thrive, the field must reexamine its reliance on Hourani. (shrink)

This paper provides a perspective on where contemporary Muslim responses to biomedical-ethical issues stand to date. There are several ways in which Muslim responses to biomedical ethics can and have been studied in academia. The responses are commonly divided along denominational lines or under the schools of jurisprudence. All such efforts classify the responses along the lines of communities of interpretation rather than the methods of interpretation. This research is interested in the latter. Thus, our criterion for classification is the (...) underlying methodology behind the responses. The proposed classification divides Muslim biomedical-ethical reasoning into three methodological categories: 1) textual, 2) contextual, and 3) para-textual. (shrink)

While there is no real tension between faith and reason for Muslim scholars, in post-Kantian philosophy of religion there have been serious doubts about the rationality of religious doctrines. It is noteworthy that Ghazali’s critiques of philosophical reasoning are totally different from Kant’s. Ghazali denied the reliability of pure reasoning without the help of faith, while Kant denied the access of reason to the intangible world. By paying attention to Kant’s philosophy for understanding the very difference of the faith/reason tension (...) in Islamic tradition and contemporary philosophy of religion and employing an extra-religious approach and an analytical-critical method, the present research has studied Ghazali’s corpus and concluded what concerned Ghazali was faith, not reason; since he held that only a pious believer could be saved from the hell. He was not concerned about reasoning without revelation and religious belief. Ghazali maintained that philosophical reasoning falls short of the truth of affairs. One could say, from a different point of view, he was aware of the limits of reasoning in the same way as Kant was; but unlike Kant, through faith, he arrived at matters which are far from the access of reason. Finally, although in Kant’s thoughts, faith has lost its rational bases, Ghazali was not in the same situation. He held that mystical, prophetical reasoning, which he called “al-Qalb”, could obtain the truth and has no conflict with faith and revelation, and it is just human reasoning that makes judgments that could come in conflict with religious beliefs. Previous research saw Ghazali as fideistic; although thinking of him of rationalist or fideistic, could be easy based on his Ashʿari commitment, but after enough reflection on his works, it turns out to be difficult to do so because one could find both evidence for his rationality or fideism. Regarding his prioritizing faith over reason, there is a lot of textual evidence in his corpus; his tendency toward reason is not very explicit but can be perceived implicitly from his works. Despite his efforts to emphasize revelation and faith, as well as left human reasoning for revelation, what arises afterward, which has a kind of validity even for him, is the same common reason. Ghazali interpreted the prima facie meaning of Quranic verses which are impossible from a rational viewpoint, such as the corporeality of God. There is no middle ground between faith and reason, and yet Ghazali still stands in the very middle; thus, he could not be seen as just fideistic. If he wanted to demarcate what could be interpreted, he would have taken the side of reason. At the same time, comparing his rationality with Descartes’ is a naïve position to hold. Mystic-minded Ghazali did not see the issue of faith and reason like a philosopher and, ultimately, due to his obedience to God, as well as the fact that his main concern is salvation, he prioritized faith over reason. It is not possible to speak of tension or competence for a mystic-minded like him. (shrink)

This chapter (5) focuses on the concept of the forgiving God in Islamic religion and theology and claims that Islamic thinking about divine forgiveness accommodates two different views that emphasize two different attributes of God: justice and mercy. The first view is associated with a rationalist school of theology known as Mu'tazilism, while the second is associated with a fideistic school known as Ash'arism. The author argues that the first view, which is based on a strict calculus of desert, leaves (...) little or no room for mercy, and that the second view is more true to our ordinary notion of forgiveness. (shrink)