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  1. Consciousness Does Not Seem to Be Linked to a Single Neural Mechanism.Carlo Umiltà & Marco Zorzi - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):701-702.
    On the basis of neuropsychological evidence, it is clear that attention should be given a role in any model of consciousness. What is known about the many instances of dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge after brain damage suggests that conscious experience might not be linked to a restricted area of the brain. Even if it were true that there is a single brain area devoted to consciousness, the subicular area would seem to be an unlikely possibility.
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  • On Giving a More Active and Selective Role to Consciousness.Frederick Toates - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):700-701.
    An active role for conscious processes in the production of behaviour is proposed, involving top level controls in a hierarchy of behavioural control. It is suggested that by inhibiting or sensitizing lower levels in the hierarchy conscious processes can play a role in the organization of ongoing behaviour. Conscious control can be more or less evident, according to prevailing circumstances.
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  • Ultimate Differences.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):698-699.
    Gray unwisely melds together two distinguishable contributions of consciousness: one to epistemology, the other to evolution. He also renders consciousness needlessly invisible behaviorally.
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  • Don't Leave the “Un” Off “Consciousness”.Neal R. Swerdlow - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):699-700.
    Gray extrapolates from circuit models of psychopathology to propose neural substrates for the contents of consciousness. I raise three concerns: knowledge of synaptic arrangements may be inadequate to fully support his model; latent inhibition deficits in schizophrenia, a focus of this and related models, are complex and deserve replication; and this conjecture omits discussion of the neuropsychological basis for the contents of the unconscious.
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  • The Homunculus at Home.J. David Smith - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):697-698.
    In Gray's conjecture, mismatches in the subicular comparator and matches have equal prominence in consciousness. In rival cognitive views novelty and difficulty especially elicit more conscious modes of cognition and higher levels of self-regulation. The mismatch between Gray's conjecture and these views is discussed.
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  • Consciousness Beyond the Comparator.Victor A. Shames & Timothy L. Hubbard - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):697-697.
    Gray's comparator model fails to provide an adequate explanation of consciousness for two reasons. First, it is based on a narrow definition of consciousness that excludes basic phenomenology and active functions of consciousness. Second, match/mismatch decisions can be made without producing an experience of consciousness. The model thus violates the sufficiency criterion.
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  • Communication and Consciousness: A Neural Network Conjecture.N. A. Schmajuk & E. Axelrad - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):695-696.
    The communicative aspects of the contents of consciousness are analyzed in the framework of a neural network model of animal communication. We discuss some issues raised by Gray, such as the control of the contents of consciousness, the adaptive value of consciousness, conscious and unconscious behaviors, and the nature of a model's consciousness.
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  • Prospects for a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness.Antti Revonsuo - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):694-695.
    In this commentary, I point out some weaknesses in Gray's target article and, in the light of that discussion, I attempt to delineate the kinds of problem a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness faces on its way to a scientific understanding of subjective experience.
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  • Unitary Consciousness Requires Distributed Comparators and Global Mappings.George N. Reeke - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):693-694.
    Gray, like other recent authors, seeks a scientific approach to consciousness, but fails to provide a biologically convincing description, partly because he implicitly bases his model on a computationalist foundation that embeds the contents of thought in irreducible symbolic representations. When patterns of neural activity instantiating conscious thought are shorn of homuncular observers, it appears most likely that these patterns and the circuitry that compares them with memories and plans should be found distributed over large regions of neocortex.
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  • The Elusive Quale.Howard Rachlin - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):692-693.
    If sensations were behaviorally conceived, as they should be, as complex functional patterns of interaction between overt behavior and the environment, there would be no point in searching for them as instantaneous psychic elements within the brain or as internal products of the brain.
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  • The Control of Consciousness Via a Neuropsychological Feedback Loop.Todd D. Nelson - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):690-691.
    Gray's neuropsychological model of consciousness uses a hierarchical feedback loop framework that has been extensively discussed by many others in psychology. This commentary therefore urges Gray to integrate with, or at least acknowledge previous models. It also points out flaws in his feedback model and suggests directions for further theoretical work.
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  • Comparators, Functions, and Experiences.Harold Merskey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):689-690.
    The comparator model is insufficient for three reasons. First, consciousness is involved in the process of comparison as well as in the output. Second, we still do not have enough neurophysiological information to match the events of consciousness, although such knowledge is growing. Third, the anatomical localisation proposed can be damaged bilaterally but consciousness will persist.
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  • Human Consciousness: One of a Kind.R. E. Lubow - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):689-689.
    To avoid teleological interpretations, it is important to make a distinction between functions and uses of consciousness, and to address questions concerning the consequences of consciousness. Assumptions about the phylogenetic distribution of consciousness are examined. It is concluded that there is some value in identifying consciousness an exclusively human attribute.
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  • Correlating Mind and Body.T. J. Lioyd-Jones, N. Donnelly & B. Weekes - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):688-688.
    Gray's integration of the different levels of description and explanation in his theory is problematic: The introduction of consciousness into his theorising consists of the mind-brain identity assumption, which tells us nothing new. There need not be correlations between levels of description. Gray's account does not extend beyond “brute” correlation. Integration must be achieved in a principled, mutually constraining way.
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  • Septohippocampal Comparator: Consciousness Generator or Attention Feedback Loop?Marcel Kinsbourne - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):687-688.
    As Gray insists, his comparator model proposes a brute correlation only – of consciousness with septohippocampal output. I suggest that the comparator straddles a feedback loop that boosts the activation ofnovelrepresentations, thus helping them feature in present or recollected experience. Such a role in organizing conscious contents would transcend correlation and help explain how consciousness emerges from brain function.
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  • Information Synthesis in Cortical Areas as an Important Link in Brain Mechanisms of Mind.Alexei M. Ivanitsky - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):686-687.
    To explore the mechanism of sensation correlations between EP component amplitude and signal detection indices were studied. The time of sensation coincided with the peak latency of those EP components that showed a correlation with both indices. The components presumably reflected information synthesis in projection cortical neurons. A mechanism providing the synthesis process is proposed.
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  • Mind – Your Head!R. P. Ingvaldsen & H. T. A. Whiting - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):685-686.
    Gray takes an information-processing paradigm as his departure point, invoking a comparator as part of the system. He concludes that consciousness is to be found “in” the comparator but is unable to point to how the comparison takes place. Thus, the comparator turns out not to be an entity arising out of brain research per se, but out of the logic of the paradigm. In this way, Gray both reinvents dualism and remains trapped in the language game of his own (...)
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  • Perspective, Reflection, Transparent Explanation, and Other Minds.S. L. Hurley - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):684-685.
    Perspective and reflection have each been considered in some way basic to phenomenal consciousness. Each has possible evolutionary value, though neither seems sufficient for consciousness. Consider an account of consciousness in terms of the combination of perspective and reflection, its relationship to the problem of other minds, and its capacity to inherit evolutionary explanation from its components.
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  • Psychopathology and the Discontinuity of Conscious Experience.David R. Hemsley - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):683-684.
    It is accepted that “primary awareness” may emerge from the integration of two classes of information. It is unclear, however, why this cannot take place within the comparator rather than in conjunction with feedback to the perceptual systems. The model has plausibility in relation to the continuity of conscious experience in the normal waking state and may be extended to encompass certain aspects of the “sense of self” which are frequently disrupted in psychotic patients.
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  • Consciousness is for Other People.Chris Frith - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):682-683.
    Gray has expanded his account of schizophrenia to explain consciousness as well. His theory explains neither phenomenon adequately because he treats individual minds in isolation. The primary function of consciousness is to permit high level interactions with other conscious beings. The key symptoms of schizophrenia reflect a failure of this mechanism.
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  • On Seeking the Mythical Fountain of Consciousness.Jeffrey Foss - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):682-682.
    Because consciousness has an organizational, or functional, center, Gray supposes that there must be a corresponding physical center in the brain. He proposes further that since this center generates consciousness, ablating it would eliminate consciousness, while leaving behavior intact. But the center of consciousness is simply the product of the functional linkages among sensory input, memory, inner speech, and so on, and behavior.
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  • Context and Consciousness.Colin G. Ellard - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):681-682.
    The commentary argues that we cannot be sure that human consciousness has survival value and that in order to understand the origins and, perhaps, the function of consciousness, we should examine the behavioural and neural precursors to consciousness in nonhumans. An example is given of research on the role of context in decisions regarding fleeing from probable predators in the Mongolian gerbil.
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  • Consciousness, Memory, and the Hippocampal System: What Kind of Connections Can We Make?Howard Eichenbaum & Neal J. Cohen - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):680-681.
    Gray's account is remarkable in its depth and scope but too little attention is paid to poor correspondences with the literature on hippocampal/subicular damage, the theta rhythm, and novelty detection. An alternative account, focusing on hippocampal involvement in organizing memories in a way that makes them accessible to conscious recollection but not in access to consciousness per se, avoids each of these limitations.
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  • Hunting for Consciousness in the Brain: What is (the Name of) the Game?José-Luis Díaz - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):679-680.
    Robust theories concerning the connection between consciousness and brain function should derive not only from empirical evidence but also from a well grounded inind-body ontology. In the case of the comparator hypothesis, Gray develops his ideas relying extensively on empirical evidence, but he bounces irresolutely among logically incompatible metaphysical theses which, in turn, leads him to excessively skeptical conclusions concerning the naturalization of consciousness.
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  • Possible Roles for a Predictor Plus Comparator Mechanism in Human Episodic Recognition Memory and Imitative Learning.Simon Dennis & Michael Humphreys - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):678-679.
    This commentary is divided into two parts. The first considers a possible role for Gray's predictor plus comparator mechanism in human episodic recognition memory. It draws on the computational specifications of recognition outlined in Humphreys et al. to demonstrate how the logically necessary components of recognition tasks might be mapped onto the mechanism. The second part demonstrates how the mechanism outlined by Gray might be implicated in a form of imitative learning suitable for the acquisition of complex tasks.
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  • Segmentalized Consciousness in Schizophrenia.Andrew Crider - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):676-677.
    Segmentalized consciousness in schizophrenia reflects a loss of the normal Gestalt organization and contextualization of perception. Grays model explains such segmentalization in terms of septohippocampal dysfunction, which is consistent with known neuropsychological impairment in schizophrenia. However, other considerations suggest that everyday perception and its failure in schizophrenia also involve prefrontal executive mechanisms, which are only minimally elaborated by Gray.
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  • Gestalt Isomorphism and the Primacy of the Subjective Perceptual Experience.Steven Lehar - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):763-764.
    The Gestalt principle of isomorphism reveals the primacy of subjective experience as a valid source of evidence for the information encoded neurophysiologically. This theory invalidates the abstractionist view that the neurophysiological representation can be of lower dimensionality than the percept to which it gives rise.
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  • Reflexive Monism Versus Complementarism: An Analysis and Criticism of the Conceptual Groundwork of Max Velmans’s Reflexive Model of Consciousness.Hans-Ulrich Hoche - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):389-409.
    From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic.
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  • Reflexive Monism.Max Velmans - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (2):5-50.
    Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming “out-thereness” of the phenomenal world and to (...)
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  • How Experienced Phenomena Relate to Things Themselves: Kant, Husserl, Hoche, and Reflexive Monism.Max Velmans - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):411-423.
    What we normally think of as the “physical world” is also the world as experienced, that is, a world of appearances. Given this, what is the reality behind the appearances, and what might its relation be to consciousness and to constructive processes in the mind? According to Kant, the thing itself that brings about and supports these appearances is unknowable and we can never gain any understanding of how it brings such appearances about. Reflexive monism argues the opposite: the thing (...)
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  • The Projective Theory of Consciousness: From Neuroscience to Philosophical Psychology.Alfredo Pereira Jr - 2018 - Trans/Form/Ação 41 (s1):199-232.
    : The development of the interdisciplinary areas of cognitive, affective and action neurosciences contributes to the identification of neurobiological bases of conscious experience. The structure of consciousness was philosophically conceived a century ago as consisting of a subjective pole, the bearer of experiences, and an objective pole composed of experienced contents. In more recent formulations, Nagel refers to a “point of view”, in which qualitative experiences are anchored, while Velmans understands that phenomenal content is composed of mental representations “projected” to (...)
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  • Consciousness and the Physical World.Max Velmans - 2008 - In Michel Weber & Will Desmond (eds.), Handbook of Whiteheadian Process Thought Volume 1. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 371-382.
    Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, and that conscious qualia are observer-independent, physical properties of the external world. Although this assumes the ‘mantle of science,’ it routinely ignores the findings of science, for example in sensory physiology, perception, psychophysics, neuropsychology and comparative psychology. Consequently, although physicalism aims to ‘naturalise’ consciousness, it gives an unnatural account of it. It is possible, however, to develop a natural, nonreductive, reflexive model of how consciousness relates to (...)
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  • Meanings Attributed to the Term Consciousness: An Overview.Ram Vimal - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):9-27.
    I here describe meanings attributed to the term consciousness, extracted from the literature and from recent online discussions. Forty such meanings were identified and categorized according to whether they were principally about function or about experience; some overlapped but others were apparently mutually exclusive - and this list is by no means exhaustive. Most can be regarded as expressions of authors' views about the basis of con-sciousness, or opinions about the significance of aspects of its con-tents. The prospects for reaching (...)
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  • An Integrative Pluralistic Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness.Rick Dale, Deborah P. Tollefsen & Christopher T. Kello - 2012 - In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins. pp. 88--231.
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  • Psychophysical Nature.Max Velmans - 2009 - In Harald Atmanspacher & Hans Primas (eds.), Recasting Reality: Wolfgang Pauli's Philosophical Ideas and Contemporary Science. Springer. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. pp. 115-134..
    There are two quite distinct ways in which events that we normally think of as “physical” relate in an intimate way to events that we normally think of as “psychological”. One intimate relation occurs in exteroception at the point where events in the world become events as-perceived. The other intimate relationship occurs at the interface of conscious experience with its neural correlates in the brain. The chapter examines each of these relationships and positions them within a dual-aspect, reflexive model of (...)
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  • An Epistemology for the Study of Consciousness.Max Velmans - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 711--725.
    This is a prepublication version of the final chapter from the Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. In it I re-examine the basic conditions required for a study of conscious experiences in the light of progress made in recent years in the field of consciousness studies. I argue that neither dualist nor reductionist assumptions about subjectivity versus objectivity and the privacy of experience versus the public nature of scientific observations allow an adequate understanding of how studies of consciousness actually proceed. The chapter (...)
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  • Where Experiences Are: Dualist, Physicalist, Enactive and Reflexive Accounts of Phenomenal Consciousness.Max Velmans - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):547-563.
    Dualists believe that experiences have neither location nor extension, while reductive and ‘non-reductive’ physicalists (biological naturalists) believe that experiences are really in the brain, producing an apparent impasse in current theories of mind. Enactive and reflexive models of perception try to resolve this impasse with a form of “externalism” that challenges the assumption that experiences must either be nowhere or in the brain. However, they are externalist in very different ways. Insofar as they locate experiences anywhere, enactive models locate conscious (...)
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  • The Conception of Anthropological Complementarism. An Introduction.Prof em Dr Hans-Ulrich Hoche - 2008 - In [Book Chapter].
    The aims of 'Anthropological Complementarism' in a nutshell(sect. 1). Against a watered-down conception of psychophysical complementarity (sect. 2). Linguistic and logical problems of identity and non-identity (sect. 3). A 'noematic' approach to consciousness (sect. 4). A plea for a pure noematics (sect. 5). My own consciousness as experienced by myself is not a part of nature (sect. 6). The major ontological tenets of mine (sect. 7). Complementarism proper (sect. 8). Suitable and unsuitable methods in philosophy (sect. 9). How to determine (...)
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  • "Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknown
    This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive (...)
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  • What Is Consciousness?: Review of The Science of Consciousness by Max Velmans. [REVIEW]Patrice Terrier - 1998 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 4.
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  • How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?Max Velmans - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):3-29.
    In everyday life we take it for granted that we have conscious control of some of our actions and that the part of us that exercises control is the conscious mind. Psychosomatic medicine also assumes that the conscious mind can affect body states, and this is supported by evidence that the use of imagery, hypnosis, biofeedback and other ‘mental interventions’ can be therapeutic in a variety of medical conditions. However, there is no accepted theory of mind/body interaction and this has (...)
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  • Gestalt Isomorphism and the Primacy of Subjective Conscious Experience: A Gestalt Bubble Model.Steven Lehar - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):357-408.
    A serious crisis is identified in theories of neurocomputation, marked by a persistent disparity between the phenomenological or experiential account of visual perception and the neurophysiological level of description of the visual system. In particular, conventional concepts of neural processing offer no explanation for the holistic global aspects of perception identified by Gestalt theory. The problem is paradigmatic and can be traced to contemporary concepts of the functional role of the neural cell, known as the Neuron Doctrine. In the absence (...)
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  • The Function of Conscious Experience: An Analogical Paradigm of Perception and Behavior.Steven Lehar - unknown
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  • How to Investigate Perceptual Projection: A Commentary on Pereira Jr., “The Projective Theory of Consciousness: From Neuroscience to Philosophical Psychology”.Max Velmans - 2018 - Trans/Form/Ação 41 (s1):233-242.
    : This commentary focuses on the scientific status of perceptual projection-a central feature of Pereira’s projective theory of consciousness. In his target article, he draws on my own earlier work to develop an explanatory framework for integrating first-person viewable conscious experience with the third-person viewable neural correlates and antecedent causes that form conscious experience into a bipolar structure that contains both a sense of self and a sense of the world. I stress that perceptual projection is a psychological effect and (...)
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  • Is Human Information Processing Conscious?Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
    Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing. Input analysis is thought to be initially "preconscious," "pre-attentive," fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by "conscious," "focal-attentive" analysis which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed (...)
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  • Overworking the Hippocampus.Daniel C. Dennett - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):677-678.
    Gray mistakenly thinks I have rejected the sort of theoretical enterprise he is undertaking, because, according to him, I think that "more data" is all that is needed to resolve all the issues. Not at all. My stalking horse was the bizarre (often pathetic) claim that no amount of empirical, "third-person point-of-view" science (data plus theory) could ever reduce the residue of mystery about consciousness to zero. This "New Mysterianism" (Flanagan, 1991) is one that he should want to combat as (...)
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  • Consciousness From a First-Person Perspective.Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):702-726.
    This paper replies to the first 36 commentaries on my target article on “Is human information processing conscious?” (Behavioral and Brain Sciences,1991, pp.651-669). The target article focused largely on experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human information processing, tracing their relation from input through to output, while discussion of the implications of the findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was relatively brief. The commentaries reversed this emphasis, and so, correspondingly, did the reply. The sequence of topics (...)
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  • Epi-Arguments for Epiphenomenalism.Bruce Mangan - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):689-690.
  • Consciousness, Causality and Complementarity.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):404-416.
    This reply to five continuing commentaries on my 1991 target article on “Is human information processing conscious” focuses on six related issues: 1) whether focal attentive processing replaces consciousness as a causal agent in third-person viewable human information processing, 2)whether consciousness can be dissociated from human information processing, 3) continuing disputes about definitions of "consciousness" and about what constitutes a “conscious process” , 4) how observer-relativity in psychology relates (and does not relate) to relativity in physics, 5) whether the first-person (...)
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  • Consciousness: Limited but Consequential.Timothy D. Wilson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):701-701.