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  1. How to Define Consciousness—and How Not to Define Consciousness.Prof Max Velmans - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):139-156.
    Definitions of consciousness need to be sufficiently broad to include all examples of conscious states and sufficiently narrow to exclude entities, events and processes that are not conscious. Unfortunately, deviations from these simple principles are common in modern consciousness studies, with consequent confusion and internal division in the field. The present paper gives example of ways in which definitions of consciousness can be either too broad or too narrow. It also discusses some of the main ways in which pre-existing theoretical (...)
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  • Intentionality, Mind and Folk Psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
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  • The Blind Shadows of Narcissus - a Psychosocial Study on Collective Imaginary.Roberto Thomas Arruda (ed.) - 2020 - Terra à vista.
    In this work, we will approach some of the essential questions about the collective imaginary and their relations with reality and truth. We should face this subject in a conceptual framework, followed by the corresponding factual analysis of demonstrable behavioral realities. We will adopt not only the methodology, but mostly the tenets and propositions of the analytic philosophy, which for sure will be apparent throughout the study, and may be identified by the features described by Perez : Rabossi (1975) defends (...)
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  • "Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknown
    This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive (...)
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  • AS SOMBRAS CEGAS DE NARCISO (um estudo psicossocial sobre o imaginário coletivo).Roberto Thomas Arruda (ed.) - 2020 - Terra à Vista.
    No presente trabalho, vamos abordar algumas das questões essenciais sobre o imaginário coletivo e suas relações com a realidade e a verdade. Devemos encarar esse assunto em uma estrutura conceptual, seguida pela análise factual correspondente às realidades comportamentais demonstráveis. Adotaremos não apenas a metodologia, mas principalmente os princípios e proposições da filosofia analítica, que com certeza serão evidentes ao longo do estudo e podem ser identificados pelos recursos descritos por Perez[1] : Rabossi (1975) defende a ideia de que a filosofia (...)
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  • Self-Ascription Without Qualia: A Case Study.David J. Chalmers - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.
    In Section 5 of his interesting article, Goldman suggests that the consideration of imaginary cases can be valuable in the analysis of our psychological concepts. In particular, he argues that we can imagine a system that is isomorphic to us under any functional description, but which lacks qualitative mental states, such as pains and color sensations. Whether or not such a being is empirically possible, it certainly seems to be logically possible, or conceptually coherent. Goldman argues from this possibility to (...)
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  • How Experienced Phenomena Relate to Things Themselves: Kant, Husserl, Hoche, and Reflexive Monism.Max Velmans - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):411-423.
    What we normally think of as the “physical world” is also the world as experienced, that is, a world of appearances. Given this, what is the reality behind the appearances, and what might its relation be to consciousness and to constructive processes in the mind? According to Kant, the thing itself that brings about and supports these appearances is unknowable and we can never gain any understanding of how it brings such appearances about. Reflexive monism argues the opposite: the thing (...)
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  • Representational Development and Theory-of-Mind Computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.
  • The Role of Concepts in Perception and Inference.David R. Olson & Janet Wilde Astington - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):65-66.
  • Are False Beliefs Representative Mental States?Karen Bartsch & David Estes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):30-31.
  • The Psychologist's Fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.
  • Dual-Aspect Monism À la Pauli and Jung.Harald Atmanspacher - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):96–120.
    Dual-aspect monism and neutral monism offer interesting alternatives to mainstream positions concerning the mind-matter problem. Both assume a domain underlying the mind-matter distinction, but they also differ in definitive ways. In the twentieth century, variants of both positions have been advanced by a number of protagonists. One of these variants, the dual-aspect monism due toWolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung, will be described and commented on in detail. As a unique feature in the Pauli-Jung conception, the duality of mental and (...)
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  • Time and Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):220-221.
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  • The Evolution of Consciousness.Max Velmans - 2009 - In Michel Weber & Anderson Weekes (eds.), Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind. Albany: State University of New York Press. pp. 261-272.
    There have been various attempts to apply Darwinian evolutionary theory to an understanding of the human condition within psychology and the social sciences. This paper evaluates whether Darwinian Theory can explain human consciousness. Starting with a brief definition of phenomenal consciousness and the central features of evolutionary theory, the paper examines whether random variations in the genome that confer a selective, reproductive advantage can explain both the emergence of consciousness and its varied forms. To inform the discussion, the paper reviews (...)
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  • Phenomenological Skepticism Reconsidered: A Husserlian Answer to Dennett’s Challenge.Jaakko Belt - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  • Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap.Todd E. Feinberg & Jon Mallatt - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
  • Whitehead's Unique Approach to the Topic of Consciousness.Anderson Weekes - 2010 - In Michel Weber & Anderson Weekes (eds.), Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind. Albany: State University of New York Press. pp. 137-172.
    Conventional approaches to consciousness assume that our current science tells us within tolerable limits what physical nature is. Because nature so understood cannot explain consciousness as we seem to experience it ourselves, explaining consciousness becomes a problem. One solution is to rethink what consciousness is so that it becomes the sort of thing our current natural science could in principle explain. Whitehead takes the opposite approach, using the existence of consciousness as a clue to what nature must be if it (...)
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  • How to Separate Conceptual Issues From Empirical Ones in the Study of Consciousness.Max Velmans - 2008 - In Rahul Banerjee & Bikas Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational, and Psychological Approaches. Amsterdam: Elsevier. pp. 1-9.
    Modern consciousness studies are in a healthy state, with many progressive empirical programmes in cognitive science, neuroscience and related sciences, using relatively conventional third-person research methods. However not all the problems of consciousness can be resolved in this way. These problems may be grouped into problems that require empirical advance, those that require theoretical advance, and those that require a re-examination of some of our pre-theoretical assumptions. I give examples of these, and focus on two problems—what consciousness is, and what (...)
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  • What is Consciousness For?Lee Pierson & Monroe Trout - manuscript
    What is Consciousness For? Lee Pierson and Monroe Trout Copyright © 2005 Abstract: The answer to the title question is, in a word, volition. Our hypothesis is that the ultimate adaptive function of consciousness is to make volitional movement possible. All conscious processes exist to subserve that ultimate function. Thus, we believe that all conscious organisms possess at least some volitional capability. Consciousness makes volitional attention possible; volitional attention, in turn, makes volitional movement possible. There is, as far as we (...)
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  • The Co-Evolution of Matter and Consciousness.Max Velmans - 2007 - Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):273-282.
    Theories about the evolution of consciousness relate in an intimate way to theories about the distribution of consciousness, which range from the view that only human beings are conscious to the view that all matter is in some sense conscious. Broadly speaking, such theories can be classified into discontinuity theories and continuity theories. Discontinuity theories propose that consciousness emerged only when material forms reached a given stage of evolution, but propose different criteria for the stage at which this occurred. Continuity (...)
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  • Reflexive Monism.Max Velmans - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (2):5-50.
    Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming “out-thereness” of the phenomenal world and to (...)
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  • How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?Max Velmans - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):3-29.
    In everyday life we take it for granted that we have conscious control of some of our actions and that the part of us that exercises control is the conscious mind. Psychosomatic medicine also assumes that the conscious mind can affect body states, and this is supported by evidence that the use of imagery, hypnosis, biofeedback and other ‘mental interventions’ can be therapeutic in a variety of medical conditions. However, there is no accepted theory of mind/body interaction and this has (...)
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  • A Plea for the Second Functionalist Model and the Insufficiency of Simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.
  • Qualitative Characteristics, Type Materialism and the Circularity of Analytic Functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.
  • Categories, Categorisation and Development: Introspective Knowledge is No Threat to Functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.
  • Functionalism, the Theory-Theory and Phenomenology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):101-113.
  • Analytic Functionalism Without Representational Functionalism.Terence Horgan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):51-51.
  • Functionalism Can Explain Self-Ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58-60.
  • An Epistemology for the Study of Consciousness.Max Velmans - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 711--725.
    This is a prepublication version of the final chapter from the Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. In it I re-examine the basic conditions required for a study of conscious experiences in the light of progress made in recent years in the field of consciousness studies. I argue that neither dualist nor reductionist assumptions about subjectivity versus objectivity and the privacy of experience versus the public nature of scientific observations allow an adequate understanding of how studies of consciousness actually proceed. The chapter (...)
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  • Psychophysical Nature.Max Velmans - 2009 - In Harald Atmanspacher & Hans Primas (eds.), Recasting Reality: Wolfgang Pauli's Philosophical Ideas and Contemporary Science. Springer. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. pp. 115-134..
    There are two quite distinct ways in which events that we normally think of as “physical” relate in an intimate way to events that we normally think of as “psychological”. One intimate relation occurs in exteroception at the point where events in the world become events as-perceived. The other intimate relationship occurs at the interface of conscious experience with its neural correlates in the brain. The chapter examines each of these relationships and positions them within a dual-aspect, reflexive model of (...)
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  • A Thoroughly Empirical First-Person Approach To Consciousness: Commentary On Baars On Contrastive Analysis.Max Velmans - 1994 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 1.
    According to Nagel, bat consciousness is "what it is like to be a bat.'' According to Baars , we will never know what it is like to be bat, so this approach to consciousness does not allow the science of consciousness to progress. Rather, the nature of consciousness as such should be determined empirically, by contrasting processes which are conscious with processes that are not conscious. The present commentary argues that contrastive analysis is appropriate for finding the processes most closely (...)
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  • First-Person Authority and Beliefs as Representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.
  • First-Person Current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.
  • Common Sense, Functional Theories and Knowledge of the Mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.
    A commentary on a target article by Alison Gopnik (1993) How we know our minds: the illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. Focusing on evidence of how children acquire a theory of mind, this commentary argues that there are internal inconsistencies in theories that both argue for the functional role of conscious experiences and the irreducibility of those experiences to third-person viewable information processing.
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  • How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.
  • The Psychology of Folk Psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
    The central mission of cognitive science is to reveal the real nature of the mind, however familiar or foreign that nature may be to naive preconceptions. The existence of naive conceptions is also important, however. Prescientific thought and language contain concepts of the mental, and these concepts deserve attention from cognitive science. Just as scientific psychology studies folk physics (McCloskey 1983, Hayes 1985), viz., the common understanding (or misunderstanding) of physical phenomena, so it must study folk psychology, the common understanding (...)
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  • Heterophenomenology Versus Critical Phenomenology.Max Velmans - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1):221-230.
    Following an on-line dialogue with Dennett (Velmans, 2001) this paper examines the similarities and differences between heterophenomenology (HP) and critical phenomenology (CP), two competing accounts of the way that conscious phenomenology should be, and normally is incorporated into psychology and related sciences. Dennett’s heterophenomenology includes subjective reports of conscious experiences, but according to Dennett, first person conscious phenomena in the form of “qualia” such as hardness, redness, itchiness etc. have no real existence. Consequently, subjective reports about such qualia should be (...)
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  • Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain.Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):183-201.
    _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274.
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  • A Pressure-Reversible Cellular Mechanism of General Anesthetics Capable of Altering a Possible Mechanism of Consciousness.Kunjumon Vadakkan - 2015 - Springerplus 4:1-17.
    Different anesthetics are known to modulate different types of membrane-bound receptors. Their common mechanism of action is expected to alter the mechanism for consciousness. Consciousness is hypothesized as the integral of all the units of internal sensations induced by reactivation of inter-postsynaptic membrane functional LINKs during mechanisms that lead to oscillating potentials. The thermodynamics of the spontaneous lateral curvature of lipid membranes induced by lipophilic anesthetics can lead to the formation of non-specific inter-postsynaptic membrane functional LINKs by different mechanisms. These (...)
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  • Consciousness, Causality and Complementarity.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):404-416.
    This reply to five continuing commentaries on my 1991 target article on “Is human information processing conscious” focuses on six related issues: 1) whether focal attentive processing replaces consciousness as a causal agent in third-person viewable human information processing, 2)whether consciousness can be dissociated from human information processing, 3) continuing disputes about definitions of "consciousness" and about what constitutes a “conscious process” , 4) how observer-relativity in psychology relates (and does not relate) to relativity in physics, 5) whether the first-person (...)
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  • Escape From the Cartesian Theater.Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):234-247.
  • Closing the Cartesian Theatre.Andy Young - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):233-233.
  • The Psychoanatomy of Consciousness: Neural Integration Occurs in Single Cells.Gerald S. Wasserman - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):232-233.
  • Global Pattern Perception and Temporal Order Judgments.Richard M. Warren - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):230-231.
  • Is Consciousness Integrated?Max Velmans - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):229-230.
    In the visual system, the represented features of individual objects (shape, colour, movement, and so on) are distributed both in space and time within the brain. Representations of inner and outer event sequences arrive through different sense organs at different times, and are likewise distributed. Objects are nevertheless perceived as integrated wholes - and event sequences are experienced to form a coherent "consciousness stream." In their thoughtful article, Dennett & Kinsbourne ask how this is achieved.
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  • Time for More Alternatives.Robert Van Gulick - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):228-229.
  • In Defense Off the Pineal Gland.Robert Teghtsoonian - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):224-225.
  • Does the Perception of Temporal Sequence Throw Light on Consciousness?Michel Treisman - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):225-228.
  • Mental Representation: Always Delayed but Not Always Ephemeral.Roger N. Shepard - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):223-224.