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  1. Logic, Models, and Paradoxical Inferences.Isabel Orenes & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (4):357-377.
    People reject ‘paradoxical’ inferences, such as: Luisa didn't play music; therefore, if Luisa played soccer, then she didn't play music. For some theorists, they are invalid for everyday conditionals, but valid in logic. The theory of mental models implies that they are valid, but unacceptable because the conclusion refers to a possibility inconsistent with the premise. Hence, individuals should accept them if the conclusions refer only to possibilities consistent with the premises: Luisa didn't play soccer; therefore, if Luisa played a (...)
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  • The processes of inference.Sangeet Khemlani & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2013 - Argument and Computation 4 (1):4 - 20.
    (2013). The processes of inference. Argument & Computation: Vol. 4, Formal Models of Reasoning in Cognitive Psychology, pp. 4-20. doi: 10.1080/19462166.2012.674060.
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  • Commentary/Elqayam & Evans: Subtracting “ought” from “is”.Natalie Gold, Andrew M. Colman & Briony D. Pulford - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5).
    Normative theories can be useful in developing descriptive theories, as when normative subjective expected utility theory is used to develop descriptive rational choice theory and behavioral game theory. “Ought” questions are also the essence of theories of moral reasoning, a domain of higher mental processing that could not survive without normative considerations.
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  • Probability in reasoning: A developmental test on conditionals.Pierre Barrouillet & Caroline Gauffroy - 2015 - Cognition 137 (C):22-39.
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  • Inferentialism and the compositionality of meaning.Jaroslav Peregrin - unknown
    Inferentialism, which I am going to present in detail in the following sections, is the view that meanings are, roughly, roles that are acquired by types of sounds and inscriptions in virtue of their being treated according to rules of our language games, roughly in the sense in which wooden pieces acquire certain roles by being treated according the rules of chess. The most important consequences are that (i) a meaning is not an object labeled (stood for, represented ...) by (...)
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  • Double-process theories: a unified cognitive architecture?Mariela Destefano & Fernanda Velázquez Coccia - 2018 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 33 (1).
    It has been distinguished between unified cognitive architecture and multiple-process architecture. Based on this distinction, we will try to show that if processes coordination criteria are explicated and analyzed, double-process theories for reasoning and decision making have difficulties to consolidate as multiple process architecture.
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  • Causal conditional reasoning and conditional likelihood.Philip M. Fernbach & Adam Darlow - 2010 - In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 1088--1093.
     
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