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  1. Logicism, Interpretability, and Knowledge of Arithmetic.Sean Walsh - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (1):84-119.
    A crucial part of the contemporary interest in logicism in the philosophy of mathematics resides in its idea that arithmetical knowledge may be based on logical knowledge. Here an implementation of this idea is considered that holds that knowledge of arithmetical principles may be based on two things: (i) knowledge of logical principles and (ii) knowledge that the arithmetical principles are representable in the logical principles. The notions of representation considered here are related to theory-based and structure-based notions of representation (...)
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  • Empiricism, Probability, and Knowledge of Arithmetic.Sean Walsh - 2014 - Journal of Applied Logic 12 (3):319–348.
    The topic of this paper is our knowledge of the natural numbers, and in particular, our knowledge of the basic axioms for the natural numbers, namely the Peano axioms. The thesis defended in this paper is that knowledge of these axioms may be gained by recourse to judgements of probability. While considerations of probability have come to the forefront in recent epistemology, it seems safe to say that the thesis defended here is heterodox from the vantage point of traditional philosophy (...)
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  • Neo-Logicism and Its Logic.Panu Raatikainen - 2019 - History and Philosophy of Logic 41 (1):82-95.
    The rather unrestrained use of second-order logic in the neo-logicist program is critically examined. It is argued in some detail that it brings with it genuine set-theoretical existence assumptions and that the mathematical power that Hume’s Principle seems to provide, in the derivation of Frege’s Theorem, comes largely from the ‘logic’ assumed rather than from Hume’s Principle. It is shown that Hume’s Principle is in reality not stronger than the very weak Robinson Arithmetic Q. Consequently, only a few rudimentary facts (...)
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  • The Small‐is‐Very‐Small Principle.Albert Visser - 2019 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 65 (4):453-478.
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  • Peano Corto and Peano Basso: A Study of Local Induction in the Context of Weak Theories.Albert Visser - 2014 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 60 (1-2):92-117.