This article aims to shed light on both the foundations and the consistency of the position regarding akrasia Xenophon attributes to Socrates in theMemorabilia.As does Plato's Socrates, Xenophon's Socrates maintains thatakrasiais impossible in the presence of knowledge. On the other hand, he differs from the platonic Socrates by granting toenkrateia,instead of knowledge, the role of foundation for virtue. If enkrateia is the very condition for acquiring knowledge and virtue, consequently the responsibility for counteringakrasiafalls toenkrateia.

The aim of this paper is to reveal Socrates as a thorough democrat. In the first section, I will disprove the credibility of Xenophon’s Memorabilia, a common source for scholars who view Socrates as an antidemocratic thinker. I will then argue, in the second section, that the views of a few scholars who portray Socrates as a prodemocratic thinker represent a far-from-satisfactory depiction of his political views. In the third section, I will then demonstrate that Socrates’ criticism of democracy is (...) not of democracy itself nor of Athenian laws, but instead a criticism of a particular sort of democracy seen in the period of Athenian imperialism, and that it derives from his fundamental recognition of human ignorance. After pointing out Socrates’ special preference for the democratic laws of Athens, seen in the Crito, I will establish, in the fourth section, a preference in his philosophy showing him as a staunch democrat who upheld the concept of the rule of law. (shrink)

Against the traditional reading of Cynic cosmopolitanism, this essay advances the thesis that Diogenes’ world citizenship is a positive claim supported by philosophical argument and philosophical example. Evidence in favor of this thesis is a new interpretation of Diogenes’ syllogistic argument concerning law (nomos) (D.L. 6.72). Important to the argument are an understanding of Diogenes’ philanthropic character and his moral imperative to ‘re-stamp the currency’. Whereas Socrates understands his care as attached specially to Athens, Diogenes’ philosophical mission and form of (...) care attach not to his native Sinope but to all humanity. An important result is that Diogenes’ Cynicism provides an ancient example of cosmopolitanism that is philanthropic, minimalistic, experimental, and utopian. (shrink)

Socrates’ inquiry into the nature of the virtues and human excellence led him to experience Socratic ignorance, a practical puzzlement experienced by his recognition that his central life commitments were conceptually problematic. This practical perplexity was not, however, an epistemic weakness but a reflection of his wisdom. I argue that Socratic ignorance, a concept that has not received scholarly attention in business ethics, is a central aim that business practitioners should seek. It is what a truthful, thorough, and courageous inquiry (...) into their professional roles and commitments leads to. It wakes them up from the moral complacency engendered by organizations, forcing them to become much more critical of their day-to-day activities and more intentional about living virtuously. It curbs the corrupting potential of authority positions and prevents the tendency of subordinates to routinely conform to sanctioned norms and expectations. Finally, it opens up novel and creative moral avenues and provides a promising model to deal with the conflicts posed by our globalized and increasingly polarized world. (shrink)

The present paper focuses on the complex relation between ethics andpolitics in Plato’s Crito. While the issue is presented from a contemporaryperspective, the problems of civil disobedience and politicalobligation are the present study’s primarily concern. The issue of civildisobedience concerns moral reasons for breaking the law, whereasthe concept of political obligation refers to a moral duty to obey the law.When disagreeing with the view that Socrates in the dialogue arguesfor an unconditional obedience to the state, the article builds on theApology. (...) Subsequently, the similarities between the position of Socratesand that of H.D. Thoreau are investigated. Finally, the paper discussesthe concept of political obligation so as to show that the argumentin the Crito anticipates several modern theories. The modern controversiesthat this article covers are shown to play an important role in Plato’sdialogue, as they are the basis of Socrates’ political obligation. (shrink)

Este estudio reconstruye el juicio de Sócrates, especialmente, el caso levantado por los acusadores. La primera parte es una discusión sobre las fuentes que tenemos disponibles para reconstruir el juicio, especialmente el análisis de Jenofonte en Memorabilia. La segunda parte reconstruye el juicio basados en una nueva evaluación de las fuentes. La tercera parte discute los aspectos políticos del juicio, y argumenta que haber levantado acusaciones políticas contra Sócrates no era necesariamente una infracción a la amnistía del 403. Más aún, (...) un estudio prosopográfico del círculo social alrededor de Sócrates muestra que un alto número de sus “amigos” eran ciudadanos que se habían unido a la revolución oligárquica del 411 y del 404-403 y habían sido condenados por traición y/o impiedad. Finalmente, se presenta un diálogo pseudo-platónico entre Sócrates y Ánito en el que Sócrates tiene que admitir que la democracia es la mejor constitución posible. (shrink)

This article surveys Xenophon’s evidence for Socrates’ views on democracy. It offers a more balanced and complete reading of the evidence in Xenophon’s Memorabilia, and takes account of new ways to assess the definition of what is democratic. It argues that Xenophon’s basic image of Socrates is democratic in the broadest sense through an investigation of topics such as Socrates’ attitudes towards democratic laws, and the use of dokimasia and the ballot, as well as his views on oligarchic and democratic (...) regimes of his time, the ‘royal art’ of rule, the assembly and its decisions, and the role of the wealthy in democracy. It also argues against the general view that Xenophon’s own views on democracy as expressed in his other works show no support for democracy. (shrink)

El objeto de este trabajo es realizar un estudio iusfilosófico sobre la aparición de las Leyes personificadas de Atenas en el Critón de Platón. La prosopopeya de las Leyes resulta ser un aspecto central para poder comprender la obra, ya que éstas entablan un diálogo imaginario con Sócrates en el cual instalan diversos argumentos filosóficos para fundamentar la autoridad de la pólis. A los fines de identificar el valor argumentativo de este recurso en la obra, analizaré el significado del nómos (...) en la Atenas del siglo V a. C. y la naturaleza de las Leyes en el contexto general del diálogo. Se busca demostrar la importancia que tienen aquéllas para explicar la decisión de Sócrates de beber la cicuta. (shrink)

The present paper attempts to throw some light on the conundrum of Socrates’ political views in the Apology and Crito. The problem resides in that the Socrates of the Apology evidently undermines the authority of Athenian democracy, whereas the Socrates of the Crito argues that his escape from prison would be tantamount to disrespecting the state, which would in turn threaten the prosperity of the entire πόλις. The article suggests that in the two dialogues, the young Plato examines the possibility (...) of steering a middle course between embracing relativism, on the one hand, and encouraging civil disobedience, on the other. Thus, the philosopher focuses primarily on investigating the two options, without either totally subordinating the citizen to the state, or unreflexively accepting any crude pragmatism. (shrink)

This essay offers a defense of ‘intellectual authority’, primarily by pointing out the untoward implications of its conceptual opposite, ‘institutional authority’, in a wide variety of contexts. An opening discussion explores conditions for the possibility of intellectual authority in legal, humanistic, and aesthetic disciplines. Social science literature documenting and describing the biasing influence of institutional authority is then canvassed and analyzed in some detail. A final section assays the theoretical significance of various efforts to eliminate non‐intellectual bias and influence, with (...) special reference to the example of “blind reviewing’ of scholarly manuscripts. (shrink)

Nearly every major philosophy, from Plato to Hegel and beyond, has argued that democracy is an inferior form of government, at best. Yet, virtually every contemporary political philosophy working today endorses democracy in one variety or another. Should we conclude then that the traditional canon is meaningless for helping us theorise about a just state? In this paper, I will take up the criticisms and positive proposals of two such canonical figures in political philosophy: Plato and Hegel. At first glance, (...) each is rather disdainful, if not outright hostile, to democracy. This is also how both have been represented traditionally. However, if we look behind the reasons for their rejection of (Athenian) democracy and the reasons behind their alternatives to democracy, I believe we can uncover a new theory of government that does two things. First, it maps onto the so-called Schumpeterian tradition of elite theories of democracy quite well. Second, perhaps surprisingly, it actually provides an improved justification for democratic government as we practice it today than rival theories of democracy. Thus, not only are Plato and Hegel not enemies of modern democratic thought after all, but each is actually quite useful for helping us develop democratic theory in a positive, not negative, manner. (shrink)

Plato justifies the concentration and exercise of power for persons endowed with expertise in political governance. This article argues that this justification takes two distinctly different sets of arguments. The first is what I shall call his 'ideal political philosophy' described primarily in the Republic as rule by philosopher-kings wielding absolute authority over their subjects. Their authority stems solely from their comprehension of justice, from which they make political judgements on behalf of their city-state. I call the second set of (...) arguments Plato's 'practical political philosophy' underlying his later thought, where absolute rule by philosopher-kings is undermined by the impure character of all political knowledge. Whereas the complete comprehension of justice sanctions the absolute political power of those with this expertise, partial knowledge of justice disallows for such a large investment of power. Plato's practical political philosophy argues for a mixed theory of governance fusing the institutions of monarchy with democracy in the best practical city-state. Thus, Plato comes to realize the insurmountable difficulties of his ideal political thought, preferring a more practical political philosophy instead. (shrink)

El choque entre el éthos cívico y las tendencias individuales de los ciudadanos en la Atenas clásica muestra cómo la ciudad hizo frente al reto que suponían algunas opiniones individuales en relación con la cohesión cívica. Mi análisis pretende ilustrar este enfrentamiento tomando como referencia la figura que de Sócrates establece la Apología de Platón; en concreto, su comportamiento ante el tribunal puede arrojar luz sobre cuál podía ser el efecto de ciertas actitudes individuales en el seno del éthos ateniense. (...) El presente estudio no pretende alcanzar un conocimiento en profundidad de la vida política en la pólis ateniense sino más bien ofrecer una reflexión sobre la compleja relación existente entre el individuo y el estado. (shrink)

In a post Cold-War world riven with ‘minor’ conflicts, and a West anxious about the intermittent threat of terrorist attack, human equality and sodality require urgent review. Among interesting proposals for a theoretical foundation to human equality is Martha Nussbaum’s call for a revived, modern version of Stoicism to teach indifference to race and a neighbourly goodwill. Yet in her concern to avoid ‘teleologies’ Nussbaum denatures Stoicism by disconnecting it from its transcendent foundations. A problem for the modern world is (...) to maintain the authority of states, with their capacity to produce relief for the poor and oppressed along with their capacity to dominate, while having them absorb the ideals of cosmopolitanism into their own policyformation. It is incumbent on the democratic state, the progenitor of the cosmopolitanism of both Cynicism and Stoicism, to promote the ideals of human dignity and equality. Nussbaum’s Stoicism scarcely helps, but there are globalizing organizations, such as the United Nations and its agencies, and globalized religious organizations, as advanced by Hans Küng, which may supply the institutional foundation. (shrink)