Citations of work:

Eric-Jan Wagenmakers, Han L. J. van der Maas & Simon Farrell (2012). Abstract Concepts Require Concrete Models: Why Cognitive Scientists Have Not Yet Embraced Nonlinearly Coupled, Dynamical, Self-Organized Critical, Synergistic, Scale-Free, Exquisitely Context-Sensitive, Interaction-Dominant, Multifractal, Interdependent Brain-Body-Niche Systems.

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  1.  23
    The Concrete Universal and Cognitive Science.Richard Shillcock - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (1):63-80.
    Cognitive science depends on abstractions made from the complex reality of human behaviour. Cognitive scientists typically wish the abstractions in their theories to be universals, but seldom attend to the ontology of universals. Two sorts of universal, resulting from Galilean abstraction and materialist abstraction respectively, are available in the philosophical literature: the abstract universal—the one-over-many universal—is the universal conventionally employed by cognitive scientists; in contrast, a concrete universal is a material entity that can appear within the set of entities it (...)
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    Searching for General Principles in Cognitive Performance: Reply to Commentators.Damian G. Stephen & Guy van Orden - 2012 - Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (1):94-102.
    The commentators expressed concerns regarding the relevance and value of non-computational non-symbolic explanations of cognitive performance. But what counts as an “explanation” depends on the pre-theoretical assumptions behind the scenes of empirical science regarding the kinds of variables and relationships that are sought out in the first place, and some of the present disagreements stem from incommensurate assumptions. Traditional cognitive science presumes cognition to be a decomposable system of components interacting according to computational rules to generate cognitive performances (i.e., component-dominant (...)
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    Is Cognitive Science Usefully Cast as Complexity Science?Guy van Orden & Damian G. Stephen - 2012 - Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (1):3-6.
    Readers of TopiCS are invited to join a debate about the utility of ideas and methods of complexity science. The topics of debate include empirical instances of qualitative change in cognitive activity and whether this empirical work demonstrates sufficiently the empirical flags of complexity. In addition, new phenomena discovered by complexity scientists, and motivated by complexity theory, call into question some basic assumptions of conventional cognitive science such as stable equilibria and homogeneous variance. The articles and commentaries that appear in (...)
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