Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Dynamics and Diversity in Epistemic Communities.Cailin O’Connor & Justin Bruner - 2017 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):101-119.
    Bruner shows that in cultural interactions, members of minority groups will learn to interact with members of majority groups more quickly—minorities tend to meet majorities more often as a brute fact of their respective numbers—and, as a result, may come to be disadvantaged in situations where they divide resources. In this paper, we discuss the implications of this effect for epistemic communities. We use evolutionary game theoretic methods to show that minority groups can end up disadvantaged in academic interactions like (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Dynamics and Diversity in Epistemic Communities.Cailin O’Connor & Justin Bruner - 2017 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):101-119.
    Bruner shows that in cultural interactions, members of minority groups will learn to interact with members of majority groups more quickly—minorities tend to meet majorities more often as a brute fact of their respective numbers—and, as a result, may come to be disadvantaged in situations where they divide resources. In this paper, we discuss the implications of this effect for epistemic communities. We use evolutionary game theoretic methods to show that minority groups can end up disadvantaged in academic interactions like (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • A Unified Social Ontology.Francesco Guala & Frank Hindriks - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):177-201.
    Current debates in social ontology are dominated by approaches that view institutions either as rules or as equilibria of strategic games. We argue that these two approaches can be unified within an encompassing theory based on the notion of correlated equilibrium. We show that in a correlated equilibrium each player follows a regulative rule of the form ‘if X then do Y’. We then criticize Searle's claim that constitutive rules of the form ‘X counts as Y in C’ are fundamental (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Inequality and Inequity in the Emergence of Conventions.Calvin Cochran & Cailin O’Connor - 2019 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 18 (3):264-281.
    Many societies have norms of equity – that those who make symmetric social contributions deserve symmetric rewards. Despite this, there are widespread patterns of social inequity, especially along gender and racial lines. It is often the case that members of certain social groups receive greater rewards per contribution than others. In this article, we draw on evolutionary game theory to show that the emergence of this sort of convention is far from surprising. In simple cultural evolutionary models, inequity is much (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Power, Bargaining, and Collaboration.Justin Bruner & Cailin O'Connor - 2016 - In T. Boyer, C. Mayo-Wilson & M. Weisberg (eds.), Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge.
    Collaboration is increasingly popular across academia. Collaborative work raises certain ethical questions, however. How will the fruits of collaboration be divided? How will the work for the collaborative project be split? In this paper, we consider the following question in particular. Are there ways in which these divisions systematically disadvantage certain groups? -/- We use evolutionary game theoretic models to address this question. First, we discuss results from O'Connor and Bruner (unpublished). In this paper, we show that underrepresented groups in (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Bargaining and the Dynamics of Divisional Norms.Justin P. Bruner - forthcoming - Synthese.
  • Diversity, Tolerance, and the Social Contract.Justin P. Bruner - 2015 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (4):429-448.
  • Natural Social Contracts.Brian Skyrms - 2013 - Biological Theory 8 (2):179-184.
    There are two fundamental problems for instituting a social contract. The first is cooperating to produce a surplus; the second is deciding how to divide this surplus. I represent each problem by a simple paradigm game, a Stag Hunt game for cooperating to produce a surplus, and a bargaining game for its division. I will discuss these simple games in isolation, and end by discussing their composition.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Learning Bargaining Conventions.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2018 - Social Philosophy and Policy 35 (1):237-263.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • In a Weakly Dominated Strategy Is Strength: Evolution of Optimality in Stag Hunt Augmented with a Punishment Option.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (1):29-59.
    I explore the evolution of strategies in an Augmented Stag Hunt game that adds a punishing strategy to the ordinary Stag Hunt strategies of cooperating, which aims for optimality, and defecting, which “plays it safe.” Cooperating weakly dominates punishing and defecting is the unique evolutionarily stable strategy. Nevertheless, for a wide class of Augmented Stag Hunts, polymorphic strategies combining punishing and cooperating collectively have greater attracting power for replicator dynamics than that of the ESS. The analysis here lends theoretical support (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation