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  1. Husserl and Stein on the phenomenology of empathy: perception and explication.James Jardine - 2014 - Synthesis Philosophica 29 (2):273-288.
    Within the phenomenological tradition, one frequently finds the bold claim that interpersonal understanding is rooted in a sui generis form of intentional experience, most commonly labeled empathy (Einfühlung). The following paper explores this claim, emphasizing its distinctive character, and examining the phenomenological considerations offered in its defense by two of its main proponents, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein. After offering in section 2 some preliminary indications of how empathy should be understood, I then turn to some characterizations of its distinctive (...)
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  • Intercorporeity and the first-person plural in Merleau-Ponty.Philip J. Walsh - 2019 - Continental Philosophy Review 53 (1):21-47.
    A theory of the first-person plural occupies a unique place in philosophical investigations into intersubjectivity and social cognition. In order for the referent of the first-person plural—“the We”—to come into existence, it seems there must be a shared ground of communicative possibility, but this requires a non-circular explanation of how this ground could be shared in the absence of a pre-existing context of communicative conventions. Margaret Gilbert’s and John Searle’s theories of collective intentionality capture important aspects of the We, but (...)
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  • Dan Zahavi: Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame: Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, Hardcover: $49.95; £, ISBN: 9780199590681. [REVIEW]Philip J. Walsh - 2016 - Husserl Studies 32 (1):75-82.
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  • Empathy and the Melodic Unity of the Other.Joona Taipale - 2015 - Human Studies 38 (4):463-479.
    Current discussions on social cognition, empathy, and interpersonal understanding are largely built on the question of how we recognize and access particular mental states of others. Mental states have been treated as temporally individuated, momentary or temporally narrow unities that can be grasped at one go. Drawing on the phenomenological tradition—on Stein and Husserl in particular—I will problematize this approach, and argue that the other’s experiential states can appear meaningful to us only they are viewed in connection with further, non-simultaneous (...)
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  • Genuine empathy with inanimate objects.Abootaleb Safdari Sharabiani - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):831-846.
    How do we enter into empathic relations with inanimate objects? Do we indirectly infer that they possess mental states, or directly perceive them as mental things? In recent years these questions have been addressed by a number of authors. Some argue in favor of an indirect approach that involves mediatory procedures; others defend a direct approach that postulates no intermediate. In this paper I argue on the side of the latter. I show that Simulation Theory, one of the most elaborated (...)
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  • Sympathetic Respect, Respectful Sympathy.John Drummond - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (1):123-137.
    To be more than a meta-ethical stance, moral phenomenology must provide an account of moral norms. This paper unites two sorts of phenomenological considerations. The first considers the teleological character of intentional experiences as ordered toward "truthfulness" in all the spheres of reason and toward a notion of self-responsibility for our beliefs, attitudes, and actions as the flourishing of rational agents. The second considers the phenomenological tradition's identification of empathy as the experience in which we encounter others as conscious agents (...)
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  • Community: a unified disunity?John J. Drummond - 2023 - Continental Philosophy Review 56 (3):401-417.
    The notion of community—a many that is one—is troubled in two respects: (1) On a theoretical level, given that there are many kinds of communities, what, despite their differences, do they share as communities? (2) On a practical level, communities in fact often manifest little unity riven, as they are, by factions and conflicts. After exploring the ways in which empathy as supplemented and complemented by affective dimensions of experience contributes to both the unity and disunity of communities, I shall (...)
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