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  1. Vergil and Dido.Jérôme Pelletier - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (2):191–203.
    According to many realist philosophers of fiction, one needs to posit an ontology of existing fictional characters in order to give a correct account of discourse about fiction. The realists' claim is opposed by pretense theorists for whom discourse about fiction involves, as discourse in fiction, pretense. On that basis, pretense theorists claim that one does not need to embrace an ontology of fictional characters to give an account of discourse about fiction. The ontolog-ical dispute between realists and pretense theorists (...)
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  • Bridging the Gap ‐ a Semiotician's View on Translating the Greek Classics.Dinda L. Gorlée - 1997 - Perspectives 5 (2):153-169.
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  • Philosophy of Religion, Fictionalism, and Religious Diversity.Victoria S. Harrison - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (1-3):43-58.
    Until recently philosophy of religion has been almost exclusively focused upon the analysis of western religious ideas. The central concern of the discipline has been the concept God , as that concept has been understood within Judaeo-Christianity. However, this narrow remit threatens to render philosophy of religion irrelevant today. To avoid this philosophy of religion should become a genuinely multicultural discipline. But how, if at all, can philosophy of religion rise to this challenge? The paper considers fictionalism about religious discourse (...)
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  • The Problem of Non-Existents.Kit Fine - 1982 - Topoi 1 (1-2):97-140.
  • Aptness of Emotions for Fictions and Imaginings.Jonathan Gilmore - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):468-489.
    Many philosophical accounts of the emotions conceive of them as susceptible to assessments of rationality, fittingness, or some other notion of aptness. Analogous assumptions apply in cases of emotions directed at what are taken to be only fictional or only imagined. My question is whether the criteria governing the aptness of emotions we have toward what we take to be real things apply invariantly to those emotions we have toward what we take to be only fictional or imagined. I argue (...)
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  • Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?Derek Matravers - 1991 - Ratio 4 (1):25-37.
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  • Kenneth L. Pike and Science Fiction.Dinda L. Gorlée - 2015 - Semiotica 2015 (207):217-231.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2015 Heft: 207 Seiten: 217-231.
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  • The Paradox (Es) of Pitying and Fearing Fictions.Jennifer Wilkinson - 2000 - South African Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):8-25.
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