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  1. Convergence Liberalism and the Limits of State Coercive Power: A Case Against the Public Justification Principle.Sean R. Rice - unknown
    Kevin Vallier defends a theory of the normative limits of the use of coercion by the state known as convergence liberalism. Central to this theory is a principle of public justification according to which the coercive power of the state is justified and legitimate if and only if each member of the public has sufficient reason to endorse the coercion. I argue that this principle is too demanding. Certain epistemological limitations render cost-benefit analyses of many, if not all, laws and (...)
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  • Does Political Community Require Public Reason? On Lister’s Defence of Political Liberalism.Paul Billingham - 2016 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 15 (1):20-41.
    Andrew Lister’s Public Reason and Political Community is an important new contribution to the debate over political liberalism. In this article, I critically evaluate some of the central arguments of the book in order to assess the current state of public reason liberalism. I pursue two main objections to Lister’s work. First, Lister’s justification for public reason, which appeals to the value of civic friendship, fails to show why public reason liberalism should be preferred to an alternative democratic theory that (...)
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  • Convergence Liberalism and the Problem of Disagreement Concerning Public Justification.Paul Billingham - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):541-564.
    The ‘convergence conception’ of political liberalism has become increasingly popular in recent years. Steven Wall has shown that convergence liberals face a serious dilemma in responding to disagreement about whether laws are publicly justified. What I call the ‘conjunctive approach’ to such disagreement threatens anarchism, while the ‘non-conjunctive’ approach appears to render convergence liberalism internally inconsistent. This paper defends the non-conjunctive approach, which holds that the correct view of public justification should be followed even if some citizens do not consider (...)
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  • Public Reason Can Be Reasonably Rejected.Franz Mang - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (2):343-367.
    Public reason as a political ideal aims to reconcile reasonable disagreement; however, is public reason itself the object of reasonable disagreement? Jonathan Quong, David Estlund, Andrew Lister, and some other philosophers maintain that public reason is beyond reasonable disagreement. I argue this view is untenable. In addition, I consider briefly whether or not two main versions of the public reason principle, namely, the consensus version and the convergence version, need to satisfy their own requirements. My discussion has several important implications (...)
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  • Public Reason Is Not Self-Defeating.Kevin Vallier - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):349-364.
    Steven Wall has two compelling arguments for what I shall call public reason liberalism's reflexivity requirement. The political concerns to reconcile persons who hold diverse moral views, and to avoid authoritarianism in politics not only require the public justification of coercion but the public justification of the standard used to determine when coercion is publicly justified. The reflexivity requirement is said to entail that public reason is self-defeating. Once RR is correctly formulated, however, cases of self-defeat will be rare, as (...)
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  • Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique.Michael Root - 2013 - Analysis 73 (3):563-568.
  • What We May Demand of Each Other.Simon Căbulea May - 2013 - Analysis 73 (3):554-563.
    In this critical notice of Gerald Gaus's The Order of Public Reason, I reject two arguments Gaus advances for the claim that social moral rules must be publicly justified.
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  • Re[Public]an Reasons: A Republican Theory of Legitimacy and Justification.Christopher McCammon - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
    There is a kind of power no one should have over anyone else, even if they don’t do anything with this power, or even if they only use this power for good. The republican tradition of political philosophy calls this kind of power domination. Here, I develop a theory of domination, and use this theory to advance our understanding of political legitimacy and justification. My account of domination refines recent neo-republican attempts to identify dominating social power with the capacity to (...)
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  • Political Morality and Constitutional Settlements.Steven Wall - 2013 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (4):481-499.
  • Authority and Expertise.Daniel Viehoff - 2016 - Journal of Political Philosophy 24 (4):406-426.
    Call “epistocracy” a political regime in which the experts, those who know best, rule; and call “the epistocratic claim” the assertion that the experts’ superior knowledge or reliability is “a warrant for their having political authority over others.” Most of us oppose epistocracy and think the epistocratic claim is false. But why is it mistaken? Contemporary discussions of this question focus on two answers. According to the first, expertise could, in principle, be a warrant for authority. What bars the successful (...)
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  • Self-Defeat and the Foundations of Public Reason.Sameer Bajaj - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3133-3151.
    At the core of public reason liberalism is the idea that the exercise of political power is legitimate only if based on laws or political rules that are justifiable to all reasonable citizens. Call this the Public Justification Principle. Public reason liberals face the persistent objection that the Public Justification Principle is self-defeating. The idea that a society’s political rules must be justifiable to all reasonable citizens is intensely controversial among seemingly reasonable citizens of every liberal society. So, the objection (...)
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  • On Jonathan Quong’s Sectarian Political Liberalism.Kevin Vallier - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):175-194.
    Jonathan Quong’s book, Liberalism without Perfection, provides an innovative new defense of political liberalism based on an “internal conception” of the goal of public justification. Quong argues that public justification need merely be addressed to persons who affirm liberal political values, allowing people to be coerced without a public justification if they reject liberal values or their priority over comprehensive values. But, by extensively restricting members of the justificatory public to a highly idealized constituency of liberals, Quong’s political liberalism becomes (...)
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