It might seem obvious that dealing with death anxiety in the health care system is desirable. Hence, there are either voices that demand more research on how this openness can be fostered or those who consider this topic unworthy of further investigations because of its triviality. The idea behind both deficient perspectives is that the health care system as a communication system can assume the position of a second-order observer who can account for his deficits. However, in terms of Luhmannian (...) systems theory, external perturbations cannot force a functional system to reflect and change the structure of his communications in a certain way. The health care system as a communication system cannot do more than integrating the topic of death anxiety in terms of its functional perpetuation. For example, in hospitals, neither health care staff nor external counselors are able to address existential issues without being affected by functional and structural requirements of the hospital. We present an outline for the justification of the avoidance of death-anxiety related talk in the health care system by reference to systems theory and existential philosophy. (shrink)

The issue of how to incorporate the individual's first‐hand experience of illness into broader medical understanding is a major question in medical theory and practice. In a philosophical context, phenomenology, with its emphasis on the subject's perception of phenomena as the basis for knowledge and its questioning of naturalism, seems an obvious candidate for addressing these issues. This is a review of current phenomenological approaches to medicine, looking at what has motivated this philosophical approach, the main problems it faces and (...) suggesting how it might become a useful philosophical tool within medicine, with its own individual, but interrelated, contribution to make to current medical debates. After the general background, there is a brief summary of phenomenological ideas and their current usage in a medical context. Next is a critique of four key claims within current phenomenological medical works, concerning both the role phenomenology plays and the supposedly clear divide between phenomenology and other approaches. There are significant problems within these claims, largely because they overlook the complexity of the questions they consider. Finally, there is some more in‐depth examination of phenomenology itself and the true complexity of phenomenological debate concerning subjectivity. The aim is to show that it will be both more productive and truer to phenomenology itself, if we use phenomenology as a philosophical method for explicating and gaining deeper understanding of complex and fundamental problems, which are central to medicine, rather than as providing simple, but flawed solutions. (shrink)

This paper considers phenomenological descriptions of health in Gadamer, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Svenaeus. In these phenomenologies of health, health is understood as a tacit, background state that permits not only normal functioning but also philosophical reflection. Nietzsche’s model of health as a state of intensity that is intimately connected to illness and suffering is then offered as a rejoinder. Nietzsche’s model includes a more complex view of suffering and pain as integrally tied to health, and its language opens up the (...) possibility of many ‘healths,’ providing important theoretical support to phenomenological accounts of the diversity and complexity of health and illness. (shrink)