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  1. The Numbers Problem.Nien-hê Hsieh, Alan Strudler & David Wasserman - 2006 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (4):352-372.
  • Dividing the Indivisible: Apportionment and Philosophical Theories of Fairness.Conrad Heilmann & Stefan Wintein - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):51-74.
    Philosophical theories of fairness propose to divide a good that several individuals have a claim to in proportion to the strength of their respective claims. We suggest that currently, these theories face a dilemma when dealing with a good that is indivisible. On the one hand, theories of fairness that use weighted lotteries are either of limited applicability or fall prey to an objection by Brad Hooker. On the other hand, accounts that do without weighted lotteries fall prey to three (...)
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  • Moral Sunk Costs.Seth Lazar - 2018 - The Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273):841–861.
    Suppose that you are trying to pursue a morally worthy goal, but cannot do so without incurring some moral costs. At the outset, you believed that achieving your goal was worth no more than a given moral cost. And suppose that, time having passed, you have wrought only harm and injustice, without advancing your cause. You can now reflect on whether to continue. Your goal is within reach. What's more, you believe you can achieve it by incurring—from this point forward—no (...)
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  • What Would Taurek Do?Tyler Doggett - manuscript
    A very short, exegetical paper about Taurek's "Should the Numbers Count?," arguing against the view that Taurek requires giving chances.
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  • Hypothetical Choice, Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons.Keith D. Hyams - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (2):217-239.
    Luck egalitarians claim that disadvantage is worse when it emerges from an unchosen risk than when it emerges from a chosen risk. I argue that disadvantage is also worse when it emerges from an unchosen risk that the disadvantaged agent would have declined to take, had he or she been able to do so, than when it emerges from an unchosen risk that the disadvantaged agent would not have declined to take. Such a view is significant because it allows both (...)
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  • Who Is Afraid of Numbers?: S. Matthew Liao.S. Matthew Liao - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (4):447-461.
    In recent years, many non-consequentialists such as Frances Kamm and Thomas Scanlon have been puzzling over what has come to be known as the Number Problem, which is how to show that the greater number in a rescue situation should be saved without aggregating the claims of the many, a typical kind of consequentialist move that seems to violate the separateness of persons. In this article, I argue that these non-consequentialists may be making the task more difficult than necessary, because (...)
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  • Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons.Alex Voorhoeve & Marc Fleurbaey - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (3):381-398.
    The difference between the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons requires that there be a shift in the moral weight that we accord to changes in utility when we move from making intrapersonal tradeoffs to making interpersonal tradeoffs. We examine which forms of egalitarianism can, and which cannot, account for this shift. We argue that a form of egalitarianism which is concerned only with the extent of outcome inequality cannot account for this shift. We also argue that (...)
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  • Broome on Fairness and Lotteries.Hugh Lazenby - 2014 - Utilitas 26 (4):331-345.
    John Broome argues that when all claims cannot be perfectly fairly satisfied in outcome, the contribution to fairness from entering claims into a lottery, and so providing them some surrogate satisfaction, ought to be weighed against, and can outweigh, what fairness can be achieved directly in outcome. I argue that this is a mistake. Instead, I suggest that any contribution to fairness from entering claims into a lottery is lexically posterior to fairness in outcome.
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  • Moral Sunk Costs.Seth Lazar - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273):841-861.
    Suppose that you are trying to pursue a morally worthy goal, but cannot do so without incurring some moral costs. At the outset, you believed that achieving your goal was worth no more than a given moral cost. And suppose that, time having passed, you have wrought only harm and injustice, without advancing your cause. You can now reflect on whether to continue. Your goal is within reach. What's more, you believe you can achieve it by incurring—from this point forward—no (...)
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  • Justice and Chances.Re'em Segev - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (2):315-333.
    According to a common view, in a case involving an indivisible good and several potential beneficiaries, who are equal in every relevant respect, there is a non-instrumental reason to allocate the benefit in a way that gives each an equal chance to receive the benefit. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with several plausible and widely held assumptions. I emphasize especially the assumption that the distributive role of chances is secondary to that of benefits in an (...)
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  • Why Lotteries Are Just.Peter Stone - 2007 - Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (3):276-295.
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  • Perspectives on the Fairness of Lotteries.Jan-Willem Burgers - 2016 - Res Publica 22 (2):209-224.
    When there are equally strong claimants for a scarce good, lotteries are often argued to be a fair method of allocation. This paper reproduces four of the views on the fairness of lotteries that have been presented in the literature: the distributive view; the preference view; the actual consent view; and the expressive view. It argues that these four views cannot offer plausible explanations for the fairness of lotteries. The distributive view is argued to be inadequate because, even though receiving (...)
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  • Measuring a Neglected Type of Lottery Unfairness.Gerard Vong - 2018 - Economics and Philosophy 34 (1):67-86.
  • Why Lotteries Are Just.Peter Stone - 2007 - Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (3):276–295.
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