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  1. Sí hay negación lógica.Ricardo Arturo Nicolás Francisco & Luis Estrada González - 2020 - Critica 52 (155).
    En este artículo discutimos la tesis de Jc Beall según la cual no hay negación lógica. Evaluamos la solidez del argumento con el que defiende su tesis y presentamos dos razones para rechazar una de sus premisas: que la negación tiene que ser excluyente o exhaustiva. La primera razón involucra una presentación alternativa de las reglas de la negación en sistemas de secuentes diferentes al que Beall presupone. La segunda razón establece que la negación no tiene que ser excluyente o (...)
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  • Rampant Non‐Factualism: A Metaphysical Framework and its Treatment of Vagueness.Alexander Jackson - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (2):79-108.
    Rampant non-factualism is the view that all non-fundamental matters are non-factual, in a sense inspired by Kit Fine (2001). The first half of this paper argues that if we take non-factualism seriously for any matters, such as morality, then we should take rampant non-factualism seriously. The second half of the paper argues that rampant non-factualism makes possible an attractive theory of vagueness. We can give non-factualist accounts of non-fundamental matters that nicely characterize the vagueness they manifest (if any). I suggest (...)
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  • Metametametaphysics and Dialetheism.Suki Finn - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1):128-146.
    This paper reflects on metametaphysics and as such develops a metametameta-physical view: that quietist metametaphysics requires dialetheism, and in turn a paraconsistent logic. I demonstrate this using Carnap’s metametaphysical position in his 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology' as an example, with regard to how it exhibits self-reference and results in inconsistency. I show how applying Carnap’s position to itself produces a dilemma, both horns of which lead to a contradiction. Such inconsistency commonly arises from meta-theories with global scope, as the 'meta' (...)
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  • Dialetheism.Graham Priest - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, A, are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or whatever one takes as her favourite truth bearer: this would make little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and (...)
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  • Reply to Bjørdal.Zach Weber - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (1):109-113.
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  • Paraconsistent Logic.David Ripley - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):771-780.
    In some logics, anything whatsoever follows from a contradiction; call these logics explosive. Paraconsistent logics are logics that are not explosive. Paraconsistent logics have a long and fruitful history, and no doubt a long and fruitful future. To give some sense of the situation, I’ll spend Section 1 exploring exactly what it takes for a logic to be paraconsistent. It will emerge that there is considerable open texture to the idea. In Section 2, I’ll give some examples of techniques for (...)
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  • Dialetheism.Francesco Berto, Graham Priest & Zach Weber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2018 (2018).
    A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A, are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or whatever one takes as her favourite truth-bearer: this would make little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false.
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  • End of Inclosure.Jc Beall - 2014 - Mind 123 (491):829-849.
    This paper briefly defends theses in Beall 2014 against objections advanced in Weber et al. 2014. The second part of the paper both defends and fortifies an objection to the ‘inclosure’ argument for glut theory, spelling an end to the inclosure strategy (or at least its application to the sorites).
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