Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Sleeper Agents: The Sense of Agency Over the Dream Body.Melanie G. Rosen - 2021 - Human Studies 44 (4):693-719.
    Although the sense of agency is often reduced if not absent in dreams, our agentive dream experiences can at times be similar to or enhanced compared to waking. The sense of agency displayed in dreams is perplexing as we are mostly shut off from real stimulus whilst asleep. Theories of waking sense of agency, in particular, comparator and holistic models, are analysed in order to argue that despite the isolation from the real environment, these models can help account for dream (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Mind–Body Connection and Causation: Conceptual and Experimental Advances.Pierre Uzan - 2021 - Foundations of Science 26 (4):901-915.
    This article deals with the difficulties of the yet intuitive causal interpretation of the mind–body connection emphasized by metaphysical, theoretical and experimental considerations. It shows that a decisive contribution to determining the nature of this connection can be provided experimentally. This experimental test is designed within the framework of a general systems theory capable of representing the concepts of complementarity and entanglement that are involved in the description of the mind–body connection.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Attention to Action and Awareness of Other Minds.Christopher D. Frith - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):481-487.
    We have only limited awareness of the system by which we control our actions and this limited awareness does not seem to be concerned with the control of action. Awareness of choosing one action rather than another comes after the choice has been made, while awareness of initiating an action occurs before the movement has begun. These temporal differences bind together in consciousness the intention to act and the consequences of the action. This creates our sense of agency. Activity in (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Mental Imagery and the Illusion of Conscious Will.Paulius Rimkevičius - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4581-4600.
    I discuss the suggestion that conscious will is an illusion. I take it to mean that there are no conscious decisions. I understand ‘conscious’ as accessible directly and ‘decision’ as the acquisition of an intention. I take the alternative of direct access to be access by interpreting behaviour. I start with a survey of the evidence in support of this suggestion. I argue that the evidence indicates that we are misled by external behaviour into making false positive and false negative (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Weighing in on Decisions in the Brain: Neural Representations of Pre-Awareness Practical Intention.Robyn Repko Waller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5175-5203.
    Neuroscientists have located brain activity that prepares or encodes action plans before agents are aware of intending to act. On the basis of these findings and broader agency research, activity in these regions has been proposed as the neural realizers of practical intention. My aim in this paper is to evaluate the case for taking these neural states to be neural representations of intention. I draw on work in philosophy of action on the role and nature of practical intentions to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Practical Realism About the Self.Carolyn Dicey Jennings - 2020 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Themes From the Philosophy of Lynne Rudder Baker. Routledge.
    In Explaining Attitudes, Baker argues that we should treat our everyday practices as relevant to metaphysical debates, resulting in a stance of realism with respect to intentional explanations. In this chapter I will argue that if one is going to be a practical realist about anything, it should be the self, or subject of attention. I will use research on attention combined with the stance of practical realism to argue in favor of a substantive self. That is, I will present (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Sense of Agency Disturbances in Movement Disorders: A Comprehensive Review.S. Seghezzi, L. Convertino & L. Zapparoli - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 96:103228.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Sense of Agency for Mental Actions: Insights From a Belief-Based Action-Effect Paradigm.Edmundo Lopez-Sola, Rubén Moreno-Bote & Xerxes D. Arsiwalla - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 96:103225.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Overlooked Ubiquity of First-Person Experience in the Cognitive Sciences.Joana Rigato, Scott M. Rennie & Zachary F. Mainen - 2019 - Synthese 198 (9):8005-8041.
    Science aims to transform the subjectivity of individual observations and ideas into more objective and universal knowledge. Yet if there is any area in which first-person experience holds a particularly special and delicate role, it is the sciences of the mind. According to a widespread view, first-person methods were largely discarded from psychology after the fall of introspectionism a century ago and replaced by more objective behavioral measures, a step that some authors have begun to criticize. To examine whether these (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Nietzsche's Theory of the Will.Brian Leiter - 2007 - Philosophers' Imprint 7:1-15.
    The essay offers a philosophical reconstruction of Nietzsche’s theory of the will, focusing on (1) Nietzsche’s account of the phenomenology of “willing” an action, the experience we have which leads us (causally) to conceive of ourselves as exercising our will; (2) Nietzsche’s arguments that the experiences picked out by the phenomenology are not causally connected to the resulting action (at least not in a way sufficient to underwrite ascriptions of moral responsibility); and (3) Nietzsche’s account of the actual causal genesis (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Brain Imaging Technologies as Source for Extrospection: Self-Formation Through Critical Self-Identification.Ciano Aydin & Bas de Boer - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):729-745.
    Brain imaging technologies are increasingly used to find networks and brain regions that are specific to the functional realization of particular aspects of the self. In this paper, we aim to show how neuroscientific research and techniques could be used in the context of self-formation without treating them as representations of an inner realm. To do so, we show first how a Cartesian framework underlies the interpretation and usage of brain imaging technologies as functional evidence. To illustrate how material-technological inventions (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Doings and Subject Causation.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):255 - 272.
    In the center of this paper is a phenomenological claim: we experience ourselves in our own doings and we experience others when we perceive them in their doings as active in the sense of being a cause of the corresponding physical event. These experiences are fundamental to the way we view ourselves and others. It is therefore desirable for any philosophical theory to be compatible with the content of these experiences and thus to avoid the attribution of radical and permanent (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • The Feeling of Agency Hypothesis: A Critique.Thor Grünbaum - 2015 - Synthese 192 (10):3313-3337.
    A dominant view in contemporary cognitive neuroscience is that low-level, comparator-based mechanisms of motor control produce a distinctive experience often called the feeling of agency . An opposing view is that comparator-based motor control is largely non-conscious and not associated with any particular type of distinctive phenomenology . In this paper, I critically evaluate the nature of the empirical evidence researchers commonly take to support FoA-hypothesis. The aim of this paper is not only to scrutinize the FoA-hypothesis and data supposed (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The Sense of Agency – a Phenomenological Consequence of Enacting Sensorimotor Schemes.Thomas Buhrmann & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):207-236.
    The sensorimotor approach to perception addresses various aspects of perceptual experience, but not the subjectivity of intentional action. Conversely, the problem that current accounts of the sense of agency deal with is primarily one of subjectivity. But the proposed models, based on internal signal comparisons, arguably fail to make the transition from subpersonal computations to personal experience. In this paper we suggest an alternative direction towards explaining the sense of agency by braiding three theoretical strands: a world-involving, dynamical interpretation of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • The Nature of Delusion: An Analysis of the Contemporary Philosophical Debates.Paredes Aline Aurora Maya - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Central Lancashire
    The present thesis surveys different philosophical approaches to the nature of delusions: specifically, their ontology. However, since none of the various theories of the nature of delusions succeeds, I argue that there must be something problematic about the form of the analyses commonly offered. My general conclusion is that one cannot characterize delusions without taking away what it is distinctive about them.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How We Know Our Conscious Minds: Introspective Access to Conscious Thoughts.Keith Frankish - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):145-146.
    Carruthers considers and rejects a mixed position according to which we have interpretative access to unconscious thoughts, but introspective access to conscious ones. I argue that this is too hasty. Given a two-level view of the mind, we can, and should, accept the mixed position, and we can do so without positing additional introspective mechanisms beyond those Carruthers already recognizes.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A teoria nietzschiana da vontade.Brian Leiter - 2017 - Cadernos Nietzsche 38 (3):17-49.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Giving Up on Consciousness as the Ghost in the Machine.Peter W. Halligan & David A. Oakley - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    Consciousness as used here, refers to the private, subjective experience of being aware of our perceptions, thoughts, feelings, actions, memories including the intimate experience of a unified self with the capacity to generate and control actions and psychological contents. This compelling, intuitive consciousness-centric account has, and continues to shape folk and scientific accounts of psychology and human behavior. Over the last 30 years, research from the cognitive neurosciences has challenged this intuitive social construct account when providing a neurocognitive architecture for (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How Do You Know That You Settled a Question?Tillmann Vierkant - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):199-211.
    It is commonly assumed in the philosophical literature that in order to acquire an intention, the agent has to settle a question of what to do in practical deliberation. Carruthers, P. has recently used this to argue that the acquisition of intentions can never be conscious even in cases where the agent asserts having the intention in inner speech. Because of that Carruthers also believes that knowledge of intentions even in first person cases is observational. This paper explores the challenge (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2012 - In Keith Frankish & William Ramsey (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press. pp. 92--111.
    In recent years, the integration of philosophical with scientific theorizing has started to yield new insights. This chapter surveys some recent philosophical and empirical work on the nature and structure of action, on conscious agency, and on our knowledge of actions.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • On the Alleged Illusion of Conscious Will.Marc van Duijn & Sacha Bem - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):699-714.
    The belief that conscious will is merely "an illusion created by the brain" appears to be gaining in popularity among cognitive neuroscientists. Its main adherents usually refer to the classic, but controversial 'Libet-experiments', as the empirical evidence that vindicates this illusion-claim. However, based on recent work that provides other interpretations of the Libet-experiments, we argue that the illusion-claim is not only empirically invalid, but also theoretically incoherent, as it is rooted in a category mistake; namely, the presupposition that neuronal activity (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Precis Of.D. M. Wegner - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Empirical Case Against Infallibilism.T. Parent - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):223-242.
    Philosophers and psychologists generally hold that, in light of the empirical data, a subject lacks infallible access to her own mental states. However, while subjects certainly are fallible in some ways, I show that the data fails to discredit that a subject has infallible access to her own occurrent thoughts and judgments. This is argued, first, by revisiting the empirical studies, and carefully scrutinizing what is shown exactly. Second, I argue that if the data were interpreted to rule out all (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Moral Schemas and Tacit Judgement or How the Defining Issues Test is Supported by Cognitive Science.Darcia Narvaez & Tonia Bock - 2002 - Journal of Moral Education 31 (3):297-314.
    Ideas from cognitive science are increasingly influential and provide insight into the nature of moral judgement. Three core ideas are discussed: modern schema theory, the frequency of automatic decision-making and implicit processes as the default mode of human information processing. The Defining Issues Test (DIT) measures the beginnings of moral understanding, which are largely non-verbal and intuitive, in contrast to the Moral Judgement Interview (MJI), which measures the highest level of verbal understanding. The positive attributes of the DIT and its (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Moral Agency, Conscious Control, and Deliberative Awareness.Maureen Sie - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):516-531.
    Recent empirical research results in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences on the “adaptive unconscious” show that conscious control and deliberative awareness are not all-pervasive aspects of our everyday dealings with one another. Moral philosophers and other scientists have used these insights to put our moral agency to the test. The results of these tests are intriguing: apparently we are not always the moral agents we take ourselves to be. This paper argues in favor of a refinement of our common perception (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Intuition-Driven Navigation of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Krzysztof Sękowski & Wiktor Rorot - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.
    The discussion of the nature of consciousness seems to have stalled, with the “hard problem of consciousness” in its center, well-defined camps of realists and eliminativists at two opposing poles, and little to none room for agreement between. Recent attempts to move this debate forward by shifting them to a meta-level have heavily relied on the notion of “intuition”, understood in a rather liberal way. Against this backdrop, the goal of this paper is twofold. First, we want to highlight how (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Predictive Minds in Ouija Board Sessions.Marc Andersen, Kristoffer L. Nielbo, Uffe Schjoedt, Thies Pfeiffer, Andreas Roepstorff & Jesper Sørensen - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (3):577-588.
    Ouija board sessions are illustrious examples of how subjective feelings of control – the Sense of Agency - can be manipulated in real life settings. We present findings from a field experiment at a paranormal conference, where Ouija enthusiasts were equipped with eye trackers while using the Ouija board. Our results show that participants have a significantly lower probability at visually predicting letters in a Ouija board session compared to a condition in which they are instructed to deliberately spell out (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Simulation and the First-Person. [REVIEW]Peter Carruthers - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):467 - 475.
    This article focuses on, and critiques, Goldman’s view that third-person mind-reading is grounded in first-person introspection. It argues, on the contrary, that first-person awareness of propositional attitude events is always interpretative, resulting from us turning our mind-reading abilities upon ourselves.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Action, Control and Sensations of Acting.Benjamin Mossel - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (2):129-180.
    Sensations of acting and control have been neglected in theory of action. I argue that they form the core of action and are integral and indispensible parts of our actions, participating as they do in feedback loops consisting of our intentions in acting, the bodily movements required for acting and the sensations of acting. These feedback loops underlie all activities in which we engage when we act and generate our control over our movements.The events required for action according to the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • We Are Not All ‘Self‐Blind’: A Defense of a Modest Introspectionism.Georges Rey - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (3):259-285.
    Shoemaker presented a priori arguments against the possibility of ‘self‐blindness’, or the inability of someone, otherwise intelligent and possessed of mental concepts, to introspect any of her concurrent attitude states. Ironically enough, this seems to be a position that Gopnik and Carruthers have proposed as not only possible, but as the actual human condition generally! According to this ‘Objectivist’ view, supposed introspection of one's attitudes is not ‘direct’, but an ‘inference’ of precisely the sort we make about the attitudes of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • A Critical Review of Methodologies and Results in Recent Research on Belief in Free Will.Esthelle Ewusi-Boisvert & Eric Racine - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (1):97-110.
    There might be value in examining the phenomenon of free will, without attempting to solve the debate surrounding its existence. Studies have suggested that diminishing belief in free will increases cheating behavior and that basic physiological states such as appetite diminish free will. These findings, if robust, could have important philosophical and ethical implications. Accordingly, we aimed to critically review methodologies and results in the body of literature that speaks to the two following questions: whether certain factors can change belief (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • No-Report Paradigmatic Ascription of the Minimally Conscious State: Neural Signals as a Communicative Means for Operational Diagnostic Criteria.Hyungrae Noh - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (1):173-189.
    The minimally conscious sta te (MCS) is usually ascribed when a patientwith brain damage exhibits obser vable volitional behaviors that predict recovery ofcognitive funct ions. Nevertheless, a patient with brain damage who lacks motorcapacit y might nonetheless be in MCS. For this reason, some clinicians use neuralsignals as a communicative means for MCS ascription. For instance, a vegetativestate patient is diagnosed with MCS if activity in the motor area is observed whenthe instruction to imagine wiggling toes is given. The validi (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Argumentative Virtues as Conduits for Reason’s Causal Efficacy: Why the Practice of Giving Reasons Requires That We Practice Hearing Reasons.Daniel Cohen - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):711-718.
    Psychological and neuroscientific data suggest that a great deal, perhaps even most, of our reasoning turns out to be rationalizing. The reasons we give for our positions are seldom either the real reasons or the effective causes of why we have those positions. We are not as rational as we like to think. A second, no less disheartening observation is that while we may be very effective when it comes to giving reasons, we are not that good at getting reasons. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Developing the Sense of Agency Rating Scale (SOARS): An Empirical Measure of Agency Disruption in Hypnosis.Vince Polito, Amanda J. Barnier & Erik Z. Woody - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):684-696.
    Two experiments report on the construction of the Sense of Agency Rating Scale (SOARS), a new measure for quantifying alterations to agency. In Experiment 1, 370 participants completed a preliminary version of the scale following hypnosis. Factor analysis revealed two underlying factors: Involuntariness and Effortlessness. In Experiment 2, this two factor structure was confirmed in a sample of 113 low, medium and high hypnotisable participants. The two factors, Involuntariness and Effortlessness, correlated significantly with hypnotisability and pass rates for ideomotor, challenge (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • The BCN Challenge to Compatibilist Free Will and Personal Responsibility.Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters - 2010 - Neuroethics 3 (2):121-133.
    Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Rational Action and Moral Ownership.Vishnu Sridharan - 2014 - Neuroethics 7 (2):195-203.
    In exploring the impact of cognitive science findings on compatibilist theories of moral responsibility such as Fischer and Ravizza’s, most attention has focused on whether agents are, in fact, responsive to reasons. In doing so, however, we have largely ignored our improved understanding of agents’ epistemic access to their reasons for acting. The “ownership” component of Fischer and Ravizza’s theory depends on agents being able to see the causal efficacy of their conscious deliberation. Cognitive science studies make clear that a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Conscious Intending as Self-Programming.Marc Slors - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (1):94-113.
    Despite the fact that there is considerable evidence against the causal efficacy of proximal (short-term) conscious intentions, many studies confirm our commonsensical belief in the efficacy of more distal (longer-term) conscious intentions. In this paper, I address two questions: (i) What, if any, is the difference between the role of consciousness in effective and in non-effective conscious intentions? (ii) How do effective conscious distal intentions interact with unconscious processes in producing actions, and how do non-effective proximal intentions fit into this (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Is Conscious Will an Illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):59 - 70.
    In this essay I critically examine Daniel Wegner’s account of conscious will as an illusion developed in his book The Illusion of Conscious Will. I show that there are unwarranted leaps in his argument, which considerably decrease the empirical plausibility and theoretical adequacy of his account. Moreover, some features essential to our experience of willing, which are related to our general understanding of free will, moral responsibility and human agency, are largely left out in Wegner’s account of conscious will. This (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Is Conscious Will an Illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):58-70.
    In this essay I critically examine Daniel Wegner’s account of conscious will as an illusion developed in his book The Illusion of Conscious Will. I show that there are unwarranted leaps in his argument, which considerably decrease the empirical plausibility and theoretical adequacy of his account. Moreover, some features essential to our experience of willing, which are related to our general understanding of free will, moral responsibility and human agency, are largely left out in Wegner’s account of conscious will. This (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • How Successful is Naturalism?Georg Gasser (ed.) - 2007 - Ontos Verlag.
    The aim of the present volume is to draw the balance of naturalism's success so far.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Questioning the Causal Inheritance Principle.Ivar Hannikainen - 2010 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 25 (3):261-277.
    Mental causation, though a forceful intuition embedded in our commonsense psychology, is difficult to square with the rest of commitments of physicalism about the mind. Advocates of mental causation have found solace in the causal inheritance principle, according to which the mental properties of mental statesshare the causal powers of their physical counterparts. In this paper, I present a variety of counterarguments to causal inheritance and conclude that the conditions for causal inheritance are stricter than what standing versions of said (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Strangers to Ourselves: A Nietzschean Challenge to the Badness of Suffering.Nicolas Delon - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Is suffering really bad? The late Derek Parfit argued that we all have reasons to want to avoid future agony and that suffering is in itself bad both for the one who suffers and impersonally. Nietzsche denied that suffering was intrinsically bad and that its value could even be impersonal. This paper has two aims. It argues against what I call ‘Realism about the Value of Suffering’ by drawing from a broadly Nietzschean debunking of our evaluative attitudes, showing that a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Meditation and the Scope of Mental Action.Michael Brent & Candace Upton - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (1):52-71.
    While philosophers of mind have devoted abundant time and attention to questions of content and consciousness, philosophical questions about the nature and scope of mental action have been relatively neglected. Galen Strawson’s account of mental action, arguably the most well-known extant account, holds that cognitive mental action consists in triggering the delivery of content to one’s field of consciousness. However, Strawson fails to recognize several distinct types of mental action that might not reduce to triggering content delivery. In this paper, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Free Will, Determinism, and Epiphenomenalism.Mark Balaguer - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    This paper provides articulates a non-epiphenomenal, libertarian kind of free will—a kind of free will that’s incompatible with both determinism and epiphenomenalism—and responds to scientific arguments against the existence of this sort of freedom. In other words, the paper argues that we don’t have any good empirical scientific reason to believe that human beings don’t possess a non-epiphenomenal, libertarian sort of free will.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism.Paul M. Churchland - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
  • Feeling of Doing in Obsessive–Compulsive Checking.S. Belayachi & M. Van der Linden - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):534-546.
    Research on self-agency emphasizes the importance of a comparing mechanism, which scans for a match between anticipated and actual outcomes, in the subjective experience of doing.This study explored the “feeling of doing” in individuals with checking symptoms by examining the mechanism involved in the experienced agency for outcomes that matched expectations. This mechanism was explored using a task in which the subliminal priming of potential action-effects generally enhances people’s feeling of causing these effects when they occur, due to the unconscious (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Who is Causing What? The Sense of Agency is Relational and Efferent-Triggered.Kai Engberta, Andreas Wohlschlägera & Patrick Haggard - 2008 - Cognition 107 (2):693-704.
    The sense of agency is a basic feature of our subjective experience. Experimental studies usually focus on either its attributional aspects or on its motoric aspects. Here, we combine both aspects and focus on the subjective experience of the time between action and effect. Previous studies [Haggard, P., Aschersleben, G., Gehrke, J., & Prinz, W.. Action, binding and awareness. In W. Prinz, & B. Hommel, Common mechanisms in perception and action: Attention and performance. Oxford: Oxford University Press] have shown a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • Agency.Markus E. Schlosser - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and 'agency' denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. The philosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and a standard theory of action. The former construes action in terms of intentionality, the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms of causation by the agent’s mental states and events. From this, we obtain a standard conception and a standard theory of agency. There are (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • The Brain in (Willed) Action: A Meta-Analytical Comparison of Imaging Studies on Motor Intentionality and Sense of Agency.Silvia Seghezzi, Eleonora Zirone, Eraldo Paulesu & Laura Zapparoli - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Reduction in the Implicit Sense of Agency During Adolescence Compared to Childhood and Adulthood.Ali Aytemur & Liat Levita - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 87:103060.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark