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Self is Magic

In John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.), Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will. Oup Usa (2008)

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  1. Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Scientific Epiphenomenalism.Alfred R. Mele - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • An Issue for Wegner’s Theory About the Conscious Will: The Readiness Potential Does Not Conclusively Represent Preparation for an Action.Beatriz Sorrentino Marques - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):860.
    O papel da vontade consciente na produção de ações tem recebido bastante atenção tanto da filosofia como da neurociência. Wegner afirma que o que ele chama de vontade consciente não desempenha nenhum papel na produção causal das ações humanas, e que a mesma é apenas uma ilusão. Será argumentado no presente artigo que a afirmação de Wegner está equivocada, porque a sua defesa da suposta ilusão está fundamentada em como ele concebe o que o Potencial de Prontidão representa em um (...)
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  • Making Sense of Self-Deception: Distinguishing Self-Deception From Delusion, Moral Licensing, Cognitive Dissonance and Other Self-Distortions.Elias L. Khalil - 2017 - Philosophy 92 (4):539-563.
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  • Mistaking Randomness for Free Will.Jeffrey P. Ebert & Daniel M. Wegner - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):965-971.
    Belief in free will is widespread. The present research considered one reason why people may believe that actions are freely chosen rather than determined: they attribute randomness in behavior to free will. Experiment 1 found that participants who were prompted to perform a random sequence of actions experienced their behavior as more freely chosen than those who were prompted to perform a deterministic sequence. Likewise, Experiment 2 found that, all else equal, the behavior of animated agents was perceived to be (...)
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  • Testing Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2010 - Neuroethics 3 (2):161-172.
    This article describes three experiments that would advance our understanding of the import of data already generated by scientific work on free will and related issues. All three can be conducted with existing technology. The first concerns how reliable a predictor of behavior a certain segment of type I and type II RPs is. The second focuses on the timing of conscious experiences in Libet-style studies. The third concerns the effectiveness of conscious implementation intentions. The discussion of first two experiments (...)
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  • Perception of Free Will: The Perspective of Incarcerated Adolescent and Adult Offenders. [REVIEW]Kimberly R. Laurene, Richard F. Rakos, Marie S. Tisak, Allyson L. Robichaud & Michael Horvath - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):723-740.
    The existence of free will has been both an enduring presumption of Western culture and a subject for debate across disciplines for millennia. However, little empirical evidence exists to support the almost unquestioned assumption that, in general, Westerners endorse the existence of free will. The few studies that measure belief in free will have methodological problems that likely resulted in underestimating the true extent of belief. Recently, Rakos et al. (Behavior and Social Issues 17:20–39, 2008 ) found a stronger endorsement (...)
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  • Unconscious Decisions and Free Will.Alfred Mele - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):777-789.
    It is sometimes claimed that certain experiments show that free will is an illusion by showing that all decisions are made unconsciously. I have argued elsewhere that these experiments do not show that any decisions are made unconsciously. But suppose I am wrong about that. Even then, I argue, these experiments do not pose a serious threat to free will. First, one is not warranted in generalizing from findings about the decisions allegedly made in these experiments to the claim that (...)
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