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How tarskian is Frege?

Mind 117 (466):427-450 (2008)

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  1. Frege’s ‘On the Foundations of Geometry’ and Axiomatic Metatheory.Günther Eder - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):5-40.
    In a series of articles dating from 1903 to 1906, Frege criticizes Hilbert’s methodology of proving the independence and consistency of various fragments of Euclidean geometry in his Foundations of Geometry. In the final part of the last article, Frege makes his own proposal as to how the independence of genuine axioms should be proved. Frege contends that independence proofs require the development of a ‘new science’ with its own basic truths. This paper aims to provide a reconstruction of this (...)
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  • Husserl and the Problem of Abstract Objects.George Duke & Peter Woelert - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):27-47.
    One major difficulty confronting attempts to clarify the epistemological and ontological status of abstract objects is determining the sense, if any, in which such entities may be characterised as mind and language independent. Our contention is that the tolerant reductionist position of Michael Dummett can be strengthened by drawing on Husserl's mature account of the constitution of ideal objects and mathematical objectivity. According to the Husserlian position we advocate, abstract singular terms pick out weakly mind-independent sedimented meaning-contents. These meaning-contents serve (...)
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  • Does Frege Have a Metalinguistic Truth-Predicate in Begriffsschrift?Junyeol Kim - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):191-203.
    In the explanations of logical laws and inference rules of the mature version of Begriffsschrift in Grundgesetze, Frege uses the predicate “… is the True.” Scholars like Greimann maintain that this predicate is a metalinguistic truth-predicate for Frege. This paper examines an argument for this claim that is based on the “nominal reading” of Frege’s conception of sentences—the claim that for Frege a sentence “p” is equivalent to a nonsentential phrase like “the truth-value of the thought that p.” In particular, (...)
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