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  1. Die Natur der Farben.Fabian Dorsch - 2009 - De Gruyter.
    Farben sind für uns sowohl objektive, als auch phänomenale Eigenschaften. In seinem Buch argumentiert Fabian Dorsch, daß keine ontologische Theorie der Farben diesen beiden Seiten unseres Farbbegriffes gerecht werden k ann. Statt dessen sollten wir akzeptieren, daß letzterer sich auf zwei verschiedene Arten von Eigenschaften bezieht: die repräsentierten Reflektanzeigenschaften von Gegenständen und die qualitativen Eigenschaften unserer Farbwahrnehmungen, die als sinnliche Gegebenheitsweisen ersterer fungieren. Die Natur der Farben gibt einen detaillierten Überblick über die zeitgenössischen philosophischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Theorien der Farben und (...)
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  • Wittgenstein as a Commentator on the Psychology and Anthropology of Colour.Martin Kusch - 2014 - In Stefan Riegelnik & Frederik A. Gierlinger (eds.), Wittgenstein on Colour. De Gruyter. pp. 93-108.
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  • Revelation and the Nature of Colour.Keith Allen - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (2):153-176.
    According to naïve realist (or primitivist) theories of colour, colours are sui generis mind-independent properties. The question that I consider in this paper is the relationship of naïve realism to what Mark Johnston calls Revelation, the thesis that the essential nature of colour is fully revealed in a standard visual experience. In the first part of the paper, I argue that if naïve realism is true, then Revelation is false. In the second part of the paper, I defend naïve realism (...)
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  • What’s That Smell?Clare Batty - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):321-348.
    In philosophical discussions of the secondary qualities, color has taken center stage. Smells, tastes, sounds, and feels have been treated, by and large, as mere accessories to colors. We are, as it is said, visual creatures. This, at least, has been the working assumption in the philosophy of perception and in those metaphysical discussions about the nature of the secondary qualities. The result has been a scarcity of work on the “other” secondary qualities. In this paper, I take smells and (...)
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  • Why Colour Primitivism?Hagit Benbaji - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):243-265.
    Primitivism is the view that colors are sui generis properties of physical objects. The basic insight underlying primitivism is that colours are as we see them, i.e. they are categorical properties of physical objects—simple, monadic, constant, etc.—just like shapes. As such, they determine the content of colour experience. Accepting the premise that colours are sui generis properties of physical objects, this paper seeks to show that ascribing primitive properties to objects is, ipso facto, ascribing to objects irreducible dispositions to look (...)
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  • Novel Colours and the Content of Experience.Fiona Macpherson - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):43-66.
    I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore that one cannot fully explain the nature of (...)
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  • Confusing Structure and Function.Kenneth M. Steele - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):52-53.
  • Ecological Subjectivism?Christine A. Skarda - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):51-52.
  • What in the World Determines the Structure of Color Space?Roger N. Shepard - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):50-51.
  • Areas of Ignorance and Confusion in Color Science.Adam Reeves - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):49-50.
  • On Perceived Colors.Christa Neumeyer - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):49-49.
  • Colors Really Are Only in the Head.James A. McGilvray - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):48-49.
  • On Possible Perceptual Worlds and How They Shape Their Environments.Rainer J. Mausfeld, Reinhard M. Niederée & K. Dieter Heyer - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):47-48.
  • Color Vision: Content Versus Experience.Mohan Matthen - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):46-47.
  • A Mathematical Framework for Biological Color Vision.Laurence T. Maloney - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):45-46.
  • In Search of Common Features of Animals' Color Vision Systems and the Constraints of Environment.Erhard Maier & Dietrich Burkhardt - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):44-45.
  • Ontogeny and Ontology: Ontophyletics and Enactive Focal Vision.Barry Lia - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):43-44.
  • Objectivism-Subjectivim: A False Dilemma?Joseph Levine - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):42-43.
  • Ethological and Ecological Aspects of Color Vision.Sergei L. Kondrashev - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):42-42.
  • Color Enactivism: A Return to Kant?Paul R. Kinnear - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):41-41.
  • Data and Interpretation in Comparative Color Vision.Gerald H. Jacobs - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):40-41.
  • The View of a Computational Animal.Anya Hurlbert - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):39-40.
  • Comparative Color Vision and the Objectivity of Color.David Hilbert - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):38-39.
  • Color for Pigeons and Philosophers.C. L. Hardin - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):37-38.
  • Multivariant Color Vision.Peter Gouras - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):37-37.
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  • Psychophysical Modeling: The Link Between Objectivism and Subjectivism.Marcia A. Finkelstein - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):36-37.
  • Enactivist vision.Jerome A. Feldman - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):35-36.
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  • Hitting the Nail on the Head.Daniel C. Dennett - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):35-35.
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  • What is a Colour Space?Jules Davidoff - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):34-35.
  • Color is as Color Does.James L. Dannemiller - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):33-34.
  • Reductionism and Subjectivism Defined and Defended.Austen Clark - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):32-33.
  • Nonreductionism, Content and Evolutionary Explanation.Justin Broackes - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):31-32.
  • Problems with Explaining the Perceptual Environment.Aaron Ben-Ze'ev - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):30-31.
  • Conclusions From Color Vision of Insects.Werner Backhaus & Randolf Menzel - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):28-30.
  • A Limited Objectivism Defended.Edward Wilson Averill - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):27-28.
  • More Than Mere Coloring: The Art of Spectral Vision.Kathleen A. Akins & John Lamping - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):26-27.
  • On the Ways to Color.Evan Thompson, Adrian Palacios & Francisco J. Varela - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):56-74.
  • Ways of Coloring the Ecological Approach.Johan Wagemans & Charles M. M. de Weert - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):54-56.
  • The Ethnocentricity of Colour.J. van Brakel - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):53-54.
  • Wavelength Processing and Colour Experience.Petra Stoerig & Alan Cowey - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):53-53.
  • Inter-Species Variation in Colour Perception.Keith Allen - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):197 - 220.
    Inter-species variation in colour perception poses a serious problem for the view that colours are mind-independent properties. Given that colour perception varies so drastically across species, which species perceives colours as they really are? In this paper, I argue that all do. Specifically, I argue that members of different species perceive properties that are determinates of different, mutually compatible, determinables. This is an instance of a general selectionist strategy for dealing with cases of perceptual variation. According to selectionist views, objects (...)
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  • Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character.Fiona Macpherson - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Stirling
    This thesis is an examination and critique of naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. Phenomenal character refers to the distinctive quality that perceptual and sensational experiences seem to have; it is identified with 'what it is like' to undergo experiences. The central claims of representationalism are that phenomenal character is identical with the content of experience and that all representational states, bearing appropriate relations to the cognitive system, are conscious experiences. These claims are taken to explain both how conscious experiential (...)
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  • The Indeterminacy of Color Vision.Richard Montgomery - 1996 - Synthese 106 (2):167-203.
    A critical survey of recent work on the ontological status of colors supports the conclusion that, while some accounts of color can plausibly be dismissed, no single account can yet be endorsed. Among the remaining options are certain forms of color realism according which familiar colors are instantiated by objects in our extra-cranial visual environment. Also still an option is color anti-realism, the view that familiar colors are, at best, biologically adaptive fictions, instantiated nowhere.I argue that there is simply no (...)
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  • Ways of Coloring.Evan Thompson, A. Palacios & F. J. Varela - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):1-26.
    Different explanations of color vision favor different philosophical positions: Computational vision is more compatible with objectivism (the color is in the object), psychophysics and neurophysiology with subjectivism (the color is in the head). Comparative research suggests that an explanation of color must be both experientialist (unlike objectivism) and ecological (unlike subjectivism). Computational vision's emphasis on optimally prespecified features of the environment (i.e., distal properties, independent of the sensory-motor capacities of the animal) is unsatisfactory. Conceiving of visual perception instead as the (...)
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  • Color Constancy, Complexity, and Counterfactual.Joshua Gert - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):669-690.
  • Afterimages and Sensation.Ian Phillips - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):417-453.
  • Necessity and Language: The Gap is Still Very Real.Javier Kalhat - 2008 - Philosophical Investigations 31 (3):227–236.
    In my previous paper "Has the later Wittgenstein accounted for necessity?" I argued against the conventionalist account of necessity proposed by Wittgenstein and his followers. Glock has addressed some of my objections in his paper "Necessity and Language: In Defence of Conventionalism". This brief rejoinder considers Glock's replies to three of those objections. In the course of doing so, I revisit Wittgenstein's explanation of the special status of necessary propositions, the supposedly arbitrary nature of colour-grammatical propositions, and the relation between (...)
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