- Routledge Handbook of Disagreement.Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.details
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Permissive Divergence.Simon Graf - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):240-255.details
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Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.details
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Deference and Uniqueness.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):709-732.details
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Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (1):1-24.details
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Attitudes, Conditional and General.Daniel Drucker - forthcoming - Linguistics and Philosophy.details
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You just believe that because….Roger White - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.details
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Disagreement.Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Thought Experiments and Intuitions.Manhal Hamdo - 2023 - Springer Verlag.details
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Epistemic authority: preemption through source sensitive defeat.Jan Constantin & Thomas Grundmann - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):4109-4130.details
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Inferentialism, degrees of commitment, and ampliative reasoning.Jesús Zamora Bonilla, Xavier de Donato Rodríguez & Javier González de Prado Salas - 2017 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 4):909-927.details
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Do great minds really think alike?Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3).details
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Who’s Afraid of Disagreement about Disagreement?Ruth Weintraub - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):346-360.details
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Continuing on.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):670-691.details
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Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1369-1386.details
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Belief gambles in epistemic decision theory.Mattias Skipper - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):407-426.details
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Epistemic Peerhood and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Robert Mark Simpson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):561-577.details
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Kuhn’s two accounts of rational disagreement in science: an interpretation and critique.Markus Seidel - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 25):6023-6051.details
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Dynamic permissivism.Abelard Podgorski - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1923-1939.details
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Knowledge and the permissibility of action.N. Ángel Pinillos - 2019 - Synthese 196 (5):2021-2043.details
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How we know what we intend.Sarah K. Paul - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346.details
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Six Problems in Pure Inductive Logic.J. B. Paris & A. Vencovská - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (4):731-747.details
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Disagreement.Graham Oppy - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (1-3):183-199.details
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Two skeptical arguments or only one?Kevin McCain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):289-300.details
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Catherine Elgin on peerhood and the epistemic benefits of disagreement.Kirk Lougheed - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3183-3202.details
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Mentalist evidentialism vindicated (and a super-blooper epistemic design problem for proper function justification).Todd R. Long - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):251-266.details
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The trouble with having standards.Han Li - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1225-1245.details
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Conciliating to Avoid Moral Scepticism.Nick Küspert - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):279-300.details
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Following the argument where it leads.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):105-124.details
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Fact-Dependent Policy Disagreements and Political Legitimacy.Klemens Kappel - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):313-331.details
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Conservatism and Uniqueness.Jaemin Jung - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2233-2248.details
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A patchwork epistemology of disagreement?Yoaav Isaacs - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1873-1885.details
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Uniqueness, Rationality, and the Norm of Belief.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):57-75.details
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Permissivism, Margin-for-Error, and Dominance.John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):515-532.details
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Partiality and prejudice in trusting.Katherine Hawley - 2014 - Synthese 191 (9).details
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Basing for the Bayesian.Cameron Gibbs - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3815-3840.details
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A subjectivist’s guide to deterministic chance.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Synthese 198 (5):4339-4372.details
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Doxastic permissiveness and the promise of truth.J. Drake - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4897-4912.details
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Why Only Externalists Can Be Steadfast.Jeroen de Ridder - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):185-199.details
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Conciliation and Self-incrimination.Jason Decker - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):1099-1134.details
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Epistemic Uniqueness and the Practical Relevance of Epistemic Practices.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1721-1733.details
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Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1213-1223.details
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The explanatory role of consistency requirements.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4551-4569.details
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The imprecise impermissivist’s dilemma.Clinton Castro & Casey Hart - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1623-1640.details
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Varieties of cognitive achievement.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1603-1623.details
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Center Indifference and Skepticism.David Builes - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.details
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Bayesianism and self-doubt.Darren Bradley - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2225-2243.details
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Gupta’s gambit.Selim Berker - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):17-39.details
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Knockdown Arguments.Nathan Ballantyne - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):525-543.details
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